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PREFACE 
This thesis on South African foreign policy in Africa 
(covering the period from Union to early 1972) is 
submitted to University of Cape Town for the degree 
of Master of Arts. It has not been submitted elsewhere 
and I am fully responsible for the contents, though I would 
like to thank those who have given me advice and help 
especially on the presentation. They include my supervisor 
Dr. David Welsh, James Mayall (of the London School of 
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South African foreign policy in Africa is a study in frustration. 
Only rarely were the more ambitious objectives accorded policy 
towards Africa realised. Despite the hopes written into the Union's 
constitution of a considerable expansion of territory, the boundaries 
of South Africa to-day are the same as those of 1910, with the de facto 
but disputed addition of South West Africa. Further, the country has 
undergone a marked decline in status since the Nationalist Party 
1 
came to power in 1948. In 1948 11South Africa was held in high 
esteem as a senior member of the British Commonweaith, a bastion 
of western capitalism, and the most advanced economic region in 
2 
Africa". 
To-day "she is ............ a byword among nations for bigotry, 
" 3 intolerance, and despotic rule. Her racial policies are the 
subject of frequent and repeated attack and condemnation at the United 
Nations; an.:,organisation, ironically, whose charter a former South 
African Prime Minister (Smuts) helped tp draft. At almost every 
level of international relations, South Africa has been ostracized by 
the world community. 
In these circumstances, South African foreign polic'y has, not surprisingly, 
been characterized as essentially defensJye and reactive 
4
, 
notwithstanding the modest success of the new outward-looking policy 
towards Africa. But while survival in an alien milieu of South Africa's 
5 
pigmentocracy may be seen to-day both as the prime determinant 
and the highest priority of South African foreign policy 
6
, her policy 
towards Africa has not always been so narrowly - or defensively -
conceived by successive South African governmend'.. Indeed one of the 
drawbacks of casting South African policy towards Africa in a single 
conceptual framework is the difficulty of incorporating in any one model 
the radical shift that has taken place both in the priorities of South 




In the period from Union until the end of the Second World War, South 
African foreign policy was prompted less by the fear of submergence 
than a desire to expand South Africa's territory in Africa and enhance 
South African influence internationally. 
The principal proponent of South African expansionism or imperialism 
during this era was Smuts, who in and out of government dominated 
the formulation of South African foreign policy objectives. Even 
during the battle of the Boer Republics for survival against British 
Imperialism at the turn of the century Smuts felt able to spell out 
expansionist ambitions of his own - ending his denunciation of British 
perfidy in The Century of Wrong with the words: "Then from the 
Zambesi to Simon's Bay it will be - Africa for the AfricandeJ {sic). 118 
J. A. Hobson writing on British imperialism at the turn of the century 
perceptively detected the roots of an indigenous imperialism in South 
Africa cutting across the divisions between the two white communities: 
11 •••••••• men at the Cape, in the Transvaal and in 
Rhodesia, British or Dutch, have fostered a South African 
imperialism, not opposed to British imperialism, willing 
when necessary to utilize it, but independent of it in 
ultimate aims and purposes. This was the policy of 
'colonialism' which Mr. Rhodes espoused so vehemently in 
his earlier political career, seeking the control of 
Bechuanaland and the North for the Cape Colony and not 
directly for the Empire. This has been right through the 
policy of an active section of the Africander {sic) Bond, 
developing 019 a large scale the original 1trek1 habit of 
the Dutch. 11 
Hobson concluded: 
11A South African federation of self-governing states will 
demand a political career of its own and will insist on its 
own brand of empire, not that of the British govr0nment, 
in control of the lower races in South Africa. 11 
For Smutshhe achievement of Union, the grant of full domestic self-
government to South Africa's white communities on their terms, 
offered South Africa the opportunity to expand her influence and 
• 
3. 
power under the protective umbrella of the British Empire, which he saw 
as guaranteeing the new state against the imperialist ambitions of other 
European powers in Africa, particularly Germany. Under Botha' s 
premiership during the first decade of the Union's existence Smuts 
enthusiastically purused a policy of reconciliation between the two white 
communities, as the es.sential basis of South African expansion. 
Conversely, he believed that expansion itself would promote white unity 
domestically and during the First World War argued forcibly against 
the retrocession of German South West Africa on the grounds that it 
would give Afrikaner nationalism a powerful boost. 11 During the 19201 s 
Smuts 1 com.mitment to political co-operation between the two white 
£. communities led him to resist strong domestic pressures to unite 
Afrikanerdom in a single party and his South African Party fused in 1921 
not with the Nationalists but with predominantly English-speaking Unionist 
12 
Party. 
But South African expansionism was not simply the creation of Smuts. 
Powerful economic forces - the search for cheap African labour to meet 
industry's increasing needs and for land to provide new areas of 
settlement for rurally impoverished Afrikaners - promoted expansion. 
However, there were also counter-pressures. Afrikaner nationalists 
opposed expansion where it involved the incorporation of non-Afr:ikaner 
white settlers who might impede their drive for supremacy in South 
Africa. They argued too that Smuts failed to put South African interests 
first in his subservience to the wider interests of the British Empire 
and feared the submergence of the Afrikaner nation urrler the impact of 
increased white immigration, which by contrast Smuts saw as the 
natural accompaniment of South African expansion . Indeed, Smuts 1 
imperialist ambitions prompted Dr. Malan to comment: "There sits 
Rhodes redivivus. 11 
13 
Nevertheless, in the end, external factors provided the main obstacles 
to South African expansion. In the 1920's German settlers in South West 
4. 
Africa resisted full incorporatioh into the Union because of fears of 
submergence by poor white Afrikaner immigrants 
14
. For the same 
reason and because they feared the drawing away of their Afrikaner 
labour supply to the Rand, Southern· Rhodesia's predominantly English-
speaking settlers opted in a referendum in October 1922 for responsible 
self-government despite the generous terms offered by Smuts for 
. . . h U . lS Af . . incorporation into t e nion rican resistance prompting Britain's 
firm adherence to guarantees protecting African land rights provided the 
major obstacl'e to South Africa's incorporation of the High Commission 
territories, an objective of successive South African governments until 
16 
the 19601s. The Portuguese state, weak and bankrupt at the turn 
of the century was able, thanks in part to its alliance with Britain during 
the First World War, to resist successfully Union encroachment on 
Mozambique during the first decade of Union when Portuguese East Africa 
was arguably the main target of Smuts 1 and Botha' s imperialist ambitions. 
17 
Despite these early disappointments, Smuts 1 "vision of a South Africa made 
greater than itself by the enlarged field of action which membership of the 
Commonwealth made possible1118 remained undimmed. In November 
1929 he set out his thoughts on the future of Africa in a series of lectures 
appropriately in memory of Cecil John Rhodes: 
11 I have tried to show that the claim of the natives to 
civilization, no less than the claim of the world to the 
vigorous development of these valuable tropical lands, 
calls for a great colol'l
1
izing effort on the part of Great 
Britain. The building up of a strong white community 
to hold and develop the healthy high lands which stretch 
from Rhodesia to Kenya would be a magnificent response 
to this call. Now that Great Britain holds these 
territories from North to South in one unbroken chain, 
she has an opportunity greater even than Rhodes dreamt 
of, to carry out her historic mission and establish in the 
heart of the African continent and as a bulwark of its 
5. 
future civilization another great European community. 
To me it seems the next critical step in the evolution 
of our Commonwealth of Nations. These fragments 
of Crown Colonies should be put in the way of becoming 
in time another important self-governing unit of the 
Empire. There are here the makings of something 
of far-reaching importance for Africa, for the Empir.e, 
and for the world. But a definite forward policy is 
wanted which will eventually lead to this consummJtj..Qn 
The future only can show whether this new g'roup ~ill ··r 
be linked with the Union in the south or whether it 
will follow lines of its own in a new northern 
constellation. What is urgently wanted is the settlement 
of a white population, able and competent to undertake 
the task of development, and finally to conquer and hold 
this continent for European civilization". 19 
In effect, Smuts had modified his original objectives of direct South African 
expansion through British Africa to the hope that the Union could act as 
a go-between for Britain in Africa. Initially, he proposed the organization 
of an annual conference of British African states held under the Union's 
auspices. 
20 
He returned to this theme during the Second World War 
proposing: "a grouping of the overseas dependencies in units large and 
strong enough to mana>ge their own affairs without control from Lonrlon 
but rather in close association with neighbouring dominions. 11 
21 
· 
His proposals were designed: 
"to make South Africa not merely secure within her own 
borders but also the leading power in Africa from the 
Zambesi to the Sudan. In effect, he was proposing a 
loosening, if not the complete elimination, of the imperial 
factor and a corresponding extension of South African 
influence. 11 22 
Finally in 1945 Smuts summed his principal objectives in 
Africa in the following terms: "The whole of my 
striving has been to ensure the knitting together of the 
parts of Africa, the parts of Southern Africa which belong 
to each other; p"'.rts that must work together for a stable 
future on the continent of Africa. 11 23 
6. 
Smuts' hopes for an extension of South African power on the continent 
were dashed in the aftermath of the Second World War and despite his 
prestige as an international statesman the beginnings of South Africa's 
post-war decline in status were discernible in the last years of his 
premiership. By the time the Nationalists came to power in 1948, 
while lip-service continued to be paid in South Africa to Pan-African 
co..:operation, the pressures of decolonization had already begun to 
force a re-casting of South Afr1ca 1s objectives on the continent in far 
less romantic terms. Occasionally, to-day, the grander visions of the 
past are re-echoed by South African politicians. For example, in an 
election speech in 1970, the Minister of Immigration (Dr. C. Mulder) 
spoke of the day when Africa would rule and dominate the world and 
concluded: "when that day comes, the few whites of South Africa will 
24 
play a role out of all proportion to their numbers and wealth. 11 
However, at the policy-making level, the South African government to-day 
has no such illusions in its quest for acceptance in what is still a 
predominantly hostile continental environment. 
What principally necessitated the re,.; casting of South African foreign 
policy in far narrower, far more modest 1erms was a radical transform-
ation of the international system. The world of 1910 when the Union came 
into being had been dominated by Europe. Two world wars shattered 
European supremacy bringing to an end the system upon which South 
African internationalist hopes had been based. 
"For.Smuts with his feet in Africa, the focus in international relations 
25 
was ........ upon Europe. 11 But more than simply Smuts' 
perspective on the world was at stake. The demise of Europe's dominant 
role in the world potentially threatened South Africa's whole domestic 
way of life.' 
"(The) dominant white minority, whether it supports 
the apartheid policies of the Nationalist Party or the 
alternative white leadership policies of the United 
Party, seeks to preserve a quasi-colonial system 
when colonialism has been execrated by the rest of 
the world. 11 26 
7. 
Pursuing this line of argument, Colin De B. Webb argues that for South 
Africa: 
11 the decisive theatre of war ..•..... was not Europe, 
but the Far East. For it was there, with the Japanese 
attack on South-east Asia, that the first of the death-
blows was struck at that world of European political 
ascendancy in which the South African system had had 
its appropriate place. " 2 7 
But what made a more immediate impact on South _African policy-makers 
forcing the abandonment of the assumptions upon which Smuts had 
formulated the country's foreign policy was th-e decline of Britain as 
a great power in the post-war period and her consequent withdrawal 
from empire under the impact of Asian and African nationalism. 
It was a process that shocked the Nationalists quite as much as those 
who cherished South Africa's British connection even though Nationalists 
by no means shared Smuts 1 assumptions or pre-occupations. Indeed, 
there is fitting irony in the fact that Dr. Malan once Prime Minister 
sought to use South Africa's position in the Commonwealth to halt the 
final retreat of British imperialism from Africa. 
28 
The doctrine that provided the ideological basis for Europ} 1s shedding 
of imperial responsibilities was the principle of self-determination. 
Associated with this doctrine was the principle that international relations 
should be based upon the recognition of the equality of independent 
sovereign states. The first of these principles (self-determination) 
has also provided the principal ideological basis for attacks on South 
African policies at the United Nations and in the world community 
generally (notwithstanding the sharp divergence of actual practice from 
the princj.ples of the new international order throughout the world), 
while South Africa has attempted to invoke the second principle to prevent 
intrusion into her domestic affairs. What has especially exacerbated 
South Africa's conflict with the world community has been the fact that 
the direction of her domestic policy has been widely perceived as running 
8. 
counter to the spirit of the international system as constituted after 
29 
the Second World War. 
In order to take account of the radical change in South Africa's inter-
national and continental environment, I have divided this thesis under 
two headings; policy towards colonial Africa {broadly, the period 
1910 - 1959} and secondly, policy towards independent Africa {1960 - ). 
The division is by no means an absolute one. South Africa first 
began to feel the pressures of decolonization soon after the end of the 
Second World War. These took a variety of forms; for example, 
India's attacks on South Africa's racial policy and the United Nations' 
refusal to countenance the incorporation of South West Africa into 
the Union. They were echoed internally by growing militancy on the 
part of the African National Congress in the 19 50 1s. Similarly after 
1960, by which time most of the countries of Africa had achieved 
independence, the remnants of colonialism remained important to 
South African foreign policy. Firstly, the continuing existence of the 
Portuguese empire has carried the colonial order into the 19701 s. 
Secondly, the former colonial powers have continued to exercise 
considerable influence on their ex-colonies. In particular, France's 
nee-colonial hold on many of her former colonies has assumed 
special importance in the context of South African initiatives towards 
francophone Africa. 
These considerations aside, the transformation from colonial Africa 
to independent Africa remains of critical importance to any consider-
ation of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. Whereas in Smuts' 
era South African governments had looked to Africa in the context 
of easing domestic pressures for land and labour, the interaction 
between dom'estic and foreign policy was reversed in the post-war 
period, as the South African government discovered that the widely 
accepted categorization of its racial policies as those of a colonial 
30 
power provided a major stumbling block to the development of 
normal relations with the new states of Asia and Africa. The point 
has not been lost on writers sympathetic to South African policy. 
9. 
The following is typical: 11 The biggest obstacle" (to the development 
of relations with Africa" was the violently emotional anti-colonial 
spirit and the fact that South Africa was regarded as a colonialist 
power" 
31 
Domestically, South Africa's deteriorating international position 
contributed to a revision of the ideological framework of South Africa's 
racial policies and at the theoretical level the sketching out of a 
programme of domestic decolonization. The Bantustan programme 
was also of course the product of domestic forces, particularly 
growing militancy on the part of African nationalists leading up to the 
massacre at Sharpeville. The mas sac re further illustrates the 
close inter-relation between domestic and foreign policy, for its 
international repercussions while not forcing a radical change of 
direction in South African policy made steps towards the implementation 
of the Bantustan programme necessary to a normalization of South 
Africa's relations with the West. Nonetheless, the attempt to 
implement separate development in the face of international pressure 
was not without its difficulties for, in general, world opinion remained 
highly sceptical of Verwoerd's ideological reconstruction of apartheid 
as incorporating the principle of self-determination. It was widely 
appreciated that the Bantus tan programme as Ve rwoerd envisaged it 
did not represent a radical devolution of power to South Africa's 
African population. 
However, the past Transkei development
32 
of friendly relations 
with the former High Commission territories and Malawi on a pragmatic 
basis has eased pressure on South Africa, at least from the West, t0 
provide evidence that the creation of Bantustan1$ represents any 
substantial reform. Indeed, the South African foreign minister 
(Dr. Muller) has argued that the West is more likely to judge South 
Africa on her ability to come to terms with Africa and, in particular, 
10. 
her neighbours than on her internal policy. 
"As the West becomes aware of our fruitful co-
operation with other African states, their attitude 
towards us improves. I believe that it will happen 
to an increasing degree because we must simply 
accept that our relations with the rest of the world 
is largely determined by our relations with the 
African states. In this connection we are giving 
the world considerable food for thought." 33 
The process of South Africa's coming to terms with decolonization on 
the continent was a slow one. With the benefit of hindsight, Rhoodie 
and Venter argue that it began shortly after the Second World War when 
11 the previous detached approach to external affairs had •.•.. to make 
' 34 
way for a re-appraisal of structure of the African continent." 
Strydom made a similar claim in 1956: 11 after the Second World War 
we suddenly realized that 160, 000, 000 or more non-Europeans of 
35 
Africa, who through the ages have slept, have awakened." 
However, his hopes that 11 through correct guidance and management 
we can preserve the good relationship between one another (Europeans 
36 
and Natives) " was not matched by much understanding of the 
currents of African or world opinion, as his open characterization of 
South African policy as white baas skap or domination showed. 
Verwoerd was the first Prime Minister to realize the need to give South 
Africa's racial policy a more up to date ideological gloss, as was 
apparent in his 1959 speeches. "We must ensure that the outside world 
realizes and that the Bantu realizes that a new period is dawning, a 
period in which the white man is leading him through the first stage 
towards full development" • . . and . . . 11 We want to build up a South 
Africa in which the Bantu and the white man can live next to one 
another as good neighbours and not as people who are continually 
37 
quarrelling over supremacy. 11 
It would be wrong though to exaggerate the significance of Verwoerd1 s 
acceptance of decolonization in theory. In practice, South Africa's 
11. 
response to decolonization was one of shock and opposition and the 
colonial powers were constantly berated by South African politicians 
for 'scuttling' out of Africa. In this context Verwoerd himself was 
hardly less critical than Malan or Strydom. 
11 ! see as a result of his (Macmillan's) policy 
the white man disappearing from Kenya, in the 
course of time being submerged . . . . . . I fear for 
the position in the Central African Federation ..• 
the policy that Britain is following in Africa does 
not do justice to the white man, and ultimately 
will not be best for the black man either." 38 
Despite the striking contrast between South Africa's international position 
since 1948 and her posture during Smuts' heyday, a degree of continuity 
in the development of the international system as it affected South Africa 
can be discerned. The post-war transfer of power from Europe to the 
new states of Africa and Asia mirrored an earlier devolution of power 
from Europe dating back to the end of the 19th century, though as far as 
most of Africa was concerned, the period marked an expansion of European 
influence. The formation of the Union of South Africa was itself part of 
the earlier process of devolution (as was the grant of powers of internal 
self-government to Canada and Australia}. European domination of the 
international system was further weakened by the First World War. 
In particular, in the aftermath the United States emerged as a power 
able to challenge the supremacy of Europe. The consequences for South 
Africa of the relative decline in Europe's importance and power were 
mixed. 
On the one hand it gave rise to the doctrine of the equality of British 
dominions. South Africa's consequent enhanced status was reflected 
in her separate representation at the VersailL~s Peace Conference in 
1919 and in the creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1926; 
changes very much welcomed by Afrikaner nationalists who were especially 
12. 
eager to see the few remaining imperial restraints on South Africa 
lifted. In particular, they were determined that South Africa should 
have the right to remain neutral in any future war involving Britain. 
It was a right the Union obtained with the pas sage of the Statute of 
W estminister in 1931. (Nationalist resentment of British imperial 
power was a recurring theme of South African domestic politics. 
Hence, Macmillan's famous characterization of the Afrikaners in his 
1960 speech as the continent's first nationalists.) 
On the other hand, the change in the balance of world power had some 
less agreeable consequences for the South African government. 
President Wilson's championing of the principle of self-determination 
at the Versailles Peace Conference had the practical result that South 
Africa was unable to incorporate South West Afrca as a fifth province. 
The application of the principle to white people overseas was generally 
accepted and welcomed by White South Africans, but its application to 
the indigenous peoples of Africa was considered another matter entirely. 
Smuts summed up white South African attitudes in declaring that the 
indigenous peoples were "barbarians, to whom it would be 
impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the 
39 
European sense." For South Africa, the mandate over South 
West Africa was a warning of the possible long~term consequences of 
T<"c"" 
Europe's decline, though in the short term that decline appeared to 
enhance South African prospects of expansion on the continent. 
Nevertheless, there were those who full recognized that the United 
States President's insistence that South Africa accept a measure of 
international control over South West Africa might open the way to the 
focussing of international attention on the Union's racial policy, that 
in short, "the mandatory theory 
40 
of future trouble. '' 
may easily con,!p:for:the gems 
13. 
In practice, though South Africa could not be faulted on the fulfilment 
of the technical aspects of the mandate, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission became increasingly critical of South Africa's racial 
policies in the territory. While this criticism was on the whole mildly 
expressed and while there W9-S never any suggestion that the Union 
should be deprived of her mandate, the reports of the P. M. C. were 
a source of embarrassment to the Union internationally and laid the 
basis for the more radical criticism of South African racial policy in 
the territory by the United Nations. Indeed, the South West African 
dispute is a striking illustration of underlying links between the pre-war 
and post-war period, notwithstanding the radical nature of post-war 
changes in the organization of the international system: 
In general, however, the prospects for South African expansion over-
shadowed the dangers to white South Africa of Europe's relative decline 
in the inter-war years. Similarly, most attention in the post-independence 
period was focused on the threat posed to South Africa. by the triumph 
of African nationalism on the continent rather than on the opportunities 
European withdrawal may present South Africa. However, the weakness 
and vulnerability of the new states over the last decade has brought 
about the belated recognition that the new circumstances, while by their 
nature a challenge to South Africa's domestic policies may nonetheless 
offer new prospects for South Africa to extend her influence and refurbish 
her tarnished image internationally. The pursuit of an outward-looking 
policy towards Africa since 1966 indicates the South African government's 
awareness of the opportunity. 
Two final points need to be made about my approach to the subject. 
Firstly, I have not dealt at any length with the mechanics of foreign 
policy formation in South Africa. My reason for not doing so (apart 
from the lack of material on the subject)~~indicates that there is little 
evidence to suggest that the frustration of South African foreign policy 
objectives stemmed from any want of technical expertise. 
•14. 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, little more than a decade after 
the creation of the Department of External Affairs, South Africa had the 
"most extensive representation of any of the Dominions." 
41 
Munger suggests that Malan1 s ignorance of emergent Africa may have 
played a part in the slowness with which South Africa accommodated 
to decolonization. After discussions with Malan, he recorded: 11 the 
former Prime Minister did surprise me with his limited and hazy 
comprehension of the geography, and contemporary events, through much 
of black Africa. II 
42 
Certainly, the creation of an African division 
within the Department of External Affairs in 1956 put South African 
diplomacy on a more professional basis and in general terms, there has 
been a large increase in both expenditure on the foreign service and 
representation abroad since the early 19501s. However, any lack of 
expertise in South Africa's foreign service in Malan•s day was probably 
compensated for by the information supplied through the commonwealth. 
Secondly, my approach to the subject is largely historical and descriptive 
and while theoretical considerations play their part in my analysis of 
South African foreign policy, I have not attempted to encompass them 
within a single theoretical model or system. My reasons for adopting, 
for want of a better word, a 'traditional' approach are three-fold. 
The first lies in the realm of theory itself. It is that the 'scientific' .or 
'behavioral' approach to international relations and politics associated 
with model.~building and general systems theory is no escape from the 
exercise of judgement and intuition, which by their nature are inconclusive 
and tentative. As Bernard Crick has pointed out the new science which has 
dominated Ame~r_ic;:tn study of politics is not value-free and on the contrary 
is rooted: 
"in the doctrinal assumptions made by advocates of 
this science : a type of specifically liberal and 
democratic political doctrine of far more limited 
applicability than the authors supposed. Values 
were taken for granted amid the enervating unity 
of belief of American liberalism, so it was believed 
that the mere discovery of facts would create a kind 
of spontaneous national therapy." 43 
15. 
More detailed criticism of the scientific approach in international 
44 
relations have been made by Hedley Bull whose criticisms seem to 
me particularly trenchant. Firstly, he argues that: 
"by confining themselves to what can logically 
or mathematically be proved or verified according 
to strict procedures, the practitioners of the 
scientific approach are denying themselves the 
only instruments that are at present available for 
coming to grips with the substance of the subject. 11 
Secondly, as a counterpart to this argument.he maintains: 
"where (they) have succeeded in casting light 
upon the substance of the subject it has been by 
stepping beyond the bounds of that approach and 
employing the classical method. What there is 
?f value in their work consists essentially of 
judgements that are not established by the 
mathematical or scientific methods they employ 
and which ~11 be arrived at quite independently 
of them. 11 
45 
Thirdly, he argues that progress along analagous lines to modern physics 
is unlikely to be made by the application of a scientific approach to the 
realm of politics in view of 11 the present welter of competing terminologies 
47 
and conceptual frameworks, 11 from which the prospects of the 
emergence of a common language and a foundation of a firm theory are 
48 
"very bleak indeed". Finally, Bull declares that he knows of 
"no model that has assisted our understanding of international relations 
that cou~d not just as well have been expressed as an empirical 
generalization." 49 In addition to my agreement with these criticisms 
I have a more deep-seated philos~phical objection to the scientific approach 
to politics and that is that many, if not most, of the propositions that 
have been put forward under this approach are not open to empirical 
verification of even a loose kind, falling far short of the rigour demanded 
in the natural sciences. Ironically, the short- comings of the scientific 
method in the field of the natU:.raflsciences exposed by the very rigour 
demanded of it has. been used as an alibi to excuse the inevitably arbitrary 
16. 
drawing of boundaries to variables in politics. Where rigour has 
been introduced in an attempt to produce a plausible facsimile of 
scientific arguments, the results have often been disappointing producing 
little more than platitudes wrapped up in vacuous jargon. 
50 
These considerations aside, there is a second reason why the scientific 
approach appears to me particularly inappropriate in the context of a 
study of South African foreign policy. While there are wide-ranging 
disagreements about the value of the approach itself, of which the 
argument above is necessarily but a brief sample, there is general 
agreement that the area in which this approach has made its greatest 
strides has been in the realm of communications theory and peace 
research or conflict resolution and that its greatest appeal has been to 
the rationalist school of international relations. 
51 
Briefly, rationalist -
as opposed to realist - thought may be summed up as resting on the 
belief that much international conflict is caused by misperception, 
failure in communication, and defects in the decision-making process. 
While there are areas of conflict where realist assumptions about the 
clash of national interests are open to question, one could hardly find 
a less promising starting-point than South Africa for a set of theories 
that tend to devalue material interests as a source of conflict. 
Perception and communication certainly do not lie at the root of the 
differences between Afrikaner and African nationalists. Clearly, too, 
the preservation of the privileges of white society is not an interest of 
the same order as that of the United States in Vietnam or Russia in the 
Middle East; two cases where, arguably, perception of interests rather 
than the nature of the actual interests themselves play a critical role. 
My third justification for following a traditional approach is that South 
African foreign policy is a new field of inquiry. Books devoted to it 
as such are all of recent origin and consequently the scope for basically 
historical studies is greater than it is in the case of the major powers 
where extensive literature on the development of policy already exists. 
I; 
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Finally, notwithstanding my general adherence to the traditional approach, 
h "d d. . h 1 . 
52 1 I ave cons1 ere in t e cone us10ns attempts to app y systems 
theory within the narrower perspective of current international 
relationships among the states of Southern Africa as well as the possible 
1. . f 1. k h S 
3 h 1 . h. b S Af app icat10n o in age t eory to t e re at10ns ip etween outh rican 
foreign and domestic policy. 
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THE UNION AND AFRICA 1910 - 1959 
The Africa the Republic faces today is very different from that the 
new Union of South Africa faced in 1910. Then, only Ethiopia and 
Liberia had survived as independent African states. The rest of 
1 
the continent fell under one European colonial power or another. 
South Africa herself was part of the British Empire and while she had 
attained internal self-government, she was not as yet a full member 
of the international system. Indeed, it is misleading to speak of an 
international system as we know it today. It was rather an European 
system projected onto the world outside. Africa like much of Asia 
provided a backyard in which European powers played out their rivalries. 
In speaking of":a(S<rnth: African policy towards the continent, it is 
.... er - -· 
important to bear in mind the restraints placed on South African foreign 
policy by her place within the British Empire. Prior to the First 
World War, South Africa's relations with other countries were almost 
entirely managed by Britain. After the war, however, South Africa 
in common with the two other 11white 11 dominions, Canada and Australia, 
asserted greater independence from Britain; an independence which 
was reflected at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and subsequently 
in the League of Nations. 
Formal acknowledgment of the enhanced status of the dominions was 
given at the 1926 imperial conference by a declaration that the dominions 
enjoyed equal status with Britain, were autonomous, and were in no way 
subordinate to one another. The following year the Union government 
created a portfolio for eJl;'.ternal affairs, which until 1955 was held by 
23. 
the Prime Minister of the day. As Marquard explains: 
"South Africa's external affairs did not require 
the undivided attention of a cabinet minister, because 
as a member of the Commonwealth her foreign affairs 
were g
0
eared to those of fellow members and were 
to a large extent coordinated by the Dominion Office 
in London 11 2 
In 1931, the Statute of Westminster set the seal on the development of 
___ .. ~.--:------ ..... --.,( 
,dofui~'ion in-dependence when Britain gave up her power to legislate for 
the dominions without their consent. The Governor-General remained 
the British monarch's representative in South Africa,' but in future 
he was appointed by, and acted solely on the advice of, the Union 
Government. 
Even after South Africa formally e's)ablished her independen~e from 
'./ 
Britain over foreign policy, Britain's role in South Africa's relations 
with the African continent continued to be a dominant one simply because 
Britain remained the leading colonial power in Africa until African states 
achieved independence in the late 19501 s and early 19601s. In general 
too decisions affecting Africa continued to be made in Europe for many 
/ 
years after the Statute of Westminster. However, it is also important 
not to over-emphasize South Africa's early dependence on Britain. 
From the outset, successive South African governments recognised that 
the country had interests and priorities of her own in Africa. On the 
whole, non-Nationalists hoped to see the Union's objectives on the 
continent achieved within the context of the British Empire, while the 
Nationalists were far more critical of the Empire's role in South African 
policy. 
Politicians of all persuasions in South Africa did however agree that 
South Africa's role would be that of the dominant power on the continent 
apart from colonial powers themselves. The Union with her gold and 
diamond mines was the economic powerh,)ouse of Africa and was seen as 
the gateway to the opening up of the interior and its resources. 
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Rhodes' dream of an Empire linked by a railway from Cape to Cairo 
remained potent. Most important of all, the Union's boundaries as 
of 1910 were not envisaged as permanent. The South African 
Constitution itsce]._!Hncluded the expectation that not just the High 
Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland 
but also Northern and Southern Rhodesia might be incorporated into 
the Union. 
3 
These British territories provided the most obvious 
targets for South African expansion, but many South Africans also 
looked to what was then German South West Africa 
4 
and Portuguese 
East Africa as areas for settlement and perhaps eventual take-over. 
A basic factor in South Africa1s expansionist drive in the years following 
Union was economic; hunger for land for white settlement and hunger 
for cheap African labour. HThe very sessions of the Convention (to 
found Union) were punctuated by demands for Bantu lands by men from 
all the colonies, especially Natal". 
5 
It is not difficult to see what 
lay behind these demands. By about the 18701 s the land frontier in 
South Africa was coming to an end. Almost 90% of the country's land 
was by then already under white ownership. Few farmers' sons 
consequently could hope to ~btain a new farm and the new industrial 
centres opened by the mines were largely being -m~rine~_, not by local 
whites but by new immigrants from Europe. Sub-division of the land 
had begun and by the 19201s and 19301s it was to lead to large-scale 
6 
white poverty especially among Afrikaners. In the years following 
Union the extension of South Africa's frontiers came to be frequently 
cited by politicians as a cure to the pro bl-ems of white poverty. 
Meanwhile the new industrial centres had created a demand for African 
labour far outstripping the previous incessant demands for labour of 
farmers, which had been a major concern of the Cape, Natal, and 
the Boer republics prior to Union. "In 1904, 76.5% of the 77,000 
African gold and coal working in the Transvaal came from foreign 
25. 
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territories, chiefly Portuguese East Africa". In short the mining 
industry was heavily dependent ort foreign labour and although basically 
satisfactory arrangements were worked out with the countries concerned, 
persistent complaints of a shortage of African labour gave added impetus 
to demands for incorporation of new territories as weil as making 
\ 
relations with countries ~fhm whom South Africa imported labour, 
stretching as far north as Nyasaland, important to successive Union 
governments. However; these remained economic rather than political 
ties. 
Ties of kith and kin linked South Africa to much of east and central 
Africa. In particular, South African settlers played an important role 
in the c alonisation of Kenya. 
11 0ne of the largest early applications for land (500 
square miles) was made in April 1902 by the East 
African Syndicate, a company with a strong South 
African interest. After some questioning, the 
British Government granted it. With only a dozen 
settlers established at the beginning of 1903, in 
August the Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot, sent 
his Collector of Customs, A. Marsden, to South 
Africa to encourage settlers to migrate to the 
country. By the end of 1905 over a million acres 
of land had been leased or sold by the Protectorate. 
authorities. By 1906 a large party of Boer 
"Irreconcilables 11 trekked overland from the 
Transvaal to the Uasin Gishu plateau; others 
poured in by boat from Britain and South Africa 11 
8 
As might be expected South African settlers also played an important 
role in the early colonisation of the two Rhodesias. 
"By design, and not by accident, the Pioneer 
Column was composed of South Africans as well 
as Britons. The political aim , as frankly 
outlined by Rhodes, demanded a substantial 
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"number of men from Natal and the Cape, so 
that if things went wrong and outside help were 
needed, the electorate of these two colonies 
would join in the clamour for Britain to intervene. 
Again, at Rhodes 1 s specific direction, the South 
Africans were 'men of both the races', so that 
the Afrikaners of the Cape Colony would qave a 
stake in the new nation from the start. 11 
The role of South Africans in the early colonisation of British Africa had 
important repercussions for the policies adopted by settler comm unities. 
Firstly, from the outset South Africa's policy of segregation far from 
being regarded as exceptional was looked to as a model by the settler 
communities elsewhere in Africa and in the early period of British rule 
their voice was dominant in the political affairs of Britain's African 
colonies. Secondly, from early on the settlers in British East Africa 
and the Rhodesias aspired to the self-government enjoyed by the Union. 
Much today is made of the restraining influence on settlers exerci~ed 
by the British colonial office. It is therefore salutory to note that the 
historian, Eric Walker records that no pressure was exercised even on 
the National Convention (to form Union) to ensure a more liberal 
constitution. lO In fact, only after the First World War did the 
British Government begin to curb the power of settler communities in 
Africa. (One ironic consequence was that, until it did, the settler 
communities in different parts of Africa lacked the incentive to band 
together more closely on political issues.) 
South African hopes for expansion into Africa were first raised by the 
First World War. Before that, domestic concerns had naturally en:o'l}gh 
been the first priority of the new Union Government under Botha, though 
the Prime Minister had in fact raised the question of the transfer of the 
High Commission territories briefly in 1913. In fact, the Union's 
immediate involvement in world affairs was not cf the government's 
making. When Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 South Africa's 
involvement was automatic. The Union had not as yet at::tained the 
constitutional status that would have allowed her to remain neutral 
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in law towards the conflict, but, that aside, the Prime Minister stated 
that he regarded neutrality as unthinkable. The day· of the outbreak of 
war in Europe the Union government sent a dispatch to the British 
Government indicating its preparedness 11 to employ the defence force 
of the Union for the performance of the duties entrusted to the Imperial 
Troops in South Africa." ll 
This was follow,e_d by a British request for what amounted to an invasion 
by African troops of German South West Africa. (The territory 
potentially threatened the Cape route, a vital supply line of the British 
Empire.) Botha immediately drew up plans for an offensive. 
However, South Africa's involvement in the war was not passively 
accepted by the electorate and before the invasion of South West Africa 
took place it was the subject of fierce domestic controversy, bordering 
on civil war. A rebellion by Nationalist-minded Afrikaners was put 
down and although in 1915 Botha successfully led South African troops 
in the conquest of the German colony, elections that same year revealed 
considerable resentment at the obligations placed on the Union by her 
membership of the British Empire. 
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Botha had hoped originally to confine South Africa's participation in 
the war to the conquest of South West, especially in view of the division 
of opinion amoung the electorate about the war. However, when later 
in 1915 the British government appealed for further South African help 
in the war in East Africa and also in France, he readily responded. 
Ittis not difficult to see why. Firstly-, it was becoming clear that a 
German victory in East Africa, while not posing a direct threat to the 
Union, would weaken the Union's position on the continent. Secondly, 
the ·s,wift conquest of South West Africa had greatly added to the Union's 
stake in a British victory, as South Africa could now see herself sharing 
in some of the spoils of victory. This had in fact helped to temper 
domestic criticism of the Union's involvement in the war, though it did 
28. 
not alter Botha1 s determination to confi:n,e South Africa's contribution 
to voluntary contingents. 
Botha1 s deputy, Smuts, took personal charge of the campaign in East 
Africa. Despite some initial difficulties, he met with considerable 
success and following the defeat of German forces in Ea.st Africa, 
some enthusiasts suggested that German East Africa be re-named 
Smutsland. Consequently, when Germany unc9nditionally surrendered 
in 1918 following the decisive interv,ention of the United States, 
expectations in the Union ran high that South Africa would be richly 
rewarded in terms of territory for her contribution to the Allied war 
effort. These hopes were by no means confined to the general public. 
Recently, British secret papers relating to the First World War have 
been made public. They contain some revealing exchanges between 
Botha and Smuts which illustrate the extent of South African ambitions. 
For Smuts the conclusion of the First World War provided the hope that 
"we shall consolidate our territories south of the Zambesi and the 
13 
Kunene. 11 Botha set his sights as high. 11 1 support you in getting 
many things for which we shall perhaps never have another chance 
especially Mozambique . . . . . . This is a matter which we must bring 
14 
up and settle in our favour. 11 Botha1 s remarks are the more 
remarkable when one considers that Portugal had been an ally of the 
British during the First World War, though it was not unusual in those 
days for victors of a war to make adfustments in territories among 
themselves. {Presumably, Botha thought the Portuguese could be 
offered German East Africa in exchange). 
However, South African hopes were disappointed. The belief that 
imperialism, the ambition of states to add to their territories, was a 
major cause of war had been gaining ground during the First World 
War as had a determination following the horrors of that war to outlaw 
future conflict. This view had a powerful champion in Woodrow Wilson 
President of the United States. 
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He was adamant at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 that 
none of Germany's colonies should be ceded outright to the victors .. 
As it was unthinkable that the colonies should be returned to 
Germany, he proposed a mandate system in its place, ironically 
drawing on proposals made by Smuts himself in relation to the 
Middle East i where the war had shattered the Turkish Empire. 
Wilson was insistent even that South West Africa be included in 
the scheme over the opposition of both the British and South African 
delegations. South West Africa finally became a C class mandate, 
one that placed fewest obligations on the mandatory power, South 
Africa and enabled her to rule the territory as an integral part of 
Union. Former German East Africa was divided into two mandate 
territories, one falling under Belgium, the other and largest 
(Tanganyika) falling under Britain. 
There was considerable anger at the outcome of the Versailles 
Peace Conference in South Africa where 11 the sanguine hopes of those 
who had looked to see him {Smuts) return from Versailles with 
great acquisitions of territory to the west and the far north had been 
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disappointed". Smuts tried to make the best of the result 
by maintaining that South Africa's mandate over South West Africa 
amounted in practice to incorporation and ind,.eed he could point to 
the fact that many thousa~ds of whites from South Africa had 
settled in the territory since the conquest, easing the pressure on 
the land in the Union. To the Nationalist Opposition, however, 
the outcome confirmed its doubts about the value of membership 
of the British Empire to the Union. It was a view that enjoyed 
widespread support among Afrikaners whose 11 own patriotism was 
intensely local and instinctively protectionist, whether in matters 
of colour, language or economic policy. Politically they felt that 
they were being dragged into world affairs at the chariot wheels of 
an Empire for which they felt no love. 11 
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In the 19201 s despite the s'et-back at the Paris Peace Conference, 
South Africa continued to press and hope for the acquisition of new 
territory. During his premiership Smuts set his sights on the 
incorporation of Southern Rhodesia. When he became Prime 
Minister in 1919, Southern Rhodesia was administered by the 
British South Africa Company, but both the British government 
and Southern Rhodesia electorate regarded the Company rule as 
only temporary and in the 19201 s the settlers were given a choice 
between internal self-government and incorporation into the Union. 
Smuts campaigned strongly for incorporation and in this he 
apparently enjoyed the support of Sir Winston Churchill, the Colonial 
Secreta,ry. 
"Churchill had tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
Coghlan and his colleagues to enter the South African 
Union as its fifth member state. The settlers, who 
saw themselves about to shake off the Company's 
control - such as it was - as well as the last vestiges 
of Whitehall rule, were unwilling to accept a new 
domination. 11 17 
Southern Rhodesia's future status was decided by a referendum in 
October 1922 and despite Smuts' willingness to pay nearly £ 7 million 
r-,j,." 
for the Crown lands, the railways and public works as the price of 
incorporation, the electorate voted decisively for responsible 
government and against joining the Union. 
A major factor in the vote was the fear of the settlers in Rhodesia 
that an invasion of poor whites in search of land and work would 
follow incorporation into Union. Further the largely English-
speaking electorate was worried by the,,gp~o~,l:ngi.:srrength of the 
Nationalist Party under Hertzog. To Smuts, the vote was a body 
blow to his hopes for involving the Union more deeply in the 
development of the continent. "To him, the Union was what the 
old Cape Colony had been to Sir George Grey, the most important 
power in Africa. Rhodesia was the railway bridge to the copper 
of the Katanga and much else in the far north.~· '/18 
._: ·~ 
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In the years following the referendum, the Union and Southern 
Rhodesia drifted apart and there was in fact little co-operation 
between the two countries politically until the Second World War. 
In 1924 Smuts was defeated at the polls. He was succeeded by 
Hertzog who immediately turned his attention to the High Commission 
territories. However, his approach to the British Government met 
with no success and after a number of exchanges between the two 
governments, the matter was dropped, to be raised again in the 
1930 1s. By 1930 the more extravagant hopes of South Africans 
that vast editions of territory would be added to Union were 
beginning to fade. Hertzog still looked forward to the eventual 
full incorporation of South West Africa. However, both the 
attitude of the League of Nations and that of the politically well-
organized German community in South West Africa provided 
b 1 
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o stac es to integration. 
Ironically, just at this point settler communities throughout British 
Africa began looking to the Union for support. The immediate 
cause of th.J~ development was the publication of a white paper on 
Africa by the British government in 1930. The white paper 
pointedly stated that in countries where Africans were predominant 
in terms of population over white settlers, African interests should 
be paramount. This state~¢:'nL,of principle by the British 
Government met with an angry response from the Union. 
Smuts called for a conference of settlers frorri Ea st, Central and 
South Africa to "show the British government the Native policy it 
20 
ought to pursue", while Hertzog asked at the Imperial 
Conference of that year that the Union be consulted before a racial 
policy radically different to her own was adopted elsewhere in 
British Africa. 
In the colonies themselves the white paper "stimulated a 'get-
together' movement from Kenya southward ..... The Union's 
Native Policy (was) applauded by Europeans on both sides of the 
Zambezi and throughout the Tanganyika and Kenya highlands". 
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The controversy was an early indication of clonflicts to come between 
"" 
the British government and settler communities over racial policy 
while also indicating British disquiet at the direction of the Union's 
own domestic policy. The controversy further served to stimulate 
greater interest in the Union in th~ future of the African continent. 
In view of today's developments some of the ideas canvassed were 
particularly interesting. For example, some Nationalists spoke of 
the need for a Dixie line across Africa to the north of the copper belt 
in Northern Rhodesia to separate colour bar states in the south from 
colour-blind states in the north. 
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Among whites throughout British Africa, South African influences could 
be found which dated back to the early days of colonisation. For 
example, there were Dutch Reform Church missions as far north as 
the Sudan. Rhodesian law remained basically the Roman Dutch law 
of the old Cape Colony and Rhode~Ja was still linked to the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein. Indeed, perh,~:I>'!I~ it is 
surprising that the Union had not shown more interest before the l 930's 
in these territories apart from considerations of incorporation. 
Reaiistically, the Union now looked not to incorporation but to the 
creation of federations in East and Central Africa. The Union 
Minister of Defence saw these as being "linked to the Union by a 
common defence policy". 
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Reflecting her new interest in Africa, South Africa acted as host to 
three conferences of African states on continental co-operation in 
various fields in 1935 and 1936. The conferences on health, 
transportation, posts, telegraphs and radio communications were 
attended by representatives from the High Commission territories, 
the two Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo. 
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The one on transportation resulted in 1936 in varJous agreements on, 
among other things, a standard railway gauge, the demarcation of 
air routes, and the setting up of a permanent secretariat. The 
following year the Union Minister of Defence went on a seven 
thousand mile goodwill flight across Africa. · When he returned, he 
spoke of the need to make Africa south of the equator, and in addition 
Kenya and Uganda, the concern of the Union and more self-sufficient 
and independent of the colonial powers. In short, to use an 
expression in vogue today, South Africa was developing an outward-
looking policy towards the continent. 
A minor illustration of what South African involvement in the 
affairs of the continent could mean was the unsolicited action of 
the South African Minister of Defence in 1935 when he sent a plane 
with a supply of tear gas to Northern Rhodesia at the time of a strike 
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of African workers on the copperbelt. 
However, the most immediate stimulus to military co-operation 
on the continent proved not to be the challenge of African nationalism 
but renewed European involvement on the continent that threatened 
stability. 
In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. It came as a rude shock to the Union 
governi.nent who feared that whatever the result, it would damage 
Union interests. If Italy lost, it was feared that it would undermine 
African deference to white authority. 
On the other hand , if the Italians won, 
34. 
it was feared that African resentment would be stimulated. 
Further an Italian presence in Ethiopia would threaten Britain's 
colonies in East Africa. Initi~lly, South Africa placed her hope in 
the League of Nations system of collective security. She fell in 
immediately with British suggestions that economic sanctions be 
applied again~t Italy. The subsequent half-hearted attempt to 
enforce sanctions and, finally, their cancellation met with strong 
opposition from the Union, but to no avail. 
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The Italians 
marched into Addis Ababa. 
The appeasement of Italy and the collapse of the system of collective 
security strengthened already existing tendencies in South Africa to 
pursue a more independent foreign policy. As the situation in Europe 
began to deteriorate, the Union came more and more to cast herself 
in the role of the defender of white interests on the continent. 
However, hopes that South Africa might be able to escape involvement 
in any new war in Europe received a set-back when Nazi Germany 
began to demand the return of Germany's lost colonies in Africa, 
which included, of course, South West Africa. Further, Germany's 
demands brought home to the Union Government its dependence on 
the imperial connection. 
Nevertheless, there was considerable sympathy for Germany's case 
in Nationalist circles and even among some members of the government. 
rn· particular, Pirow caused some embarrassment to the Union 
government by declaring himself in favour of a German foothold on 
the Continent. His statements were followed by repeated declarations 
by the Union government that there was no question of South West 
Africa being handed back to Germany. In any event, it was 
becoming clear that if war broke out in Europe, the cabinet would 
be seriously split on the question of South African participation. 
Consequently, the Munich agreement in 1938 was welcomed with 
some relief in South Africa. 
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When war nevertheless broke out the following year after the collapse 
of the agreement, the decision whether South Africa should support 
Britain was left to the House of Assembly. It voted by a narrow 
majority to declare war on Germany. The Prime Minister, Hertzog, 
who spoke in favour of neutrality, resigned. He was succeeded by 
§fauts. The Second World War resulted in widespread internal 
conflict inside South Africa, but it lies outside the scope of this thesis 
to describe it in detail. Suffice it to say that many Nationalists 
openly flouted their sympathy for National Socialism, believing that 
a German victory~ uld end the link between Britan and South Africa 
they were so distrusted and disliked. 
As in the First World War, the government did not bring in 
conscription but raised a volunteer army; .iriit_i~lly~_:; a Mobile Defence 
Force whose members made themselves liable for service for four 
years anywhere in Africa. To begin with, Smuts did not commit 
himself to sending South African troops to Europe, and South Africa's 
main contribution to the war effort was in Africa, though towards the 
end of the restriction on troops serving outside Africa was lifted and 
South Africans played an important part in the Italian campaign. 
During the war, the Union's prestige reached its zenith internationally, 
particularly in the person of Smuts, who as an individual had been the 
dominating influence on South Africa's relations with the outside world. 
Ch.urchill went so far as to ask Smuts to take his place as Ac·t-~ng Prime 
Minister in Britain while he (Churchill) was attending a summit 
conference in Teheran. This honour Smuts dec+Jned, but the offer 
does indicate the international respect Smuts enjoyed. 
The war also strengthened South Africa's position on the continent. 
The Southern Rhodesian government placed her troops under Smuts' 
command and worked in close cooperation with tre Union. Kenya, 
where there were South African troops stationed on the border with 
Ethiopia to meet any Italian threat, Northern Rhodesia, and Nya~§aland 
also maintained clos~; military liaison with the Union. Further, South 
....... __ ·~ ~-' •' '~ '.. ,; 
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Africa entered defence agreements with the Portuguese territories 
of Angola and Mozambique and the Belgian Congo. 
Smuts clearly hoped that these war-time contacts would lead to 
closer permanent ties with the continent in peace. 
11 Now is the time ·I.or us to readjust our outlook on 
African affairs and to develop a new conception of 
our relations with our neighbours . . • • We cannot 
stand aloof, we of this richly-endowed South Africa. 
If we wish to take our rightful place as the leader 
in Pan African development and in shaping future 
policies and events in this vast continent, we must 
face the realities of the present and seize the 
opportunities which those offer. 11 26 
Thus spoke Smuts at the beginning of the war. He was optimistic 
on other fronts as well. The Windhoek legislature had unanimously 
requested incorporation into the Union and he hoped that after 
consulting the former League of Nations powers South West Africa 
would at last become a fifth province of the Union. He also looked 
to Britain for the incorporation of the High Commission territories 
as a reward for South Africa's contribution to the war effort. 
At the same time, he assured the Rhodesias and countries to the north 
that the Union had no plans to incorporate them. 
The gradual change in outlook that had taken place on this score 
partly reflected a change in South Africa's economic priorities. 
The demand for African labour was still strong and the Union still 
depended heavily' on foreign migrant labour. However, hung.er for 
land no longer represented a pressing problem. The war-time boom 
absorbed many thousands of poor whites and former tenant farmers 
or bywoners into industry. As Walker put it, "the struggle" between 
black and white was "transferred from the openveld to the fact\ories 
·/ 
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and poorer quarters of the rapidly growing towns 11 • 
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South Africa now looked to the north not so much for land, but for 
trade. Smuts pressed home the need for improved communications 
with the continent and remained to the end of the war optimistic on 
the future of peace-time Pan-African co-operation. 
However, by no means everyone shared Smuts' optimism on the post-
war role of the Union. 
"Unfortunately, South Africa seems to be interested 
in neighbouring territories mainly as potential 
customers. A few indefatigable optimists even look 
on Africa as a vast hinterland crying out for the 
Union's industrial products and anxious to pour its 
wealth into her bilingual lap. South Africa, 
however, cannot expand industries on imports of 
African raw materials based on low paid sweat 
labour and at the same time hope to find profitable 
markets in these poverty- stricken areas. 
Moreover, the African continent cannot be regarded 
as, and will not in any case become, the Union's 
private preserve". 28 
However, in general, sober analysis of this kind was rare. Hopes 
in South Africa that the Union would play a major role in post-war 
Africa were high; hopes inflated, at least in part, by Smuts' 
international prestige. 
In fact, the immediate afte rrnath of war proved even Smuts' modest 
hopes unjustified. In particular, he was rebuffed by the newly 
formed United Nations Organization on the question of South West 
Africa though he had a hand in the drawing up of its Charter ! 
Britain made no move to transfer the High Commission territories 
as appreciation for the Union's war services. Worse from the 
South African government's point of view was to come. The war 
years had given rise to widespread questioning of the legitimacy of 
colonial rule throughout Africa and Asia, not least because of the 
idealistic principles of self-determination enunciated by the victors, 
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for example, in the Atlantic Charter. Further, two super-powers 
had emerged, the United States and Russia and both were committed 
to opposing colonialism. In October 1945 African leaders representative 
of the new elites on the continent gathered in Manchester for the 
sixth Pan-African Congress to articulate demands for self-determination; 
demands which were to transform the continent in the 19501s and 19601s. 
They made this radical challenge: "We demand for Black Africa 
autonomy and independence, so far, and no further, than it is possible 
in this one World for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject 
to inevitable world unity and federation." 
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This stimulus the war gave to African nationalism was not a factor 
Smuts appreciated in his hopes for post-war Africa. In this, he was 
not alone. The colonial powers themselves underestimated the 
growth of African nationalism and while envisaging that some reforms 
in administration were necessary were not prepared for the radical 
changes that, in fact, took place. The sp~e,~M with which the colonial 
__ ,,..· 
powers succumbed to the demands of African nationalists was to 
become in the 1950 1s a source of unending shock to both major 
political parties in South Africa. 
The depth of feeling aroused in South Africa by decolonisation can 
.best be gauged by Malan1 s reaction to British policy in West Africa. 
"There will have to be a psychological revolution. 
One finds in the world today that there is sickly 
sentimentality in regard to the black man. 
Some?>n,e·]n authority told me in England ••• that 
one can say with truth that they venerate a black 
skin. The position is that under these circum-
stances I fear that the people of Europe, the white 
nations of Europe are becoming decadent ! 11 30 
It is then not surprising that almost twenty years elapsed before South 
Africa pursued actively an African foreign policy geared to the 
-
transformation brought about on the continent by African nationalism. 
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In retrospect, what is surprising was not South Africa's containment 
of African nationalism within her own borders, but her incapacity to 
take a greater part in the combat of African nationalism elsewhere 
on the continent. It was an incapacity that in part reflected a 
remarkable decline in South Africa's status in the world following the 
war. It was also a consequence of the facts that decolonisation 
began in an are a of Africa where South Africa had little influence, 
the territories of West Africa (as Verwoerd was later to put it, 
these were "undoubtedly wholly black men's countries" 31). 
South Africa's stature was in part affected in the immediate post-
war years by the attention India's new leaders focused on the Union's 
traatment of Asians. However, more important than this was the 
change of government brought about by the Nationalist Party's 
victory at the polls in 1948. The new government lacked the 
prestigious figure of a Smuts to command international respect. 
It was committed to policies entrenching white power in a world in 
which the spirit of liberal reform was strong and many in Britain 
as elsewhere were unable to forg,et ·the role some of its leaders had 
played in the war. Further, the wholly Afrikaner composition of 
the new government dedicated ultimately to republican status did not 
commend it to the largely English-speaking settler communities 
elsewhere on the continent who might otherwise have seen in South 
Africa a natural ally in their fight against the reforming policies 
of the· British Colonial Office. In addition, many of the new Cabinet 
Ministers lacked experience of office and, for example, the blunt terms 
in which some of them defended white supremacy at its most extreme 
served simply to aggravate opinion of their policies. In short, the 
image the Nationalists projected to the world was not a favourable one 
and this in its:eif contributed to the country• s lack of influence on 
• l• ·~. ~.) 
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developments on the continent. 
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The policies of the new Prime Minister (Dr. D. F. Malan) towards 
Africa were not essentially different to those Smuts pursued. 
As an Afrikaner Nationalist, he rejected Smuts 1 objective of the 
political unification of British territories, but he still hoped that 
the Commonwealth would provide the basis for furthering "white 
Christian civill.zation11 on the continent and the combat of communism. 
Indeed, the need to exclude communism from Africa was the subject 
of most of Malan 1 s pronouncements on Africa and in this context 
he wholeheartedly endorsed Smuts• plea for Pan-African co-operation. 
Like Smuts, he strongly supported the firm maintenance of power 
in white hands. 
In 1953 Dr. Malan spelt out his policy towards Africa in greater detail. 
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The main points of what was called Malan1s African Oarter were as 
follows: 
11 1) protection of the indigenous people of Africa 
against the penetration by peoples of;;~~ia\ 
2}:~ the guidance of Africa along the road to European 
ci~ilization. 
3) the suppression of communist activities ,and 
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4) the prevention of militarization of Africans." 
Hostility towards India because of her championing of the anti-colonial 
'':b~~s<"~ .. played an important part in policy. In particular, the South 
African government feared that Africa's wide-open spaces were a 
target for Indian settlement and resented India's membership of the 
British Commonwealth. Further, by placing South Africa's treatment 
of Indians (inside South Africa) on the agenda of the U. N. General 
Assembly in 1946, India had placed South Africa's racial policies in 
an unfavourable light; an action that did much to arouse South Africa's 
suspicions as to India's intentions towards Africa. 
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In practical terms, Malan's first initiative was to appoint a special 
Ambassador-at-large for Africa, Charles Te Water. Te Water 
was an experienced diplomat, who had acted as President of the 
League of Nations Assembly. After a tour of the nations of Europe 
with dependencies in Africa, Te Water reported back to Malan 
that he encountered considerable hostility to apartheid. His 
advice was for the Union to concentrate on co-operation in the 
economic, scientific and cult~~al spheres with countries south of the 
Sa,hara, rather than to develop direct political ties. Te ;water's 
indirect approach had powerful critics. Louw - later to become 
the first Minister of External Affairs - was one of them. He 
wanted the Union to make direct contact with the leaders in the 
settler communities in Kenya, the Rhodesias, and elsewhere. 
It was a position that enjoyed wide support in the Nationalist Party, 
but, in practice, Te Water's advice was followed if only because the 
opportunities for political co-operation with settlers failed to 
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materialize. 
An area in which both Louw and Te Water agreed on the need for 
continental co-ope;rcitiqn '.Was defence. Originally, South Africa had 
hoped to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but had been 
rebuffed. The Union government now argued.):he case for a regional 
African defence alliance~to reinforce N.A. T.O. This suggestion 
was more sympathetically received by the colonial powers and in 
1951 a conference on defence was held in Nairobi comprising 
representatives of the colonial powers 
35 
, South Africa and Rhodesia. 
The United States attended as an observer. The result of the meeting 
was 11 a series of unanimous recommendations designed to ensure 
the rapid movement of troops and military supplies through the 
eastern and central parts of Africa" 
36 
However, no agreement could be reached on the formation of an 
African regional defence organization because of South Africa's 
strong hostility to the arming of Africans. Despite the failure of 
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this conference, there were further efforts in the 19501s by South 
,bfrica and the colonial powers to reach agreement on defence 
co-operation. Indeed, one explanation given for South Africa's 
readiness to grant Britain wide-:ranging rights under the 1955 
Simonstown agreement was the expectation that 11 the Agreement 
would be the first stage in an African regional defence alliance 
similar to the network of alliances then being established in the 
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Middle East, Europe, and the Far East" · The emergence of 
independent Africa saw this expectation disappininted 11as it became 
clear that South Africa's racial policies would permit of no co-
operation with Central African nations 1'. 
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The attempt to secure co-operation on defence was not the only 
African iniative taken by Malan. In 1950 "S.outh Africa acted as 
~·' .-F·' 
host to a conference on problems of transport in Southern and Central 
Africa. Malan pushed ahead with the closer integration of South 
West Africa into the Union over a growing volume of protest at the 
United Nations. He also raised without success the question of a 
transfer of the High Commission territories to the Union. 
However, the main focus of attention in the 1950's was on 
constitutional changes taking place elsewhere on the continent. 
Changes in the Gold Coast provided the Union government with its 
first shock. The result of elections in 1951 under a new constitution 
had been an overwhelming victory for Nkrumah's Convention People's 
Party and consequently the British authorities appointed Nkrumah as 
Leader for Government Business. The realization of the precedent 
this created caused an immediate reaction in South Africa, where 
previously very little attention had been paid to West Africa, a part 
of the continent in which South Africa had little influence or interest. 
·' 
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Walker records that: 
11the South African Prime Minister was shocked 
deeply and the leader of the Opposition only slightly 
less so by this elevation of a Negro to so high an 
office, and by the hope expressed subsequently 
by the British Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, 
that the Gold Coast would soon become a Dominion" 
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Malan, in particular, feared a further change in the composition of 
Commonwealth. India had already been, as far as the Union was 
concerned, a disagreeable addition. 
Besides this development in West Africa, the early 19501 s saw the 
two Rhodesias and Nya!~fa,land moving towgrds Federation under the 
banner of partnership between the races. The eventual constitution 
was very much a compromise between settler segregationist attitudes 
and British hopes for an alternative to apartheid. These hopes were 
described as follows by Creighton: "The design •.•..• was intended 
in the first place to contain South Africa and erect an inexpugnable 
barrier of British liberalism across the southern half of the continent.·~:! 40 
In short, despite the conservative constitution that finally emerged, 
there was little in the thinking behind the scheme that appealed to the 
Nationalists in South Africa. Indeed, one M. P. called for incorporation 
of Southern Rhodesia into the Union, to which Malan replied that any 
move in that direction would have to come from the Rhodesian settlers 
themselves. It d~O. not. 
'~,.. . , 
Consequently, the formation of Federation 
in 1953 left the Union government, ideologically, more isolated than 
ever. The same year saw the elevation of Nkrumah to Prime Minister 
in the Gold Coast. Malan was quick to draw the moral that African 
nationalists in Northern Rhodesia would soon be demanding the same 
rights as Gold Coasters; a comment perhaps reflecting his 
disappointment at the acceptance by the settlers of partnership. 
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At the end of 1954, Malan retired as Prime Minister and Strydom 
took his place. The following year, Eric Louw became the Union's 
first Minister of External Affairs, a portfolio previously always 
held by the Prime Minister. Louw was the logical choice in view 
of his wide international experience. Indeed he had exercised 
considerable influence on South Africa's foreign policy during 
Malan1s premiership. His main achievement was to put South 
African diplomacy on a more professional basis. In particular, 
in December 1956 a separate division of African Affairs was 
created within the Department of External Affairs. These 
developments heralded a more realistic attitude towards events 
on the continent, (for example, when Sudan became independent 
in 1956, Louw sent a telegram of congratulations to the country's 
new leaders. Louw even had tea with the Sultan of Zanzibar ! 41). 
Malan had always conceived of co-operation in Africa as being 
through the colonial powers and was fierce in his .opposition to 
decolonisation. Under Strydom, the Union government began to 
realize the need to come to terms, as far as possible, with the 
changes on the continent that the Union was, after all powerless to 
prevent. In a speech in August 1955 Strydom gave expression to 
the new attitude. 
11 The relationship between South Africa and non-white 
states in Africa, with their millions of inhabitants, 
should be one of mutually interested parties in Africa, 
without hostility towards one another - a relationship 
of peoples and governments who re~~nise and respect 
one anothers rights of existence". 
Louw, formerly a critic of Te Water, now placed special emphasis 
on the development of scientific and technical co-operation with the 
emergent African states. South Africa continued to play an active 
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role in the Council for Technical Co-operation in Africa (C. C. T .A.) 
and the Scientific Council for Africa ( C. S. A.) ffter Ghana1s 
independence and in fact Ghanaian representatives attended meetings 
of a specialised committee of C. C. T. A. held in South Africa 
at the end of 1957. Further, South Africa became a member of 
the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara 
(F. A. M.A.) at its inauguration in February 1958 in Accra. 
The new organisation was to be a clearing house for technical 
information. 
When Ghana became independent in 1957 South African representatives 
attended the celebrations and the idea that South Africa would 
eventually be exchanging diplomatic representatives with black 
governments in Africa was gaining ground in the Union. 
In short, the need to reach an accommodation with emergent Africa 
was already being appreciated in the second half of the 1950's. 
However, speeches also reflected a good deal of apprehension at 
what was taking place on the continent. Particularly interesting 
was a speech of Louw1 s in June 1957 on the importance of the 
continent to South Africa as a future market for her goods. 
"As far as the Union of South Africa is concerned, 
we naturally welcome any development on the 
continent of Africa . • • . . We welcome it in the 
interest of the continent, of which we are a part, 
provided no impediment will be placed in the way 
of South Africa's access to thc;:se markets. 
The territories to the north of the Limpopo are 
the natural markets for our large and expanding 
industries and whatever arrangements are made, 
whatever interests are secured by outside countries, 
we expect that no impediment will be laid in the way 
of our access to those markets. 
"May I at this stage also express the hope that our 
industrialists will take note of what is happening in 
Africa •••.• I trust that they will take greater pains 
than they have done in the pas.t, to secure a footing 
in these markets." 43 
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At the time Louw was speaking, South African trade with the 
continent was small and falling as a proportion of total trade. 
From 1950 - 57 imports from Africa constituted less than 10% 
of total imports and while exports to Africa constituted 22. 6% 
of South African exports during this period, the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland took over 80% of these. 
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Louw had reason to be concerned at African attitudes on the 
question of trade. By the close of the decade, a number of 
African organizations, including the All-African People's 
Conference, the Ghanaian Trade Union Congress, and the 
Kenyan Federation of Labour had called for boycotts of South 
African goods. Small though the direct impact on the South 
African economy would be of a continental boycott, it threatened 
to cfep:dve South Africa of the opportunity otherwise offered 
by independence of greatly expanding her trade with the continent. 
In general, by the close of the decade, South Africa1s racial 
policies were increasingly a stumbling block to the Union's 
relations with Africa and the world at large, whether economically 
or politically. Part of the reason why Strydom1s outward-looking 
pronouncements on Africa remained essentially in the .)realm of 
theory was his defence of white supremacy in terms of domination 
(baasskap). The first tentative recognition .tha.t. a change in the 
framework in which South Africa's racial policy was judged was 
necessary to the country's foreign policy was to come under 
Verwoerd1s premiership. He became Prime Minister in September 
1958 following Strydom 1s death. 
!Atroducing the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill in 1959, 
', ........ 
Verwoerd laid the basis of the new framework. 
"I believe that we are now faced with a fateful hour 
in which a final choice has t'b be made. It is not 
an easy choice because, in whichever way one 
regards the future th.~~r·e are difficulties to be 
surmounted. But among the alternatives is the 
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"choice of separate Bantu development 
in line with the devefopment in Africa and in line 
with the objects of the world at large; viz. to give 
the Bantu self-government in their own areas. 
Then, however, we can also tell the world and 
Africa with even more justice: Also give us, 
the white people, the right to retain and to govern 
our own area". 45 
The need to replace the concept of baasskap was clear enough. 
By 1959 South Africa found herself under heavy fire at the United 
Nations on both the is sue of apartheid and her mandate over South 
West Africa. 
However, the outlook for South Africa in 1959 contained some 
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still optimistically maintain that whatever the hostility to apartheid 
dialogue was still being secured. Further, many areas of Africa 
had not as yet been decolonised and the·!'le were precisely the areas 
where Union and settler interests were greatest, the Rhodesian 
Federation where white supremacy had survived partnership without 
difficulty, and Kenya where British troops were restoring order 
in the country, in the wake of the Mau Mau uprising. In 1960, 
the situation was to be very much more menacing and at a time 
when the Union faced possibly the worst domestic crisis in her 
history. In 1959 .fudependence was confined to West Africa 
(apart from, that is, the ancient empire of Ethiopia and the Arab 
states of the North) and British policy for Central and East Africa 
still remained apparently unsettled. 1960 saw it clearly 
enunciated. 
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SOUTH WEST AFRICA ORIGINS OF A DISPUTE 
To-day South West Africa's status remains disputed. The United 
Nations maintains that South Africa's continued administration of the 
territory is illegal, a view endorsed by the International Court of 
Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971; For its part, the 
South African government holds that the United Nations General 
2 
Assembly resolution terminating South Africa's mandate was itself 
illegal. However, for all practical purposes the territory is ruled 
to-day as an integral part of the Republic; in fact, since the passing 
3 
of the 1969 South West Africa Affairs Act , virtually as a fifth 
province. 
Throughout the period of Union South West Africa was a major area 
of foreign policy concern for successive South African governments 
and serves as an illustration of many of the common themes of South 
African foreign policy whether it be the impingement of relations between 
Afrikaner and Englishman on foreign affairs or the impact of South Africa's 
racial policy on her international position. At the time of Union South 
West Africa was a German colony. Initially, British policy-makers 
4 
had been prepared to welcome Germany's emergence as a colonial power , 
but the attitude among the British in South Africa was hostile from the 
outset. "The general opinion here is that there is not room for two 
flags in South Africa." 
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By the time of Union, relations between Britain and Germany had deteriorated 
to the point that British,;·,policy-makers fully shared South African suspicions 
as to Germany's intentions in the area. Britain feared that Germany 
might use the territory as the base for an attack on the Cape, Britain's 
southern sea-route to India and a vital supply line of Empire. 
Further the Kaiser's warm message of support for President Kruger 
during the Anglo-Boer war had not been forgotten and it was feared that 
Germany might once again attempt to exploit the tensions existing between 
the two white communities in South Africa. 
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Finally the 1904 Herera uprising prompted the view that German 
maltreatment of the indigenous population would lead to further unrest 
that might spill over South West Africa's borders and affect the Union. 
Consequently, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, Britain 
decided to carry the war in Europe to Germany's colonies overseas. 
The South African government needed little prompting to fall in with 
British policy. An invasion of South West Africa was swiftly planned 
by Botha (the Prime Minister) and Smuts (the Minister of Defence) 
and when fighting broke out in September on the border between the 
Union and South West Africa action by the Union government became 
a matter of urgency. However, Botha wisely approached the situation 
with caution. Firstly, he enlisted only volunteers for the campaign 
and secondly he secured the support of Parliament. 
The wisdom of this policy was soon borne out in practice. On October 
9th, Colonel S. Maritz of the Union army defected to the Germans and 
a rebellion was sparked off among Afrikaner nationalists against the 
war effort. About 7, 000 Free Staters and 3, 000 Transvaalers 
participated in the rebellion. 
6 
However, Botha was able to put down 
the rebellion within a few months, in part because key Nationalist leaders 
like General Hertzog refused to give the movement their overt support. 
The concern of the British government that the rebellion might spread 
can best be gauged from the fact that it secretly arranged to divert 
Australian troops to the Cape. But in the event the British government 
was spared the prospect of re-fighting the Anglo-Boer war :~y{l}il:e already 
engaged in war in Europe. The Union government's chief concern was 
that the rebellion should not inflame feelings between the white 
communities. Consequently Botha set great store by the fact that 
"in suppressing the rebellion the government have had the most hearty 
co-operation of both races 11 and he called for 11 the same co-operation 
7 
in German South West Africa" In Smuts 1 opinion: 
"These difficulties through which we have passed 
successfully have helped to consolidate the people 
of South Africa and to weld them into a strong united 
53. 
"people, and in that sense, I think they have been 
strengthened rather than weakened by the occurrences 
that have taken place. " 8 
This viewpoint proved over-optimistic. The rebellion did leave its ,, 
scars. In particular, the execution of Commandant Japie Fourie for 
his part in the rebellion created sympathy for the rebels among a wide 
cross-section of Afrikaners. Further, the belief of many English-
speaking South Africans that Germany was implicated in the rebellion 
heightened tensions between the two communities. The Rand Daily Mail 
bluntly stated: 11 In German South West Africa were made plans for 
fomenting civil war in the Union, for the invasion of its territory and 
for the overthrowing of its elected government." 9 The evidence 
given for this view was an "agreement concluded between the rebel 
leader Colonel Maritz and the South West African government by which 
South Africa would become a republic and South West Africa would 
. w 1 . B II 10 acquire a vis ay. 
But most important of all, the rebellion highlighted a growing feeling 
among Afrikaners that the Botha government was acting on behalf of 
British imperial interests rather than those of South Africa. This 
feeling had been expressed as early as 1912 by General Hertzog. 
"The time has come when South Africa can no 
longer be ruled by non-Afrikaners, by people 
who do not have the right love for South Africa 
•••••.• Imperialism is only acceptable to me 
as far as it is of service to South Africa. 
When it comes into conflict with the inte:iests of 
South Africa, I am a decided opponent of it .••• 
I am not one of those who always talks of 
conciliation and loyalty, because these are idle 
words which deceive no-one." 11 
Hertzog's attitµde found expression in the formation of the Nationalist 
Party in January 1914. with its slogan "South Africa first" 
The party soon proved its potency by winning 27 seats in the general 
election in October 1915. By contrast, Smuts maintained that South 
Africa's foreign policy interests were best served by South Africa's 
operating under the protective umbrella of the British Empire. 
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It was a fundamental difference of approach that was to dominate South 
African politics until South Africa became a republic and left the 
12 
Commonwealth. 
The actual campaign against German South West Africa was short and 
successful. On January 14th, 1915, South African troops under Botha1s 
command invaded the territory. On May 12th the capital, Windhoek, 
fell and finally on July 9th the Governor of German South West Africa 
surrendered unconditionally. Both in Britain and South Africa Botha 
was hailed as a hero and it was even suggested that the territory be 
re-named Bothaland. It was widely assumed that the territory would 
be absorbed into South Africa. The Times editorialized: 
11 It is theirs no longer. The colony where in 
a time of weakness and indecision we suffered 
Germany to plant her foot has been wrested from 
her by the prowess of a Dominion on whose 
disaffection she fondly built and her name 
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disappears from the map of South Africa. 11 
The South African peace terms under the Treaty of Khorab were 
generous. Non-regular troops on the German side were allowed to 
return to their civilian occupations and only 26 of the regular officers 
were interned. Ip. general, the German settlers were content to await 
the outcome of the war in Europe. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
war the composition of the white population of South West Africa had 
undergone a substantial change. The German population had- shrunk 
from over 12, 000 at the outbreak of war to less than 8, 000 in May 1921 
when a new population was taken in the territory. By contrast the 
total white population of South West Africa had risen to over 18, 000 
due to the settlement of some 10, 000 South Africans. 
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Indeed, 
the area opened to white settlement - easing pressure on the land in 
the Union - was represented by Botha and Smuts as a major political 
and economic benefit of the conquest to the Union. 
While it was appreciated in South Africa that the outcome of the war 
in Europe would necessarily play ap important part in the re-drawing 
of the map of Africa, the South African governrnelit;"readily assumed ... r, ,_. 
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that the annexation of South West Africa .would be little more than a 
formality. Consequently President Wilson's "Peace Note11 of 1917 
urging the conclusion of a peace without annexation came as a rude 
shock to both the Union and the British government. In April 1917 
a committee of the Imperial War Cabinet gave its full backing to 
South Africa1 s position. 
11 The retraces sion of German South West Africa 
was absolutely impossible even in the contingency 
of a completely unsatisfacto:ry peace. It would 
mean the submergence of those who had made 
every sacrifice on behalf of the Empire in South 
Africa and would bring other elements to the 
front whose predominance would jeopardise the 
whole position in South Africa". lS 
In short, it was feared that the handing back of South West Africa to~ 
Germany would provide Afrikaner Nationalism with a powerful boost. 
The strength of the United States President's position lay in the growing 
belief that imperialism was a cause of war. It was a belief particularly 
strong in left-wing circles and supported by the new communist 
government in Russia. 
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That this new climate of opinion might 
eventually deprive the Union of South West Africa alarmed and angered 
white public opinion in the Union. Overseas, Smuts campaigned 
against the return of any of Germany's colonies by playing of fears of 
a German Mittelafrika in which Germany would build up a massive 
black army. He received strong support in conservative quarters in 
Britain. The Express and Star commented: "The world owes 
General Smuts a debt of gratitude for his expose of the threat to 
civilization entailed in Germany's colonial plans. u 
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Smuts• campaign was effective in countering suggestions that 
territories conquered during the war should be handed back to Germany 
but it failed to meet suggestions that Germany's lost colonies should 
be placed under some form of international control. 
The argument over the fate of these areas came to a head at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference after Germany's defeat in 1918.. The United 
States President, Woodrow Wilson championed the view that former 
German possessions should be administered as a sacred trust of 
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civilization under a League of Nations. Ironically, his ideas owed 
much to proposals Smuts himself had put forward a year earlier 
for the Middle East and Eastern Europe. However, Smuts had 
specifically insisted that his ideas were not applicable to Africa. 
"It is a continent inhabited by barbarians who not 
only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to 
whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas 
of political self-determination in the European 
sense. They might be consulted as to whether 
they wanted their German masters back, but the 
result would be so much a foregone conclusion 
that the consultation would be quite superfluous. n 
By contrast, Wilson - fearing the accusation that "the Great Powers. 
first portioned out the helpless parts of the world, and then formed 
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a League of Nations 11 - was adamant that there could be no 
exceptions. 
Smuts• tactics from the outset were that "unconditional annexation 
of the German colonies should be p~essed for to the ll.ttnos.t.n ZO 
Smuts was not alone. He had the full support of Britain and Australia. 
However, Wilson was .the key figure because his approval was seen 
as essential to a post-war Pax Anglo-Americana - envisaged by all at 
that time as perhaps the only hope of a lasting peace - and in the end, 
Britain, South Africa, and Australia were forced to compromise and 
accept mandates for the territories they had conquered. 
The Union•s mandate for South West Africa was a 11 C 11 class mandate, 
one that placed fewest obligations on the mandatory power. 
The conference applied 11 C 11 class mandates to: . 
"territories, such as South West Africa and certain 
of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the 
sparseness of their population or their small size 
or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, 
or their geographical contiguity to the territory of 
the mandatory, and other circumstances, can be~_·_ ' 
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11best administered under tbe laws of the Mandatory 
as integral portions of its territory, subject to 
safeguards ••• in the interests of the indigenous 
population. u 21 
The specific safeguards included the prohibition of the slave trade 
and of the sale of liquor to the indigenous population, the control of 
arms traffic and military training, the guaranteeing of freedom of 
religion and conscience, and the submission of annual reports to the 
League of Nations. There was also a more general safeguard, 
namely that "the mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material 
and moral well-being and the soc:1al,,progress of the inhabitants of 
h . u 22 t e territory. 
The outcome of the Versailles conference caused considerable 
resentment in South Africa, where some at least recognized the possible 
long term implications of the United States President's determined 
stand. The periodical, South Africa , was not untypical of reaction 
in the Union. It asked: 11what is a mandate ? 11 and gave the answer: , 
11W e know and all South Africans know what it must not 
mean. It must not mean that the natives of South West 
Africa are to have any ground for supposing that if 
they are dissatisfied at any time with the Union 
government some mysterious League across the seas 
will take ,:u:e..Jheir imaginary grievances. The mandatory 
theory will have to be very carefully applied to South 
West Africa or it may easily contain the germs of future 
trouble." 23 
They we re prophetic words: 
In domestic political terms, the failure of the Union government to secure 
outright annexation lent added weight to the arguments of those who 
·questioned the value to South Africa of the imperial connection. While 
Smuts did not hide his disappointment at the outcome of the Paris Peace 
Conference, he maintained that the specific terms of the mandate were 
tantamount to effective incorporation. 
created a very different impression. 
However, Smuts r own power 
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11 The mandatory state should look upon its position 
as a great trust and honour, not as an office of 
profit or a position of private advantage for it or 
its nationals. And in case of any flagrant or 
prolonged abuse of this trust the population 
concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the 
League, who should in a proper case assert its 
authority to the full, even to the extent of removing 
the mandate and entrusting it to some other state if 
necessary. u 24 
Nevertheless, Smuts had some grounds for hoping that eventually 
outright annexation would be achieved. The previous German 
administration had been strongly criticized for its inhumane treatment 
of the indigenous population, especially its virtual extermination of 
the Hereros, and initially the Union's rule had been welcomed by 
opinion in the League of Nations. 
Indeed, in the early years of the mandate South Africa's racial policy 
was not the principal obstacle to annexation. That proved to be the 
attitude of the German population. They were, as Smuts put it later, 
"relentlessly opposed to incorporation in the Union and identification 
with this country (South Africa) • 11 25 Although the German settlers 
formed a minority of the white popul:i:i,tion in South West Africa, it 
was a large - and politically influential - minority, thanks in part to the 
generous terms of the 1915 treaty' of Khorab. In fact, because of the 
division among the South African majority between followers of 
Hertzog and of Smuts, the German settlers organized under the 
Deutscher Bund won a majority of elected seats in the first elections 
to the South West African Legislative Assembly in 1926. 
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In addition, the German section was supported in its opposition to 
27 incorporation by the sympathetic interest of the German government. 
The opposition of the German settlers in South West ~frica to 
incorporation did not stem from any disagreement with South Africa's 
racial policy, but from the fear that in the event of incorporation they 
would be further swamped by an influx of poor Afrikaner settlers that 
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would both prove a burden to the territory's economy and threaten 
their dominance of it. In the years after the First World War they 
resented the fact that 11land-hungry South Africans, spilling across 
the border, were allocated huge farms, virtually for the asking, that 
28 they were then petted and pampered into eventual solvency." 
The maintenance of the German section's cultural identity and 
opposition to immigration formed the cornerstones of the Bund's 
policy. 
The conflict between the two white communities did not directly 
involve the League of Nations and from the outset it was South Africa's 
racial policy that provided the main source of conflict between the 
Union and the League's Permanenf'Mandates Commission. 
In particular, criticism followed the disappointment of initial hopes 
that South Africa's rule would spell an end to the abuses of the German 
administration. Through Proclamation 15 of 1919 the Union government 
maintained the police zone - comprising the southern three-quarters 
of South West Africa - created by the German administration in 19ll. 
Under German rule , responsibility for African education had been 
left entirely to the missionaries with the help of small government. 
subsidies. This pattern was maintained by the Union until 1935 when 
just one government school was created in the Aminius reserve. 
Similarly, the prohibition, of African private ownership of land stayed 
in force, as did with':.little modification the pass laws the Germans had 
instituted. The arrest of Africans for "Laziness 11 , 11indolence", and 
"disobedience" continued. 
The persistence of these abuses did not go unnoticed at the League of 
Nations. In a 1930 study for the Permanent Mandates Commission, 
Professor Quincy Wright concluded that 11the mandatory1 s policy 
appears to be devoted to white rather than native interests", 29 while 
the situation in South West Africa led Commissioner Rappard of the 
P.M. C. to comment that "on every occasion in the past when whites 
and blacks have come into contact in territories equally habitable by 
30 both, the blacks had gone to the wall. u 
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While this criticism was resented by the South African government 
which could not be faulted on the specific obligations under the mandate 
it had little to fear from a conservative body like the League which 
included colonial powers, which did not expect the Union to right 
wrongs of the German administration overnight. 
League criticism was in part a response to particular events in South 
West Africa. The most important of these was the Bondelswarts 
massacre in 1922. A tax on dogs had led to a revolt by the Bondelswarts, 
a tribe (in the southern portion of the territory) which was dependent 
on dogs for hunting. After the tribe had refused to surrender one of 
its leaders to the police, the authorities had used planes to bombard 
the tribe into submission. More than a hundred men, women and 
children were killed in the raid. 
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Another revolt by the Rehoboth 
Basters in 1925 was ended without bloodshed, but it also threw an 
unfavourable light on South African policy at the League. 
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The conflict between South Africa and the League was not cmfined to 
the UniOn government's treatment of the indigenous population. It also 
revolved around the question of sovereignty and South Africa's 
interpretation of the mandate, though the two areas of dispute were 
linked. Misgivings about South Africa's racial policy in South West 
Africa undoubtedly contributed to the P. M. C. 1s zeal in resisting 
South African pretensions of sovereignty over the territory. 
Speeches by South African politicians, especially Smuts 1 1920 claim 
that the mandate was virtually equivalent to annexation, roused 
suspicions that South Africa would attempt to secure complete integration 
of the territory by stealth, as did a: 1926 treaty between South Africa 
and Portugal which blandly stated that South Africa possessed 
sovereignty over South West Africa. Finally, South Africa's 
suggestion in its 1936 report to the League that the inclusion of South 
West Africa as the Union's fifth province would not conflict with the 
terms of the mandate brought a hostile response from 1be Permanent 
Mandates Commission. 
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Important though the skirmishing between the P.M. C. and Union was, 
it should not be exaggerated. There was never any question for 
example, that the League would deprive South Africa of the mandate. 
Indeed, in retrospect, the attitude of the League appeared reasonable 
compared to that of the United Nations. In 1950 the South African 
Prime Minister, Dr. D. F. Malan complained: 
u The United Nations wants to thrust down our throats 
a ·doctrine of equality between white and non-whites. 
In the League of Nations we had to do with a reasonable 
body. Th3~eague trusted the Union and South West 
Africa". 
In the wake of its defeat in the 1926 elections in South West Africa, the 
Union section ended its political divisions and banded together under the 
United National South West Africa Party ~.U.N.S.W.A.P.) in 1927 -
thereby foreshadowing the eventual fusion of the United Party and the 
Nationalist Party in South Africa. The U.N.S. W.A.P. easily won the 
1929 elections to the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek and the German 
section was consequently forced to adopt a more accommodating 
attitude towards the South African government and the Union section in 
South West Africa. A period of co-operation between the two 
communities followed, but it was short-lived. The rise of nazism 
in Germany - bringing Hitler to power in 1933 - sparked off fresh 
agitation among the German community in South West Africa. 
In particular, Hitler's demands for the restitution of Germany's 
former colonies (including South West Africa) were taken up by the 
German community and heightened tension in the territory. Branches 
of the Nazi Party and Hitler Youth were established in South West Africa 
and existing German organizations taken over by supporters of 
National Socialism. Alarmed, the Administrator banned the two 
overtly Nazi bodies in 1934. A year earlier, the German members 
of the Legislative Assembly had walked out after the U.N.S. W.A.P. 
34 
had called for the ban. 
The position of South West Africa internationally was complicated by 
the- policy of appeasement followed by the British and French 
62. 
governments in the 19301s. In particular, Britain's appeasers 
envisaged a scheme under which Ge:imany would be compensated 
economically for the foss of her colonies, for example, by being 
granted a share in the raw materials of the mandates. However, 
despite considerable sympathy for Nazi Germany among Afrikaner 
nationalists, there was no support in the Union for the restitution 
of South West Africa to Germany. Few went further than Oswald 
Pirow, Minister of Defence and a Nazi sympathizer, who suggested 
that a new territory should be carved out of the Cameroon, the 
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Belgian Congo and Angola to meet Germany's colonial aspirations. 
The Nationalist leader, Dr. Malan, argued that South Africa should 
"try to obtain the co-operation of Germany with a view to a friendly 
solution under which South West Africa (would) be vested in the Union", 
and promised "moral support to a scheme that (would) satisfy Germany's 
colonial needs." 
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Nevertheless, the atmosphere of appeasement served to raise German 
hopes in South West Africa that German rule would eventually be 
restored. 
"A Territorial Fuhrer supervised the Nazification 
of children in the German school. The processions 
and flag-waving demonstrations were poor mimicries 
of the real thing in Europe, but they frightened the 
antagonistic in Windhoek and Swakopmund. After 
Munich, tension and German truculence rose in 
South West Africa. Young Germans left the 
territory to train as soldiers and pilots in Germany. 11 
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But the situation was transformed by the outbreak of war in Europe 
in 1939 and the South African parliament's narrow decision ~o participate 
in support of Britain. Dur:ing the war, hundreds of Germans were 
interned in South West Africa and the political power and influence of 
the German section effectively broken. The defeat of Hitler in 1945 
ended once and for all the prospect of the restitution of German rule. 
As Smuts noted in 1946, by then those who opposed incorporation had 
I 
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"either disappeared or waived their claims". 
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At the close of the Second World War, delegates from 50 countries. 
met at San Francisco between 25 April and 26 June 1945 to frame the 
Charter of a Successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations. 
Smuts represented South Africa at the conference and took the 
opportunity to press the Union's claim for the incorporation of South 
West Africa. However, the conference ruled his attempt to secure 
approval for incorporation out of order and the question of South West 
Africa's status was deferred for consideration by the U. N. General 
Assembly the following year. In the intervening months, while 
other mandatory powers agreed to place their mandated territories 
under the trusteeship of the United Nations, the South African 
government prepared its case for incorpo:r.ation. During the war, 
the Legislative Assembly in Windhoek had passed a unaminous 
resolution in favour of incorporation. To supplement this 
demonstration of white opinion, the South African government 
organized a "referendum" among the indigenous inhabitants of the 
territory through consultation with native commissioners, tribal 
chiefs, and headmen,· The result was an overwhelming majority 
for incorporation, but the General Assembly did not accept the 
methods used to arrive at it. 
The other main planks of the Union's case were that the Union had 
administered the territory for 25 years and had introduced a 
progressive policy of native administration and that there was no 
geographical or economic prospect that South West Africa could 
exist as a separate state. These arguments failed to sway the 
Trusteeship Committee, which voted without opposB:ion to reject 
South Africa1:\s request for incorporation; a decision endorsed by the 
General Assembly. The Union retaliated by refusing to accede to 
requests to place South West Africa under U. N. Trusteeship. 
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However, by approaching the United Nations Smuts laid himself 
open to the accusation that he had implicitly acknowledged that the 
mandate over South West Africa had survived the demise of the 
League of Nations. His action consequently gave rise to considerable 
dissatisfaction in South Africa. In 1947 Eric Louw for the Oppostion 
introduced a motion in the House of Assembly calling for the 
incorporation of South West Africa as a fifth province. He argued 
that such a step did not require an approach to the United Nations 
because South Africa 1s obligations to the international community 
for South West Africa had ended with the dissolution of the League. 
"My submission is that with the pas sing of the 
League and with the removal of League supervision, 
the Union of South Africa, thereby, in addition to 
de facto possession also acquired de jure possession. 
I ;na;y: put it this way, that the nine points of law 
arising from possession now become the ten paints 
of the law in the full~/sense of the term. 11 39 
~-...,.:r- . ....-..~~ ~· 
Though angered by the attitude of the United Nations towards incorporation 
._ ..... s'" ',., ... ~ ' 
Slliu:t:s·'was not willing at this stage to flout world opinion by integrating 
South West Africa as a fifth province. He did concede that the time 
had come for the Union to consider providing representation in the 
Union Parliament for the white population of South West Africa. 
But unlike the Nationalists Smuts still hoped that a compromise(\ 
satisfactory to South African interests could be arrived at that would 
meet South Africa1s more moderate critics at the U. N. In 
particular, he was opposed to: 
"language which looks like a challenge which may 
appear provocative and which may put the bristles up 
of stronger nations than ourselves and make our case 
more difficult. It is not wisdom to use language which 
looks like a challenge. We are at the beginning of 
what may be a difficult phase for this country" 40 
However, the 1948 elections in South Africa brought the Nationalists 
to power, who immediately adopted a more uncompromising stance 
over South West Africa. In 1949 they introduced legislation that gave 
white voters in South West Africa six M. P. 1s in the House of Assembly. 
In addition, the government provided for the nomination of two senators 
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for South West Africa. However, Malan did not go so far as to make 
the territory a fifth province and indeed, as D. B. Molteno had pointed 
out in the 1947 debate, on the question of the authority of the U.N., 
there was considerable common ground between the parties. 
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At the United Nations, South Africa's representative formally told 
the Trusteeship Committee that his government saw no legal or moral 
obligation to put the territory under U. N. trusteeship. The essence 
of the case he presented was that with the demise of the League, the 
second party to the mandate over South West Africa had ceased to 
exist and that consequently South Africa's obligations to the international 
community for South West Africa had lapsed; in effect, the position 
adopted by Louw in Opposiion. The legalistic nature of the Union 
government's position transformed the South West African issue::~ from 
a political dispute to a legal one, though the division between the 
political and legal aspects of the case never became absolute for the 
U. N. never en ti rely abandoned hope of securing a solution through 
political initiatives. Faced with South Africa's refusal to negotiate 
on the political issues at stake, the United Nations turned to the 
International Court of Justice at the Hague to establish the status of 
South West Africa and South Africa's obligations, if any, to the 
international community. 
On July 3 1950, the court gave the first of its Advisory Opinions on 
South West Africa. The main findings of the court were as follows: 
1. .that South West Africa was still a mandated territory as 
, 
asstxmed'by the Union in 1920. 
2. that South Africa's obligations as the mandatory remained. 
3. that U.N. trusteeship could be applied to South West Africa 
but that South Africa was not obliged to place it under that 
system. 
4. that the status of the territory could be modified only with 
the consent of the United Nations. 
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In reaching its decision the Court considered "two principles ••••• 
to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation 
and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples 
·r form a sacred trust of civilization'." 
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In short, the Court rejected South Africa's claim that the mandate 
had lapsed. The decision was a considerable set-back for the Union 
but at the same time the Court's finding that South Africa was not 
obliged to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system gave 
South Africa room for manoeuvre. In December 1950, the General 
Assembly voted to accept the Court's Advisory Opinion and set up an 
Ad Hoc Committee to confer with the Union government on its 
international obligations over South West Africa. However, the 
government did compromise to the extent of declaring its readiness 
to renew its obligations under the mandate under certain conditions. 
These were the negotiations of a new agreement with the Allied powers 
of the First World War, the United States, Britain, and France under 
which South Africa would be directly obligated to them. In this way, 
the government hoped to extract the maximum advantage out of the 
most favourable reading of the court's findings. 
It is not difficult to see the political logic behind the South African 
proposal. Firstly, the offer was an attempt to meet a section of world 
opinion half-way while in fact making minimal concessions. After all, 
South Africa's concrete obligations under the original mandate had never 
been taxing ones and would not interfere with South Africa's application 
of apartheid to the territory. Secondly, an agreement with the three 
governments would effectively both end debate at the U. N:. on South 
West Africa, which threw an unfavourable light on South Africa's domestic 
policies, and remove the possibility of U.N. supervision, which South 
Africa feared would lead to demands for the political emancipation of 
South West Africa's indigenous peoples. South African fears on this 
score partly stemmed from the racial composjtion of the United Nations 
as Louw made clear in the 194 7 debate. 
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"It consists of predominantly Coloured and 
Asiatic countries, and of countries whose 
inhabitants are of mixed blood • • • • • A large 
number of the South American and Central 
American peoples are predominantly of mixed 
blood • • • • • The U. N. should be afforded no 
opportunity, by the submission of reports, to 
interfere with our affairs or discuss our 
administration of South West Africa." 43 
The Ad Hoc Committee - established to secure the implementation 
of the Courts opinion - not surprisingly rejected South Africa's 
proposal as did the American, British and French governments. 
Faced further with South Africa1s unwillingness even to submit 
reports, the Committee requested that two Herero chiefs, sharply 
critical of South African policies, be allowed to address the 
U. N. 1 s Fourth Committee. The Union government reacted 
angrily to the request and refused to grant passports to the two 
chiefs. The Committee's request touched South Africa on a 
particularly sensitive nerve, the political rights of the indigenous 
population; an issue underlining the difference of approach between 
the League and the United Nations. The Permanent Mandates 
Commission's criticisms of South African rule had been essentially 
administrative in character. Its concerns were the governments 
faihlre to provide further educational opportunities for the 
indigenous people, working conditions, and wage levels. While 
the ultimate goal from the outset, despite Smuts 1 objections, was 
self-determination, the standard by which South African policy was 
judged was whether it furthered the general betterment and education 
of the inhabitants. By contrast, the United Nations demanded more 
tangible progress of a directly political nature towards self-
determination. This was the 1equality1 Malan found so objectionable 
and was why U. N. activity on South West Africa reflected on South 
Africa's internal racial policies in a way much P.M. C. criticism 
had not done. 
The United Nations' response to South Africa's refusal to give the 
Herero chiefs pas sports was to grant hearings to the Reverend 
68. 
Michael Scott on 8 and ll December, 1951. This action raised yet 
another legal question, that of the constitutionality of the Fourth 
Committee 1s practice of hearing petitioners. At the January 1952 
session of the General Assembly, the South African representative, 
Dr. Donges, vigorously attacked the practice as unconstitutional. 
In a bitter speech he declared: 
"If others will persist in making ·of the United 
Nations a forum for discussing the internal 
affairs of South Africa, we shall be forced to 
retaJt~t¢'"in kind and we certainly have sufficient 
straw with which to make bricks for use against 
our attackers." :44 
There was now clearly little common ground between the majority 
of U. N. members and South Africa. 
In 1953 the Ad Hoc Committee reported that negotiations arising out 
of the 1950 Advisory Opinion had been abortive. After its suggestion 
of anew agreement with the Allied Powers of the First World War had 
been rejected, the South African government had re-affirmed that it 
was neither willing nor obliged to submit South West Africa to U. N. 
supervision. Deadlock was thus complete. At this point, a member 
of the Fourth Committee suggested that the dispute might be resolved 
by a further reference to the International Court of Justice by a member 
of the defunct League of Nations that would make the Advisory Opinion 
binding on South Africa. However his suggestion was not taken up 
partly because the enforcement of the Court's 1950 decision would not 
of its elf oblige South Africa to place South West Africa under U. N. 
trusteeship. 
Following the failure of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly 
·established a new Committee on South West Africa authorized to 
negotiate with the Union and to compile annual reports on South West 
Africa. However, hopes that this body would succeed where the Ad 
Hoc Committee had failed quickly faded when the South African 
69. 
government flatly turned down a request that it send a representative 
to the Committee's sittings. Nevertheless, the Committee perservered 
with its intention to compile reports on the territory. A question 
left unresolved by the Ad Hoc Committee, the admissibility of 
hearing petitioners, inevitably arose again. To resolve it, the 
Committee referred the matter to the International Court of Justice, 
which decided by 8 votes to 5 in June 1956 that hearing petitioners 
was not inconsistent with its 1950 Advisory Opinion. However, 
apart from settling this minor issue, the Committee was no more 
successful than its predecessor. In view of South Africa's refusal 
to· co-operate, it could hardly have been otherwise. But while South 
Africa's intransigent stand effectively made the committee's work . 
impossible, opinion moved against South Africa at the United Nations 
as a result of her stand. 
General Assembly resolutions became yearly more critical of South 
Africa's policies and finally in February 1957, .the Assembly asked 
the Committee on South West Africa to prepare a report on the following 
question: 
"What legal action is open to the. members of the 
United Nations or to the United Nations acting 
either individually or jointly, to ensure that the 
Union of South Africa fulfils the obligations 
assumed by it under the mandate pending the 
placing of the Territory of South West Africa 
under the Trusteeship System? 11 45 
At the same time, there fresh moves towards reaching a compromise 
:1f1i'the Union involving a proposal that South West Africa be partitioned. 
This proposal gave rise to the creation of yet another committee, the 
Good Offices Committee. It included in its membership representatives 
of the United States and Britain and to begin with, at least, this new 
essentially conservative creation met with greater success. 
In June 1958, the committee visited Pretoria and discussed the 
possibility of partition with the Union government. As a result of these 
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discussions it put forward a proposal that the northern area of South 
West Africa be created a trusteeship territory while the south would 
be incorporated in the Union. The South African government 
cautiously acknowledged that the Good Offices Committee's suggestion 
merited consideration, but nevertheless re-stated its own previously 
rejected proposal of a new mandate agreement with the United States, 
Britain, and France. And that in fact was the closest the United 
Nations or any of its committees and South Africa ever came to 
agreeing over the future of South West Africa. 
After the Fourth Committee granted new hearings to the Rev. 
Michael Scott and Mr. Kerina Getzen despite South African protests, 
the Union government withdrew from all further discussions with 
U. N. bodies, including the Good Offices Committee, on South West 
Africa. And finally at a session in October 1958 the Fourth 
Committee itself rejected proposals for the partitioning of the 
territory. Its decision effectively ended any possibility that the 
Good Offices Committee 1 s work would reach a fruitful conclusion; 
its work had been the last serious attempt by the international 
community to arrive at a political solution to the dispute through 
agreement with South Africa. By 1959 it was clear that there was 
virtually no possibility of a voluntary settlement of the South West 
African is sue. 
In the light of this realization, the General Assembly in November 
1959 drew the attention of member states to the Committee on South 
West Africa's report on legal action open to them on the status of 
South West Africa. The report, the result of the Assembly's 1957 
request, concluded that legal action was feasible under Article 7 
of the mandate and Article 37 of the statute of the International Court 
of Justice. The dispute thus entered a new phase and though the 
South West African issue continued to engage the United Nations 
in the early 19601s, its work was overshadowed by the case at the 
Hague. 
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Inside South West Africa, African and Eoloured opposition to South 
African rule had wholly superceded pre-war German opposition to 
incorporation. Reconciled to the Union the remaining German 
p~pulation gave its support in the main to the Nationalist Party, 
which consistently won six of the newly created South West African 
seats in the Union House of Assembly. Tribally based opposition 
to South African rule, particularly from the Herero Chief's Council 
had always been strong in the territory. In the post-war years 
this opposition took on a more avowedly nationalist character, 
leading to the formation of the South West African Progressive 
Association in the mid 19501s. Finally in 1959, two African 
nationalist parties were founded, the South West African National 
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Union (S. W. A. N. U.) and the Ovamboland Peoples• Organization. 
Opposition to the mandate in part took the form of petitions to the 
United Nations but at the close of the decade events in South West 
Africa itself dramatically highlighted African dissatisfaction with 
South African policy. An attempt to move the African population 
of one of Windhoek's locations to a new township led to strong protests 
and after an angry crowd gathered on 10 December (1959) following 
the arrest of pickets, outside "the location beer-hall, the police 
opened fire killing ll and wounding 44. It was not the first incident 
of this kind in the post-war period. Three Ovambo contract worke"ts 
had been killed by police fire during a strike in 1953. Nonetheless, 
the 1959 incident, which occurred when the General Assembly was in 
session, served to emphasise that there was an unbridgeable gulf. 
between South Africa and the overwhelming majority of U. N. members. 
By 1960 it was possible to conclude that the central significance of 
the dispute over South West Africa's status was that it had brought to 
the fore South Africa's fundamental conflict with the international system; 
her failure to provide for the political self-determination of all her 
inhabitants. The issue of self-determination had been raised as early 
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as 1919 at Versailles, but the argument there was essentially 
about the acceptance of abstract principles. The principal members 
of the League of Nations were after all colonial powers and consequently 
self-determination was seen at best as the ultimate goal of policy. 
In fact, in the case of 1C 1 class mandates, it was not expected that 
the indigenous population would be provided with any political 
representation in the short term. Nevertheless, Wilson1s determined 
stand of principle at Versailles did play an important role in making 
apartheid an international issue some 40 years later. 
During the 19501s the South West African issue provided emergent 
countries which viewed apartheid as an affront to their newly won 
independence with a backdoor to sponsoring debates on South Africa's 
domestic racial policies at the United Nations. It lost this 
importance in the 19601s when the United Nations became less 
inhibited about debating directly South Africa's domestic affairs. 
Lastly, by the end of the decade, it was clear that the Nationalist 
government's efforts to forestall internationalization of South West 
Africa's status by tactics of non-co-operation had been counter-
productive. Far from preventing the intrusion of the international 
community into the Union 1s domestic affairs, they were highlighted 
and debated in greater depth because of the Nationalists 1 rigid 
insistence that they had no obligations to the international community 
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over South West Africa. 
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INCORPORATION FRUSTRATED - THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES 
The history of relations between the three territories and South Africa 
provide an early example of the frustration of South African foreign 
policy objectives stemming from her domestic policies.• 
This is one reason why relations with the territories occupy such a 
special place in the study of South Africa's policy on the African 
continent. South Africa consistently pressed for the incorporation of 
the three territories until the 19601s, when South Africa finally 
acknowledged the impossibility of dissuading the British government 
from going ahead with its intention to grant self-government and 
ultimately independence to the territories. 
The original exclusion of the three territories from the Union of the 
four self-governing colonies of Natal, the Cape, the Orange Free State 
and the Transvaal was largely a result of the British Government 
sensitivity to African fears as to the consequence of inclusion in the 
new state. In particular, the African tribal authorities feared that 
their lands would be taken over for white farming, a fear justified by 
some of the speeches of farmers at the National Convention to draw 
up the Union's constitution. Geographically, however, the territories' 
exclusion was anomalous as successive South African Prime Ministers 
have taken great pains to point out. 
2 
Economically too the,re was a 
strong case for their inclusion. All three were members of the pre-
Union customs union and were important sources of labour for the 
Witwatersrand mines. 
However, while not sanctioning their initial inclusion in the Union of 
South Africa, the British government made it clear that it envisaged 
the eventual incorporation of the territories into South Africa. 
The preamble of the Act of Union passed by the British parliament 
in 1909 declared 11 it is expedient to provide for the eventual admission 
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into the Union or transfer to the Union of such parts of South Africa 
as are not originally included therein11 
3 
That geographically 
the territories were an integral part of South Africa was not 
disputed. Details of the way in which such a transfer could take 
place were included in a schedule to the Act of Union. 
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"Upon receiving addresses from both Houses of 
the Union Parliament, the King-in-Council was 
empowered to grant a tran!>.fer of government 
upon the terms and conditions S'e:t:forth in the 
same schedule, conditions which forbade the 
alienatfon of land, the sale of liquor and the 
imposition of differential tariffs." 5 
The crucial point to be picked out was, of course, the condition 
prohibiting the alienation of tribal lands. Its significance was not 
lost on delegates to the National Convention, where i1~; ran into strong 
opposition particularly from Natal and the Orange Free State. 
In addition, the British government gave assurances that the people 
of the three territories would be consulted prior to any transfer and 
though this did not specifically form part of the Schedule, it remained 
a major element of British policy throughout negotiations with the Union. 
Nevertheless, the belief that the ultimate destiny of the territories 
lay in incorporation into the Union was reflected both in the 
administration of the territories and their relations with South Africa 
after the establishment of Union. 
The South African government collected customs for the three 
territories on the basis fixed by the customs union of 1903; namely 
the Union government agreed to pay a fixed percentage of revenue 
6 
collected. The common law of the Union prevailed in all three. 
In all three South Africa contributed to the running of the rail and bus 
services. South African currency was used in the territories and 
South Africans dominated positions in the administration. In two 
(Basutoland and Swaziland) the postal and telegraphic services were 
run by South Africa. 
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These then were the-;,deep roots of the territories' present day 
dependence on the Republic. 
Efforts by the Union government to secure incorporation of the 
territories form the major theme of relations between the territories 
and South Africa. In the early period, in particular, British 
government objections to incorporation stemmed largely from its 
fear that the land hunger of South Africa's white farmers suffering 
under the effects of the sub-division of land would undermine the 
rights of the tribal authorities. It was also naturally engugh a major 
factor behind tribal opposition. 
In the course of time, however, opposition from both quarters 
flowed more directly from the Union's domestic policies of 
segregation. A~;though it is difficult sometimes to distinguish 
exactly and neatly between these two sorts of opposition, it is 
nevertheless an important distinction to make, because it is easy 
in retrospect to ascribe attitudes to the British government of 
fundamental opposition from the outset to South African racial policy 
that is simply not justified by the evidence. 
7 
In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Union came closest to 
securing incorporation in the late 19301s when pressure on the land, 
a persistent factor behind popular agitation in. South Africa for 
incorporation was beginning to ease. 
The ~first approach to the British government was made by General 
Botha 
8 
in 1913. The pretext was a speech by Sir Starr Jameson to 
a meeting of the Chartered Company of British South Africa. The 
speech had touched on a historical claim of the Co~pany to the 
administration of B'e'.chuanaland. And while there was no reason to 
believe that the British government would now contemplate such a 
transfer, the existence of apparently conflicting claims afforded 
Botha the opportunity to raise the whole issue of a transfer. 
Initially, Botha set l:rls sights on the joint incorporation of Bechuanaland 
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and Swaziland, but was prepared to make Swaziland his first 
objective. 11Should the simultaneous transfer of both these 
Protectorates not be feasible in the opinion of the Imperial 
Government, then we urge that Bechuanaland also be transferred 
as soon as possible after the incorporation of Swaziland has been 
. 9 
settled. 11 The British government replied that it was prepared 
to consider the transfer of Swaziland but not for the present that· 
of Bechuanaland. 
However, the outbreak of the First World War inten-upted the 
exchanges between the two governments. After the war they were 
re-opened by Botha. While making clear that he envisaged that 
ultimately Bechuanaland and Basutoland would be transferred he 
acknowledged that there was no special urgency for their inclusion 
and directed his attention to Swaziland. He pointed out that the 
territory was net exclusively African but contained a sizeable 
white population mainly former Transvaal residents. (Transvaal 
had, in fact, administered the territory before the Anglo-Boer 
War). 
In particular, Botha argued that incorporation would enable the Union 
11to make better provision for the political representation of the 
resident white population of Swaziland, 11 
1 
O a theme repeated by 
Dr. Verwoerd as recently as 1963. The whole question of Swaziland's 
/ future was discussed in 1919 when Botha and Smuts visited Br:ita:htl.. 
However, Botha1s death that same year and the domestic difficulties 
faced by Smuts, the new Prime Minister, delayed and hindered 
negotiations. Besides, Smuts was more concerned during this 
period with securing the inclusion in Union of a much richer prize, 
Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, Smuts did on occasion refer to 
the need for the incorporation of Swaziland notably in order to "save 
the western Transvaalers (sic) from becoming bywoners· in their 
11 
own country. 11 But these were hardly terms likely to appeal 
to the British government fearful that the Union might violate tribal 
land rights. 
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In 1924 Smuts was defeated at the polls and succeeded by the more 
uncompromising figure of General Hertzog. Hertzog's immediate 
concern in office was the implementation of his policy of segregation. 
Among the measures he was preparing to this end was a Native Land 
Bill, one of whose purposes was the fulfilment of a 1913 pledge to 
provide Africans with more land for their reserves. White farming 
interests made it difficult for the government to acquire the land in 
the Union and consequently Hertzog looked to the High Commission 
territories. 
He made his first approach to the British government in October, 1924. 
He stressed, in particular, the economic advantages to be gained 
from a transfer. Further he pointed out that white deputat~ons from 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland had seen him to press for incorporation 
and he asked the British High Commissioner to make a general 
investigation of the feelings of the inhabitants. The British government 
replied to this approach in December 1925 indicating that it did not 
consider the time suitable for any transfer in view of the fact that the 
Union's native policy-was about to be radically revised. 
However, the British government did add that it would be prepared to 
discuss transfer of Swaziland in a year's time, while stressing that 
the inhabitants of the territory would have to be consulted and that 
care would have to be exercised so that the reception given to plans 
for a transfer by African tribal auth0rities did not force their 
withdrawal. British apprehensions as to the feelings of the territories 1 
inhabitants was understandable. At the time of Hertzog's first 
approach, the chief of the powerful Bamangwato tribe in Bechuanaland 
had declared: "We are a contented people, not like those who are 
under the Union government. There the native people are oppressed 
We strongly oppose any effort to include the Bamangwato reserve in 
the Union." 
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The opinion of chiefs was much the same in 
Basutoland and Swaziland. The lower status in the Union of tribal 
authorities did not appeal to them. Further, in all three territories 
the tribal authorities exercised a strong hold over the people. 
. ... 
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Of all the territories, though, Swaziland did appear to the British 
to be the most feasible candidate for transfer in view of its extensive 
white settlement. Replying to the British letter in April, 1926, 
Hertzog agreed to confine his attentions for the moment to Swaziland. 
He outlined proposals for giving the whites there parliamentary 
representation as well as promising to build a railway to serve 
Swaziland's economic needs after incorporation. Further, he 
undertook to respect the provisions of the Schedule as far as 
Africans living in the reserves were concerned, but expressed the 
view that some amendment to the Schedule would be necessary as it 
affected Africans outside the Swazi reserves. The reason for 
Hertzog's reservation on this score was obvious enough. He wanted 
Swaziland to conform to the pattern of segregation he envisaged for 
the Union. 
The British government replied that it was not prepared to compromise 
over the terms of the Schedule and that it would not contemplate any 
amendment to the protection the Schedule afforded Africans. It is 
easy to see in the British stand on this is sue objection to the direction 
of South Africa's domestic racial policy, for the British refusal to 
consider changes to the Schedule implied, did it not, that Britain 
believed Hertzog's policy of segregation would lead to a dimunition 
of African rights in the territory. Here, admittedly, it is hard to 
distinguish between the two kinds of opposition to transfer I mentioned 
earlier and it is reasonable to suggest that British coolness to transfer 
stemmed in part from a general feeling of disappointment in Britain 
that the Northern tradition of segregation had gained the upper hand 
since Union over the more integrationist policies of the Cape. 
However, I think it would be wrong to ascribe to the British government's 
attitude opposition to segregation any more radical than that. 
In 1927, the British Secretary of State for the Dominions· visited all 
three territories himself and was able to gauge at first hand the 
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hostility of the African inhabitants to incorporation. Later that 
year in discussions with Hertzog in London, he put this to him. 
As a consequence, Hertzog was compelled either to concede that 
the time was not ripe for securing a transfer of even one of the 
territories or face rebuff by the British government. Faced with 
this choice Hertzog decided to drop his request for the time being. 
The question of transfer was next raised by Hertzog at the end of 
1932 when he sent a general letter to the British government 
expressing his desire to re-open negotiations on the transfer of the 
territories. The re was a note of exasperation in the letter, . which 
contained a veiled threat; its emphasis on the need for "reserving 
as much as possible fields of labour within the Union for the Union 
natives, with the consequential exclusion of natives from outside 
the Union. 11 
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The implication was clearly that if the British 
government refused to give ground on transfer, South Africa would 
consider retaliating against migrant workers from the High Commission 
territories, but the threat contained little conviction in view of 
constant complaints in the Union of a shortage of African labour. 
Hertzog's letter did, however, underlie South African determination 
to pursue renewed negotiations to a successful conclusion and the next 
six years saw a major effort on the part of the Union to secure 
agreement to incorporation. His letter was followed up by discussions 
between Smuts and the British government the following year in 
London and by a memorandum prepared by the Union's Minister of 
Finance, the gist of which was that as South Africa was forced to 
14 
bear "the brunt of the economic maintenance of the territories" 
her request for incorporation should be granted. The British 
government's reply stressed the importance of pledges given to the 
African inhabitants of the territories. Hertzog did not let the 
matter rest there, but pressed for a decision by the British government. 
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Besides the economic arguments advanced earlier, Hertzog raised 
the issue of stock disease in the territories as an additional reason 
for getting an urgent answer. He received a reply from the British 
government at the end of 1933 repeating British pledges to the 
inhabitants and stating simply that the British cabinet did not consider 
the time suitable for effecting a transfer. From the British point 
of view two new factors were complicating negotiations. The first 
was the autonomous character of the Dominions after the passing of 
the Statute of Westminster in 1931; an independence emphasised by 
the Union's own Status of Union Act of 1934. Constitutionally, it 
meant that South Africa could no longer be bound by the terms of the 




The second factor was t, e Pim reports on conditions in the three 
territories. They pointed to far-reaching neglect on the part of the 
British government of the economic and social development of the 
territories. The first served to intensify African ap~rehensions 
about incorporation. 
"Suspicion of the Union's intentions mounted high 
in all three territories. Tribesmen feared that 
their lands were to be overrun by the Union's 
Poor Whites and 1redundant1 Natives; they feared 
the pass laws, and, those who had them, the loss 
of their cherished guns, the loss also of the sense 
of freedom that was still theirs. 11 16 
The second led the British government to suggest to the Union 
that if she co-operated in mea:sures for thej economic and social 
improvement of the territories, that might help to improve the climate 
of opinion in the territories towards incorporation. This mes sage 
was conveyed to the Union government in a letter in July 1934. 
It seemed that the way was at last open for a successful outcome 
to negotiations between the two governments. 
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However, there were still difficulties. One was created by an 
approach by the Southern Rhodesian government for the incorporation 
of Bechuanaland • The British government stalled on this request 
and continued to press for Union co-operation, This did come, 
Hertzog agreed to advance £35, 000 towards development schemes, 
However, in announcing , and having to justify, the grant to the Hause 
of Assembly in 1936, he clumsily stated: 
"I got the definite assurance that the British 
government would use every effort to see that the 
transfer took place, but that it was "necessary 
to obtain the goodwill of the natives inhabiting those 
territories. Then steps would be taken by the 
British government • . . • . • Since last year we have 
been in the position that England is actually only 
holding those territories for us, to hand them over 
to us as soon as that little child is quiet, and does 
no more shouting. " 1 7 
By 11 that little child" he meant the African population of th_e three 
territories. Further, Hertzog threatened the inhabitants that if they 
did not accept transfer "then they must realize that the markets of the 
Union will no longer be open to them .••. , , The longer they try to 
18 
remain outside the more they will have to pay the penalty for it." 
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Hertzog's carrot or the stick approach thoroughly alarmed the 
territories' inhabitants with the consequence that: ,_; ·;· ..... , .... 
"so strong a feeling against acceptance of the 
contribution was in fact expressed by the African 
authorities, that the High Commissioner eventually 
found himself compelled to inform the Union 
government that he could not hope for some time 
to ask that the contribution be actually paid". 20 
The offer was then withdrawn. Hertzog's speech was also followed by 
a denial that the British government had given any assurance that transfer 
would take place. In fact, the whole incident rather soured relations 
between Britain and the Union. The following year the South African Prime 
J 
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Minister repeated his allegation that Britain had given a written 
assurance that the territories would be transferred within a few 
years and complained; "The Union's right to the transfer of the 
administration of the Territories to it is indisputable. That the 
time for transfer to the Union has already ex'pir.ed'was conceded 
21 
two years ago 11 • 
Hertzog also appeared angered that the British government had 
not done more to influence the African inhabitants towards an 
acceptance of a South African take-over. He was further adamant 
that since South Africa had achieved autonomous status, the 
Schedule was no longer operative. 
22 
However, despite all these 
difficulties some progress towards co-operation between the two 
governments in regard to the territories was achieved. In a letter 
to the British government at the end of 1937, Hertzog took an 
altogether more reasonable approach. 
Without changing his mind on the status of the Schedule, he indicated 
that in the event of transfer, South Africa would respect the lines 
laid down in the 1909 Schedule as the system of administration 
approximated to that in the Transkei, an example <'.th~ Union was 
willing to see extended. On more practical matters, for example 
the entry of cattle from the territories Hertzog, while sensitive to 
the Union's white farming lobby, indicated that he was prepared to 
compromise. He further suggested that a Joint Advisory Committee 
be set up to consider development schemes. 
The suggestion was favourably received by the British government 
and in March 1938 the British Secretary of State for the Dominions 
ann.ounced agreement on the setting up of the committee. It was to 
consist of Union officials and the Resident Commissioners of the three 
territories. The first report of this committee came out in February, 
1939. It mainly concerned itself with 11 the amelioration of the position 
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in regard to cattle", their production and marketing, and the control 
. 23 
of cattle diseas.e. However, the report only covered Swaziland 
and a section of Bechuanaland and had little on the various improve-
24 
ment schemes initiated as a result of the Pim reports. 
More important was a memorandum sent by the Union to the British 
government during 1939. It was a conciliatory document that went a 
long way to allaying Britain's remaining fears as to the Union's 
intentions. The South African government now agreed to maintain the 
scheme of administration envisaged in the Schedule and to consult the 
British Government prior to any ~arn:e&O.ment. It guaranteed that the 
powers and status of the chiefs would not be changed. Further, South 
Africa assured the British government that she would support existing 
schemes for the economic, social and educational betterment of the 
25 
inhabitants. She also agreed not to interfere with the rights of 
Swazis to buy land outside their reserves, a point at issue between 
the two governments in 19 2 01 s. 
Whether this memorandum would have in the end formed the basis of 
a transfer, we do not know as the outbreak of the Second World War 
interrupted the negotiations. However, what evidence there is, 
. . 26 
suggests that 1t might well have. British opposition prior 
to this had not stemmed from any radical abhorrence of South 
African racial policy. Segregation was after all the pattern in British 
Africa. It is true that Hertzog did complain in 1937 that South 
Africa's racial policy was misunderstood in Britain, but disagreement 
with South African domestic policy was not a significant feature of 
British argument on the subject of the future of the three territories. 
The British gove_rnment was more concerned to see that safeguards 
for tribal rights in the Schedule were honoured. That Britain 
insisted on this as a point of principle flowed from her experience 
elsewhere on the continent that settler communities could not always 
be relied upon, if left to themselves, to meet their obligations to 
tribal peoples. 
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There was of course, no question at this stage that the High Commission 
territories would ever achieve self-government, let alone independence. 
Once satisfied that the Union was prepared to honour the guarantees 
that the British government had given the tribes in the area, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the British government would have agreed 
to transfer, though the opposition of the tribes to incorporation might 
still have proved an obstacle~ That it would not have proved insurmount-
able is suggested by the fact that when Hertzog in 1937 pointedly 
stated that while the British government was committed to consulting 
the inhabitants, it was not committed to securing their support :Dr 
transfer, he was not contradicted by anyone in the British government. 
No formal exchanges on the question of a transfer took place during 
the war years. South African and British politicians were fully 
absorbed by the problems created by the war effort, though in 1943, 
Smuts Hertzog1s successor as Prime Minister, raised the issue 
indirectly by exp res sing the hope that 11his country might at last 
be allowed to take over the governance of the High Commission 
• . .f 1 d f . . II Z? Territories, i on y as a rewar or its war services . 
However, in the immediate post-war years the question of transfer 
was not raised and the next South African Prime Minister to approach 
the British government was Dr. D. F. Malan following the Nationalist 
Party's victory at the polls in 1948. 
It seems appropriate at this point to deal with some aspects of 
relations between the High Commission territories and the Union 
during this period ( 1910-1948) not directly bearing on the is sue of 
incorporation. The two most important areas of co-operation were 
the customs union South Africa and the territories belonged to and 
migratory labour. By 1945, it is estimated that some 50, 000 
labourere from the High Commission territories worked in the Rand 
. 1 28 mines a one. 
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The earnings of these migrants was an important factor in the 
economy of the territories particularly Basutoland. It also 
benefited the Union, a point underlined by the report of an 
,interdepartmental committee on labour resources in 1930 that 
complained of a chronic shortage of labour in the Union. 
Restrictions on labour recruitment outside the Union were 
consequently few and when the Union government did act in 1937 
to regulate the employment of foreign Africans in South Africa, Z9 
the High Commission territories were specifically excluded from 
the provisions of the regulations. A 1914 regulation that for a time 
suspended recruitment north of the Tropic of Capricorn did, however, 
affect part of Bechuanaland. Apart from that, what few restrictions 
existed originated from the territories themselves. 
The sale of cattle did provide one source of friction between the 
territories and the Union. Bechuanaland and to a lesser extent 
Basutoland were hit by Union regulations that disallowed the sale of 
light-weight cattle; regulations stemrriing largely from the fear of 
South Africa's white farmers that their prices would be undercut. 
Cattle disease was also a bone of contention. The territories felt 
with some justice that Union precautions on this score were designed 
f h . f u . . h f h . . 'd . 30 more or t e protection o n1on pr1c;es t an or yg1en1c cons1 erations. 
The co-operation between the Union and Southern Rhodesia on the 
administration of the railway line linking the two countries through 
31 
Bechuanaland led to other more ambitious railway schemes 
involving the High Commission territories. One was to link 
Southern Rhodesia with Walvis Bay through Bechuanaland, another 
the Transvaal with the east coast through Swaziland. However, in 
the end neither got off the ground. Finally, there was other less 
dramatic technical co-operation between the Union and the territories 
on the combat of tsetse fly and locusts, _the control of malaria, 
and on agriculture and animal husbandry generally. 
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Malan first raised the question of the High Commission territories 
with the British government when he attended the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949. He told the House of Assembly 
the following year that he had told the British government that: 
11 the people of South Africa were becoming 
impatient, because in spite of numerous 
attempts which had been made in the interim, 
almost 40 years has passed without anything 
having been done, or, at any rate without 
anything having been accomplished and 
without any practical steps having been taken 
to transfer the Protectorates to us". 32 
In the coming years Malan1s comments on the British attitude became 
increasingly bitter as it became clear that the British government 
now viewed South Africa's racial policies. as a major obstacle to 
incorporation and in rebuffing Malan1s approaches strongly emphasised 
the opposition of the territories 1 inhabitants to incorporation. 
In February 1951, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Patrick Gordon-Walker, visited the three territories. 
He met Malan in Cape Town where the South African Prime Minister 
took the opportunity to press the Union's claim. Malan complained 
that the Union was 11 compelled to harbour territories, entirely 
dependent on her economically, and largely also for their defence, 
33 
but belonging to and governed by another country11 , a position he 
maintained that no other Commonwealth country would be prepared to 
tolerate for a moment. The British reply stressed once again the 
need to consider the views of the inhabitants. 
The effectiveness of the British position lay in the fact that any 
serious. attempt to ascertain the views of the inhabitants would 
surely have resulted in a stinging rebuff for the Union, which would 
not only have reflected on Malan1s attempts to secure incorporation 
but on his apartheid policy in general. Following the change in 
Britain from a Labour to a Conservative administration, Malan 
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returned once again to the subject, threatening to make transfer an 
issue at the next South African general election and to demand customs 
payments from the territories. The new British government simply 
ignored these threats and Malan in fact did not carry out either threat 
but after his party's re-election in 1953 he did tell the Free State 
Party Conference that the issue would have to be settled in the next 
five years 11without any of the assurances which some were demanding 
that Africans should thereafter have a say in South African affairs". 
34 
Malan 1s next step was to introduce a resolution supporting his claim 
in the House of Assembly in April, 1954, following further fruitless 
discussions with the British government earlier in the year. 
He hoped to get support of the Opposition for his resolution, so as 
to present a united front to the British, but the United Party refused 
on the grounds that his tactics were wrong. Consequently, the 
debate turned into an acrimonious discussion of apartheid and achieved 
very little. 
It did, however, induce the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston 
Churchill, to make a statement urging Union Ministers 11 not needlessly 
(to) press an issue on which we could not fall in with their views 
without failing in our trust''. 
35 
This infuriated Nationalist M. P. •s 
who saw in it an implicit attack on apartheid and led some to demand 
that the territories be seized. However, Malan was not prepared to 
involve the Union in a conflict with Britain over the issue and refused 
to back up his tough words with action. Malan1 s threats on the issue 
contained a good deal of bluff, which the British government was able 
to call. 
On one issue, though, the British government had proved sensitive 
to the Union's feeling. In 1948 Serets e Khama the designated 
successor as chief of the Bamangwato in Bechuanaland had married 
an English girl. There was a strong reaction in the Union where 
the new Nationalist government was in the process of legislating to 
prohibit racially mixed marriages and subsequently carnal intercourse 
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between white and non-white. Malan conveyed his government's 
strong feelings on the is sue to the British government as did the 
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins. 
In addition, Smuts as leader of the Opposition warned that on 
this highly emotional issue the United Party would find it impossible 
to oppose demands for an economic blockade of the High Commission 
territories. Fearing that the strength of feeling in the Union might 
lead to unilateral action by the South African government to 
incorporate the territories, the British government decided to 
appease white opinion in Southern Africa by banning the Khamas from 
h 1 d f f . . d 36 residence in Bee uana an or a 1ve year per10 . 
In December 1954, Strydom succeeded Malan as Prime Minister and 
while pledging to continue Malan1s campaign for incorporation did not 
in fact press the issue. He did raise the question of transfer at the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, but the British merely 
restated its previous position and no progress towards an agreement 
was reached. Apart from this approach, Strydom took little action 
on the issue acknowledging that incorporation was not a possibility, 
at least for a time, considering the British attitude. However, 
interest in the future of the territories remained high and was given 
added point by the publication in 1955 of the Tomlinson Commission's 
37 
The report included the three territories in its proposed report. 
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Bantustan scheme and while Verwoerd denied that their incorporation 
was essential to the success of the policy, it was obvious that if the 
Union could secure their inclusion in the scheme, it would greatly 
add to the creditability of the Bantus1an policy. This led - the 
Nationalist newspaper, Dagbreek to put forward an interesting 
suggestion that the Union could co-operate with Britain to this end 
without actually demanding the incorporation of the territories as such. 
It was an idea taken up by Verwoerd in the 19601s. 
In September 1958, Verwoerd became Prime Minister following the 
death of Strydom. It was clear by this time to the British government 
that having rejected South African approaches for a transfer, it would 
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have to provide itself for the political future of the territories. in the 
light of developments elsewhere on the continent. For years the 
question of possible incorporation into the Union had so dominated 
British thinking on the territories that political development in them 
had been neglected, though some reforms had followed the jolt of 
the Pim reports in the 1930's. 
In 1959 Britain at last introduced a measure that opened the way 
towards internal self-government in the territories. The country to 
reap the benefit of this policy was Basutoland. Orders-in-Council 
were promulgated in September for a new constitution to become 
effective in 1960. The new constitution created a Legislative 
Council of 80 members of whom half were to be elected by the 
country's nine District Councils, which were in turn elected by the 
people. These reforms, which were followed by others in the other 
two territories, set the territories on the path towards a political 
future, nominally at least, independent of South Africa and created 
a new situation in the 19601s as far as relations between South Africa 
and the territories were concerned. South Africa's policy in the 
light of these changes is the subject of another chapter, but this 
is an appropr.E.te point to comment on the most striking feature of 
relations prior to the constitutional reform in Basutoland. 
This was South Africa1s failure, even in the 19501s when the British 
government's attitude to apartheid clearly provided an obstacle to 
incorporation, to appeal to those who wielded political influence 
in the territories , in particular, the chiefs. Even granted that 
the tribal authorities were hostile to incorporation - and it should be 
mentioned that the Union government's threats to the territories 
were often responsible for the degree of antagonism towards South 
Africa - it certainly lay within the Union's power to develop some 
political links with the peoples in the territories. That the government 
did not even attempt to do so suggests that Verwoerd' s prophecy 
as early as 1951 that "the Apartheid policy will mean that the 
39 protectorates will actually become self-governing territories" 
lay in the realm of theoretical philosophy as far as the Union was 
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concerned rather than of pracf._q~cal politics. 
It is not difficult to trace an ideological background to present day 
relations between South Africa and the territories, but it needs to 
be tested against the background of actual behaviour and South 
Africa's behaviour during this period certainly did not take into 
account the possibility that the territories would achieve self-
government and independence. It was only in the 19601s in 
haphazard ways that South Africa began to come to terms with the 
political development of the territories and in a sense South Africa's 
relations with the territories prior to this were only an aspect of 
40 
her relations with Britain. The distinction is an important 
one for it underlies the radical nature of the adjustment South 
Africa has had to make in coming to terms with the existence on the 
contin-ent of independent states no longer directly tied to the foreign 
policy of the former colonial powers. It is a point I will be returning 
to in other contexts. 
I have dealt at some length with the efforts of South Africa to secure 
incorporation of the three High Commission territories because it 
neatly illustrates two other common themes of South African foreign 
policy on the continent. 
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proprietary nature 
Professor Macmillan has spoken of the 
South Africa's interest in the continent has at 
times shown. This is ~ertainly evident in the case of the territories 
as is shown by South Africa's unwillingness to accept in full the 
restraints that would have been placed on the Union by the Schedule. 
In fact, the Union only accepted the Schedule wholly in 1939, whicg 
with the outbreak of war proved too late to secure incorporation. 
A second theme, the frustration of foreign policy because of the 
country's domestic policy becomes evident in the 19501 s efforts. 
In this case the British government's view of apartheid proved 
decisive, though it should be said that Britain's view derived in part 
from the views of the inhabitants, who were her responsibility. 
Further, their attitude to apartheid anticipated the outlook of new 
independent states on the continent towards South Africa. 
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Notes on Incorporation Frustrated - The High Commission Territories 
1. Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. Called the High 
Commission territories because they fall within the 
jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner in South Africa. 
2. Especially Dr. Malan, who described their existence as 
an "absurdity". See below. 
3. Quoted in Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and 
Swaziland : History of Discussions with the Union of South 
of South Africa 1909 - 1939 Cmd. 8707 (H.M'.r.?.O., London 
1952) p. 131. 
4. Referred to below simply as 11the Schedule". 
5. R. P. Stevens - Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland 
(Pall Mall Press, London 1967) p. 5 
6. Basutoland received ). 88575% of total customs receipts, 
Bechuanaland O. 2762% and Swaziland O. 149%. 
7. I think that both Lord Hailey and Richard Stevens are somewhat 
guilty on this score. 
8. The Union's first Prime Minister. 
9. , .-·,cind. 8101 P· 13 
10. Ibid. p. 14. 
11. Walker p. 598. A "bywoner 11 is a squatter. 
12. Quoted in M. Benson - Tshekedi Khama (Faber and Faber, 
London 1960) p. 45. 
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13. Cmd. 8707 p. 38. 
14. Ibid. p. 41. 
15. So-called because their author was Sir Arthur Pim. 
The first (on Swaziland) wa:s published in 1932. 
16. Walker p. 663. 
17. Hertzog in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 27 Col. 5920 - 1936 
18. Hertzog quoted in Cmd. 8707 p. 67. 
19. The carrot was the £35, 000; the stick the threat to the 
territories 1 markets. 
20. Lord Hailey - The Republic of South Africa and the High 
Commission Territories (Oxford University Press, London 
1963) p. 76 
21. Hertzog (to press conference in Bloemfontein in July 1937) 
quoted in Hailey p. 78. 
22. Constitutionally, there is little doubt Hertzog was right. 
23. Cmd. 8707 p. 96 
24. See Ibid pp. 90-96 
25. Ibid pp. 100-2. 
26. See J.E. Spence - 11British Policy towards the High Commission 
Territories" in the Journal of Modern African Studies Vol II 
No. 2 - 1964 pp. 238-42. 
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27. Walker p. 735 
28. See Ibid. p. 754 
29. Act 46 of 1937 made it an offence for any foreign African to 
enter, or anyone to employ such a foreigner, without the 
permission of the Secretary of State for Native Affairs. 
30. The terr itories 1 suspicions were raised by the coincidence 
in time between tough Union measures and price depression. 
See Hailey p. 45. 
31. A line originally built by the British South Africa Company. 
32. Malan in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 71 Col. 4192 
- 1950. 
33. Malan quoted in N. Manseigh (ed.) - Documents and speeches 
on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931 - 1952 Vol. 11 
(Oxford Univ:ersity Press, London 1953) p. 929 
34. Walker p. 853 
35. Churchill in House of Commons : Parliamentary Debates 
5th series, Vol. 526 Col. 966 - 1954 
36. See M. Benson pp. 200 - 1. 
37. The E:ommission for the Socio-Economic Development of the 
Bantu Areas, to give it its official title, laid the basis for the 
implementation of separate development. 
38. Then Minister of Native Affairs. 
39. Verwoerd in House of Assembly Debates Vol. 74 Col. 3059 
- 1951. 
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40. That is, the distinction between direct relations with the 
territories and relations through another party, Britain. 
41. See W. M. Macmillan - Africa beyond the Union (South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1949) p. 6. 
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SOUTH AFRICA1S OTHER NEIGHBOURS l 
Initially,' the Union did not enjoy close relations with her other 
neighbours in southern and central Africa, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, 
and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, 
as Marquard has pointed out South Africa's relations with these 
territories until the end of the Second World War were "economic 
rather than political. 11 
2 
This was especially true of the Portuguese 
territories despite strong economic ties between the Union and 
Mozambique. The principal reason why these economic ties were 
not accompanied by closer political and diplomatic relations was 
the apparent weakness of Portugal's Empire in Africa. At the end 
of the 19th century few thought it could survive the pres sure of 
European powers far richer and militarily stronger than Portugal. 
When the Portuguese state declared itself bankrupt in 1893, the 
3 
disappearance of Portugal from the map of Africa seemed imminent. 
Consequently during the first decade of Union, many South African 
politicians saw in Portugal's political instability an opportunity for 
the expansion of the Union's boundaries. Indeed in 19ll the South 
African Prime Minister, General Botha even contemplated the 
annexation of LourencffLMarques by force but was restrained by the 
British government concerned to maintain its alliance with Portugal 
in view of the deteriorating situation in Europe. South Africa was 
not alone in wishing to relieve Portugal of her colonial burden in 
Mozambique. The British South Africa Company in Rhodesia 
declared its inter est in securing Beira as a port for the new colony 
should the Portuguese leave and during the First World War the 
Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, F. D. P. Chaplin wrote to the 
British Colonial Secretary outlining a scheme whereby Southern 
Rhodesia would annex Beira and the area around it, while South 
Africa would secure Lourenco Marques and the southern districts 
of the country. Chaplin suggested that Portugal might be compensated 
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with a new colony carved out of German East Africa. 
Towards the end of the war Botha also expressed the hope that South 
Africa would secure Mozambique in the context of a general settlement 
after the First World War. 
4 
However, President Wilson's 
insistence at the Versailles Peace Conference of a peace without 
annexation put an end to South African and Rhodesian hopes of 
costing the Portuguese from East Africa. 
However, even after South Africa and Rhodesia had become reconciled 
to the continued presence of the Port:uguese in a strategically 
important position in Southern Africa differences of language , 
religion and racial policy inhibited the development of close political 
links. Another reason for Portugal's isolation was the small size 
of the white communities in Angola and Mozambique prior to the 
19501s. Nonetheless, economically, Mozambique was indispensable 
to both Rhodesia and South Africa as a major source of African 
labour~ As early as the 18601s the Transvaal had recruited labour 
from among the Tonga in southern Mozambique. The major gold 
discoveries on the Rand greatly increased demand and by the last 
decades of the 19th century, the foundations of Mozambique's 
importance to South Africa as a vast labour poolc:dor the mines 
had been laid. In 1897 an agreement regularising the flow and 
recruitment of labour from Mozambique was signed by Portugal 
and the Transvaal Republic. · 
Labour was not the only area of economic co-operation between the 
two countries. In 1884 the Transvaal Republic had entered into 
an agreement with the Portuguese for the construction of a railway 
linking the Rand to the port of Lourenco Marques. The line, 
completed ten years later, had a partly political purpose. It 
enabled the Transvaal to "break out of the British commercial 
5 
stranglehold by channeling her foreign trade through Lourenco Marques". 
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However, from the outset the line faced stiff competition from a 
rival railway completed two years earlier in 1892 linking the mines 
with Cape Town and a year after the Mozambique railway came into 
operation a third line from Durban reached the Rand. But largely 
for political reasons, President Kruger - through his control of 
tariffs on the Transvaal section of the three lines - discriminated 
in favour of the Portuguese line. Even after the defeat of the 
Boer republics and the subsequent establishment of Union the 
Mozambique railway retained the lion's share of traffic to and from 
the Rand thanks to special privileges granted to the Portuguese in 
return for their co-operation on the labour front. 
In 1909 Portugal and the Transvaal (now a self-governing colony) 
entered into a new labour agreement. Under this convention - as 
it was called - the continued commercial viability of the Lourenco 
Marques railway was guaranteed by the stipulation that 11 50-55% of 
all railway traffic to and from the competitive area (Johannesburg, 
. 6 
Pretoria, Krugersdorp industrial area11 would pass through the 
Portuguese port. In return the mining companies were granted 
wide labour recruiting privileges in Mozambique. The convention 
remained in force after the establishment of Union. In the 19201 s 
the South African government came under strong pressure from 
the Cape and Natal to protect their ports against Portuguese 
competition. Consequently in 1923 South Africa allowed the 
Convention to lapse but at the same time insisted on continuance of 
labour recruitment privileges in Mozambique. From the 
Portuguese point of view this was clearly unacceptable and finally, 
in 1927 they threatened to end South African labour recruitment 
altogether. As a result a new Convention was negotiated in 1928 
and with minor modifications remains in force to-day. Under the 
1928 convention Mozambique was guaranteed 4 7t% of rail traffic 
to and from the Rand while South Africa received in exchange a 
guarantee that the Portuguese administration would ensure the 
supply of not less than 65, 000 ikfrican labour recruits for the 
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Mines each year. The current agreement provides for a maximum 
of 100, 000 recruits per year from southern Mozambique (below 
7 
the 22nd parallel). 
The organization handling the recruitment of African labour from 
Mozambique was the Witwate.rsrand Native Labour Association. 
It was exclusively en.trusted with this task from 19 03. Initially, 
the W.N.L.A. resorted to questionable and often illegal methods; 
for instance it formed 11 a corps of armed •runners' or 'emigration 
police', uniformed in such a way as to be confused with the 
regular police in the minds of the Africans". 
8 
At times the 
corps numbered upwards of six thousand. In addition, the W. N. L.A. 
actively encouraged illegal immigration of labour to South Africa 
in excess of the total provided by the agreements with the Portuguese. 
After the Second World War these abuses were curbed and the 
W.N.L.A. 
II 9 
now o'perates within the law'' , maintaining 
offices and some 250 agents in Mozambique. Indeed, since the 
wa1r·1n-ecruitment has presented few problems given what is a 
sufficiently attractive wage when compared to opportunities for 
African employment in Mozambique itself. Further the convention 
itself has occasioned little political controversy despite some 
resentment from white settlers in Mozambique at the drain on the 
country's labour reserves. For example, Marvin Hams has 
estimated that in 1954 the labour recruiting companies in Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa together held some 350, 000 African 
workers from Mozambique under contract. Adding a further 50, 000 
illegal migrants to this total he concludes that migrant workers 
accounted for 400, 000 Africans out of a total labour pool of about 
10 
600, 000 in southern Mozambique. The Portuguese administration 
which received a fee for each worker recruited, strongly defended 
the migratory labour system. 
The use of Mozambique's ports and railroads for the transit traffic 
of the Rhodesias and South Africa and the export of labour were 
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essential sources of income in meeting the Portuguese territory's 
11 constant trade deficit". 
11 
Indeed Duffy argues that most of the development of both Angola 
and Mozambique was the result of 1 'external influences and the 
development of lands on Portuguese African frontiers - the Congo, 
the Rhodes:i,as, and South Africa." 
12 
South Africa's relations with Angola were never as close as those 
with Mozambique. Angola had no common border with the Union 
proper and was never an area of major labour recruitment for 
South Africa. Indeed the tenuous historical ties that did exist 
tended to· strain rather than cement their relations. In 1880 
some 300 Boers under the leadership of Jakobus Botha had settled 
in Angola. Some became successful farmers while others were 
re-settled in South West Africa soon after its conquest by the 
Union in the First World War. 
"But the Trekkeri:Pwere never really happy in 
Angola their sense of isolation in a Catholic 
Portuguese-speaking community, and various 
governmental restrictions on their use of fire-
arms, led :ryjny of them in 1928-9 to return to 
the Union" 
Prior to this exodus, however their grievances did aggravate South 
African relations with Portugal as did for a time disagreements over 
the boundary between Angola and South West Africa. The final 
delimitation of Angola's frontiers w:ith: an agreement between South 
d 1 . 19 2 6 . d bl . d . 
14 
Africa an Portuga in cons1 era y improve matters. 
But even before this agreement there had been some military co-
operation between Portugal and South Africa to defeat pockets of 
15 
African resistance to white rule in Ovamboland. 
' 
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·Much closer South African ties with the two Portuguese territories 
came in the 19501s when 11Angola and Mozambique took on more 
and more the aspect of white colonies" 
16 
The post-war influx 
of Portuguese immigrants itself brought about a significant change 
in the social structure of the two territories. 
11 The cultural and economic life of the white 
communities became more intensely Portuguese. 
The occasional blending of African and Portuguese 
worlds was now less frequent. The homesickness 
and the insecurity of the new arrivals led them to 
re-create their cultural patterns and to assert 
their presence on the basis of the .colou:r .. ·of their 
skin. ?:i 17 
Many of the new settlers looked to South Africa. 
"And the discovery that they each shared a concept of white 
supremacy, whether called assimilation or apartheid drew the 
18 
countries of southern Africa into closer rapport. 11 
De-colonization elsewhere on the continent and the common threat 
posed by African nationalism also prompted a change in outlook 
and conseq~ntly more extensive co-operation between the Portuguese 
and South African governments. In particular, South Africa was 
more willing to acknowledge Portugal's contribution to the combat 
of African nationalism following the withdrawal of other colonial 
powers from Africa. 
"The South Africans have in recent years come to 
admire the Portuguese regime in Africa ••... While 
the South Africans do not wish to emulate the Portuguese 
social policy with regard to the few Africans who have 
been able to acquire an education they recognize its 
merits as a policy. It is a logical and sensible 
policy to keep in primitiveness and ignorance as 
many as they can, while integrating the others, 
and it does not require the police force that has been 
found necessary in South Africa. 
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11 The Union, therefore, which receives 
tangible benefits from its neighbour will give 
the maximum of support to the Portuguese in 
diplomacy and in the United Nations, and it is 
probable that at least the Nationalist government 
in South Africa would supply even military aid 
if it were needed especially against a black 
African nation. 11 19 
This judgement seems essentially correct, though perhaps over-stated. 
In 1956 the President of Portugal, General Lopes visited South 
Africa. The following year Portugal was host to the Union's 
Governor-General, Dr. Ernest Jansen who gave expression to the. 
new cordiality between the two countries. "By a happy accident11, 
he declared 11we are neighbours". I believe that we should be 
grateful to history for this accident.'' 
20 
As yet, however, 
there was no question of an alliance between South Africa and 
Portugal. When Portugal became a member of the United Nations 
in 1956, her Foreign Minister, Dr. Noguiera commented: "There 
is not the slightest likelihood of a military agreement between us 
and South Africa. The moral condemnation of having to accept 
aid from South Africa would be too high a price to pay." 
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Subsequently, Portugal found her own policies under attack at the 
United Nations and Noguiera 1 s reservations. lost much of their 
weight, but it was not until the 1960's that obstacles to South 
African-Portuguese exchanges in the political and military field 
wholly fell away. 
Southern Rhodesia's ties with South Africa were from the outset very 
much closer. Indeed, the Act of Union made provision for the 
eventual incorporation of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. 
English and Afrikaans South Africans predominated among the 
first white pioneers in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa's 
22 
influence on the .institutions of the territory was strong. 
At the time of Union Southern Rhodesia was administered by the 
British South Africa Company under a charter from the British 
government. A delegation (without voting rights) from Southern 
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Rhbdesia had in fact attended the National Convention to form 
Union, but it had opted to s.tay out of the new state as it was clear 
that were they to throw in their lot with the Union their representation 
in the Union Parliament would be small. The delegation was 
divided between representatives of the British South Africa Company 
and of the settlers themselves led by Charles Coghlan (in 1899 
the Company had made provision for the election of settler 
representatives to the country's Legislative Council, while 
maintaining unfettered executive power). Coghlan' declared that 
he was convinced that it was Southern Rhodesia's "absolute and 
inevitable destiny" 
23 
to join the Union and consequently, while 
incorporation fell into abeyance for the time being, provision was 
made for both the Rhodesias to come in at a later date. His 
views were to change. 
·During the First World War little consideration was given to 
Southern Rhodesia's constitutional status. It was in the immediate 
post-war period that the issue crystallized down to a choice between 
incorporation into the Union and responsible government. There 
was general agreement that the Company as a ruling power had 
served its purpose 11now that the country was beginning to pay its 
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own way." The charter of company rule was due to expire 
in October 1924 and there was no question of its extension. 
Another a.lternative, that of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, 
did not command popular support among the settlers. "Amalgamation 
with the 'Black North' with its swarming Bantu and sprinkling of 
Europeans could indefinitely postpone the self-government which they 
25 
more and more confidently expected. 11 
The overwhelming majority of the elected members of the Legislative 
Council pressed for responsible governmen.t. However, 
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incorporation into the Union also commanded powerful support in 
the colony especially among businessment and in the press. 
The British government favoured incorporation and stalled on 
settler requests for responsible government. But the keenest 
advocate of Rhodesian inclusion in the Union was the South African 
Prime Minister, Smuts. The case for incorporation stressed 
the country's ties with$ outh Africa. Southern Rhodesia had been 
settled from the south. Its law was Roman Dutch; appeals went 
·to the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court in 
Bloemfontein. The country was a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union; most of its trade was with South Africa or went 
through South African ports. Bulawayo was linked to the Union's 
railway system. Finally, it was argued that the settler community 
was too small to stand on its own feet. 
110n the other hand, many Rhodesians feared 
centralised Pretoria rule and the republicanism 
and bilingualism of the Union. They prided 
themselves on being a British community in 
spite of the Jews, Greeks and Moslems in the 
towns and the Afrikanders (sic), perhaps one-
eighth of the total European population, who 
lived in groups in the countryside. They 
dreaded an influx of Poor Whites into their 
empty acres and the fre·e movement from the 
south of bankrupts and other undesirables, 
whom, mirabile dictu, their immigration laws 
,li~q hitherto succeeded in keeping out. They 
·re·~tred, too, the drawing off of their native 
labour supply to the Rand. u 26 
The rise of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa as evidenced by 
the Nationalists' increased strength after the 1920 elections re-inforced 
settler fears. Following post-war elections in Rhodesia in the 
d
. . 27 
reEJponsible government party won a resoun ing v1ct.ory , the 
Legislative Council petitioned the British government for self-
government. The settlers' case was considerably strengthened 
by the recommendation of the Buxton Committee set up by Winston 
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Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) that self-
government be granted to Southern Rhodesia subject to safeguards 
to protect the indigenous population. 
Nevertheless Churchill prevailed on the settlers' representatives 
to confer with Smuts in South Africa on their way to discussions 
on the country's future in London. Smuts seeing South Afric~i's 
hopes of incorporating Southern Rhodesia slipping away made an 
extremely generous offer to the Rhodesians. Under the terms 
he offered Southern Rhodesia 11 would become South Africa's 
fifth province and be represented in the Union Parliament by ten 
and ultimately seventeen. members in the House of Assembly with 
'.ii.:~\ 28 
four seats in the Senate." Smuts also promised that the 
Union would spend not less than £500 000 on development over the 
next ten years and would buy the company's land and mineral 
rights valued at nearly £ 7 million. Further, Smuts characteristically 
argued: 
11 The entry of Rhodesia into the Union is not 
only in her own interest and that of the Union, 
but also in the interest of the British Empire. 
Rhodesia as a separate state struggling vainly 
with her impossible task is certain to become 
an embarrassment to the British government 
in the end." 29 
In South Africa Smuts' action roused Nationalist isuspicions that the 
attempt to secure the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia was designed 
"to break the back of Afrikanerdom11 • 
30 
The Nationalists calculated 
quite reasonably that Southern Rhodesia's ten seats in the House of 
Assembly - rising with population to 17 - would provide Smuts with 
a substantial electoral advantage as Southern Rhodesia's settler 
community was predominantly English-speaking and loyal to the 
British Empire. Undoubtedly Smuts' speeches and the generous 
character of the terms considerably influenced opinion in Southern 
Rhodesia in favour of the Union. However, they came too late 
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to win majority support for incorporation in the Union. 
Lingering suspicions existed that the money Smuts promised would 
finance the settlement of poor White Afrikaners in Rhodesia. 
Further, Smuts• handling of the revolt by white workers on the 
Rand and Nationalist hostility towards their entry into the Union 
damaged South Africa's case. The settlers made their final 
choice in a referendum - as recommended by the Buxton 
committee - in October 1922. They voted by 8, 774 votes to 
5, 989 for responsible government, which Coghlan now championed 
rather than incorporation in South Africa. 
The result was a bitter disappointment to expansionist-minded 
South Africans who were forced to admit that "Rhodes 1 dream 
of a united Southern Africa was at an end. II 
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For Smuts 
the vote was a shatteri. ng blow to his grandiose ambitions for 
South Africa on the continent. He believed: 
111£ he succeeded in bringing the Rhodesians 
in, he would hold the whiphand over the 
Portuguese in Mozambique; he would be in 
a position to establish South African control 
over the emergent copper industry in 
Northern Rhodesia, if not in Katanga; he 
would be able to build economic and political 
bridges between all the territories of white 
settlement as far north as Kenya." 32 
As a result of the referendum Southern Rhodesia was granted internal 
~eif-government in 1923. After the defeat of Smuts and the election 
of a coalition government of Nationalists and Labour in 1924 in South 
Africa the two countries drifted apart politically, while maintaining 
close economic ties. In the 19301s the wealth of the copper mines 
in Northern Rhodesia attracted settler attention. They saw the 
possibility of extending the country's political power and adding 
to its prosperity through ties with the North. Various proposals 
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to amalgamate the two Rhodesias dominated the political scene. 
The Union was forgotten. 
Like its southern counterpart at the time of Union, Northern 
Rhodesia fell under the administration of the British South 
Africa Company within the framework of the British Empire. 
Originally, the administration was divided between North-Eastern 
and North-Western Rhodesia until the two were finally merged in 
l 9ll. White settlement in Northern Rhodesia at this point of 
time was small though rising (from l, 500 in 19ll to 2, 300 in 1914 
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) 
Many of the early settlers were South African and at the close of 
the 19th Century the Dutch Reformed Church had sent missionaries 
to Northern Rhodesia, However, while mining did attract whites 
to Northern Rhodesia from the earliest days of settlement, it 
was not until the 1930s that mining transformed the country and 
attracted more than a modest number of settlers. This followed 
the discovery in 1925 of rich copper deposits near Ndola close to 
the Congolese border. 
From the outset Northern Rhodesia had close ties with her southern 
neighbour. A railway system linked Northern Rhodesia to Bulawayo 
in the south and Katanga in the north. The line took coal from 
the Wankie mines in Southern Rhodesia to the Congolese copper 
mines. However, to begin with, Northern Rhodesia was not seen 
as a promising area for white settlement. Milner, the British 
High Com~issioner in South Africa at the turn of the century saw 
the Zambezi as the natural boundary of what he imagined would 
one day be self-governing British South Africa. Afrikaners, too, 
like Smuts had seen the Zambezi as the logical boundary of their. 
political ambitions : 11 Then from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay 
it will be - 'Africa for the Africander• (sic)." 
34 
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Consequently Successive Union governments did not show the 
degree of interest in the political future of the territory that they 
showed towards Southern Rhodesia or the High Commission 
territories despite provision in the Act of Union for Northern 
Rhodesia's eventual inclusion in an enlarged South Africa. 
In the 1930s the growing settler community began to exercise 
political influence in Northern Rhodesia. In particular, the 
settlers were attracted by proposals for Union with Southern 
Rhodesia. They reacted strongly as well to the 1930 British 
White Paper declaring the paramountcy of African interests and 
looked south for allies. A strike of African mine-workers at the 
Mufulira copper mine in 1935 accompanied by rioting further 
alrmed white opinion. (The South African Defence Minister, 
Oswald Pirow, sent tear-gas by carrier plane to Northern 
Rhodesia during the troubles. His action reflected South Africa 1 s 
growing interest at that time in the continent generally). The 
strike gave added impetus to white demands for the amalgamation 
of the two Rhodesias and in January 1936 a conference at Victoria 
Falls of representatives of political parties from both Rhodesias 
passed a resolution in favour of 11 the early amalgamation of No:xthern 
and Southern Rhodesia under a ronstitution conferring the right of 
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complete self-government" As a result the British government 
appointed a Royal Commission to enquire into the question of closer 
association among Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
The Bledisloe Commission as it was known reported in March 1939. 
While it accepted the idea of amalgamation in principle, it recommended -
to the settlers• disappointment - that the time was not yet ripe for 
such a ste~. The two main reasons given were the small size 
of the white population in the three territories and the need to 
co-ordinate more closely the territories' African policies~ There 
the matter rested at the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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Though the Bledisloe Commission recommended its inclusion, 
Nyasaland had played little pa~t in the settlers 1 proposals for 
a new Central African state in the 1930s. Unlike the two 
Rhodesias, Nyasaland had not been included in the Charter of the 
British South Africa Company but had become a British Protectorate 
in the 1890s. White settlement in the country was very small -
only some 1 500 by 1930. 
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Nevertheless from an early date, 
the importance of Nyasaland to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
was immense. For both countries it was a major source of 
African labour. 
11 The indigenous exchange economy had superimposed 
on it a money economy in which few of the Africans 
could fully participate. Large numbers of able-
bodied men soon migrated to Rhodesia and South 
Africa in search of work not only to meet their 
tax demands and to supplement nominal 
subsistence but also because of their natural 
restlessness. u 37 
Prompting in particular the migration to South Africa were strong 
links between the two areas dating back to pre-colonial times. 
The Ngoni people had settled in Nyasaland after breaking away from 
Shaka1s Zulu Empire in about 1820. There had been extensive 
South African participation in Sir Harry Johnson's expedition 
establishing British rule including a donation from Rhodes. 
Indeed, in the early years of colonial rule Rhodes 11 subsidized" 
the financially embarrassed administration to the tune of £10, 000 
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a year. 11 He consequently had considerable in:ffuence on the 
new protectorate's government which he used to promote the 
employment of South Africans in key positions in the civil service. 
He also encouraged South African missionaries to work in the 
territory and, in fact, the Dutch Reformed Church 11were allowed 
a spiritual monopoly of the central districts of Malawi." 39 
Rhodes' championing of the dignity of labour provided the background 
to the early imposition of a hut tax, perhaps the key factor in 
establishing the early dependence of the protectorate on the south. 
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· 11 With these growing links, news of South 
Africa's great wealth quickly spread in 
Malawi. Large numbers of Malawians 
unable to find jobs in their homelands· 
and consequently unable to pay the newly 
imposed hut tax flocked to South Africa 
and Rhodesia in search of work" 40 
Apart from migratory labour, however, the Union showed little 
political interest in Nyasaland prior to the territory's inclusion 
in the 1950s in the Cm tral African Federation. 
After the Second World War, interest in the creation of a Cent:ral 
African Federation grew. The settlers in the Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland (which as a result of the Bledisloe Commission came 
increasingly to figure in the plans for a new state) saw in it the 
basis of a new British Dominion in Africa. The idea was given 
added impetus by the election of a Nationalist }?a.rfy)5overnment 
in South Africa in 1948. Settler leaders in both Rhodesias were 
quick to impress on the British government the importance of 
creating a bastion of British influence in Africa in view of the 
Afrikaner victory in South Africa, where Nationalist cabinet 
ministers were continuously referring to the desirability of 
creating a republic, possibly outside the Commonwealth. 
"In a future war, Welensky declared, South Africa might remain 
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neutral: hence it could no longer be considered strategically safe." 
It was an argument that appealed to the British government which 
feared the spread of Afrikaner influence to the north and more 
particularly the Nationalists' racial ideology. As the British 
government saw it; 
"If the Nationalist influence got a foothold north 
of the Limpopo then north of the Zambezi, there 
was no knowing where it might stop nor what harm 
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11 it might do to Britain's plans for colonial 
liberation and African development in the 
whole continent. The will to extend 
apartheid and baasskap was not lacking; 
they could be expected to penetrate any 
undefended points of weakness. The design 
to federate Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
which the colonial office recommended •.•• 
was intended in the first place to contain 
South Africa and erect an inexpugnable 
barrier of British liberalism across the 
southern half of the Continent". 42 
The Rhodesian settlers approached Federation from a very different 
viewpoint. On racial matters, there was, in fact, a large measure 
of common ground between the settlers and the whites of South Africa, 
though it tended to be masked for a time by differences between 
Englishman and Afrikaner. Indeed, the Northern Rhodesian settlers 
were attracted to Federation precisely because they saw in it the 
opportunity of escqping the liberal policies of the Colonial Office; 
while 
"Southern Rhodesia wanted to perpetuate its 
own European way of life, which is essentially 
a South African one based on white supremacy 
and racial segregation, and to expand the self-
governing colony into a great white Dominion. 
It needed the riches of the copperbelt to realize 
its ambition, and felt pretty sure that if it could 
assimilate No:rihern Rhodesia because of its large, 
increasing and powerful white population". 43 
Nyasaland, the Rhodesian settlers would have preferred not to include 
in the new state, but were prepared to do so as a necessary concession 
to the British government, which hoped thereby to diminish its 
commitments in the area. Hopes in the Rhodesias that the new 
state would be the basis of a great 11White Dominion" stemmed in 
part from the large post-war white immigration. Between 1946 
and 1951, 34, 672 South Africans alone settled in Southern Rhodesia. 
44 
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In the end, the constitution of the new Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland was a compromise between settler aspirations and the 
development envisaged by the British government and in 1953 
the new state was launched under the Prime Ministership of Sir 
Godfrey Huggins. and under the banner of racial partnership. 
Much to the British government's relief the experiment seemed to 
rule out for all time the possibility of Southern Rhodesia's joining 
up with the Union. Not surprisingly, there was a strong reaction 
to these developments from the Nationalist government in South 
Africa. Malan made clear on a number of occasions his cool 
attitude towards the proposed Federation and his resentment at 
British intentions to set up the Federation with a rival racial ideology 
to the Union. "There should be 11 , he said, 11the most cordial 
relationships and co-operation between the Union and our neighbours 
in the north, and everything which amounts to an attempt to drive a 
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wedge between us we should disapprove and disapprove strongly." 
He saw Federation in this light and complained bitterly about "the 
effort that is being made in certain circles to get that scheme, which 
has been provisionally drawn up, adopted in these three::iterritories 
by frightening them in some way or another with the Unipn "· 
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And when the Federation came into being, one Nationalist M. P. 
(Albert Hertzog) commented that "Federation is obviously aimed 
against the Union • • • • • • • to prevent the Europeans of Southern Africa 
from forming a unit ••••• to prevent the possibility that the Europeans 
47 
(of Southern Rhodesia) might look more and more towards the Union." 
There was a further source of conflict between South Africa· and 
the Rhodesias and that was the treatment of the Afrikarer minorities. 
There was a sizeable minority of Afrikaners in both Rhodesias. 
Creighton puts the figure as high as "nearly 40 per cent of Northern 
Rhodesia's white population ••••• and 20 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's. n
48 
By 1950 Afrikaners in Southern Rhodesia had founded their own 
newspaper and petitioned the government for the establishment of 
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Afrikaans medium schools. The denial of this request caused 
considerable resentment in Nationalist circles and brought loud 
protests from the Nationalist press in South Africa. For their 
part, the English-speaking settlers resented Nationalist interest 
in Afrikaner communities outside South Africa which at times they 
saw as almost ressembling that of Hitler to the Auslandsdeutche. 
Cited as evidence for this view was a speech by the South African 
Governor-General during a visit to Southern Rhodesia in 1953, 
in which he told an Afrikaner audience, 11 Your loyalty to the 
country where you are now settled does not detract from the 
maintenance of the spiritual possessions which are your own. 
It does not mean that ties of blood and tradition have necessarily 
been broken". 
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Throughout the 19 5 01 s differences of this kind tended to inhibit 
political co-operation between the Union and the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and tended to obscure their common interest 
in the maintenance of white supremacy. {In a somewhat similar way, 
differences of language, religion, and racial ideology had delayed 
political co-operation between South Africa and the Portuguese 
territories). South Africa did maintain close economic relations 
with the Federation, which accounted for about three quarters of 
South Africa's exports to Africa. The vast bulk of these went to the 
two Rhodesias. (Ties of labour rather than trade gave Nyasaland 
her southward orientation). However the Federation's share of 
South African exports to the continent was from 1957 a declining one 
and the protection given Southern Rhodesian industry through Federation 
undoubtedly hit South African exporters especially in the Northern 
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Rhodesian market. Economically, the break-up of Federation 
was to South Africa's advantage. It was the twin shock of the rise 
of African nationalism and the direction of British policy that forced 
a re-assessment in the early 19601s on the Federation (and its 
constituent parts) of its relations with South Africa. Speeches 
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m 1960 by British Ministers - in particular Macmillan's firm 
re-affirmation of British protection over Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland ended the self-delusion of Federation settlers that a 
great White Dominion could be created in Central Africa, if not 
. h B .. h h . h B · · h · 51 wit , ritis consent, t en wit ritls acquiescence. 
The consequence was that politics in Central Africa entered a 
period of fluidity in the early 19601 s. A re-assessment of 
relations with South Africa also occurred in the Portuguese 
territories following the African nationalist revolt in Angola in 
1961 and attacks on Portuguese policy at the United Nations. 
However, at the end of 1959, there was.tittle to indicate that what 
would emerge would be a white redoubt comprising South Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories or that South 
Africa would come to terms with African governments on her 
doorstep. 
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THE EARLY 19601s - YEARS OF CRISIS 
1960 has been described as the year of Africa, for in that year no 
fewer than 15 African states 
1 
attained sovereign independence 
including the Congo (Leopoldville) and Nigeria, two of the giants of 
Africa by reason of size and population. The number of independent 
slates on the continent was more than doubled. (At the end of 1959, 
there had been only 12 independent states on the continent including 
South Africa and the Arab states of North Africa
2
). This in itself 
would have made 1960 a difficult year of adjustment for South African 
foreign policy. As it was, events inside South Africa aggravated 
South Africa's international position,. making it a year of cdsis for 
the Union. 
Less immediate in its effect than the emergence of the new African 
states and the Union1s internal troubles, but equally important was 
the change in British policy towards her remaining territories in 
Africa. Peter Calvocoressi dates the change to 1959. 
11At some point in 1959, the British Prime 
Minister turning now his attention to Africa 
decided to change his policy (with his Colonial 
Secretary), to push British territories into 
independence instead of applying a half-hearted 
brake and so to make a bid for the friendship of 
the African nationalisms which were becoming 
3 
a force to be reckoned with in world affairs 11 • 
However,. 1960 was the year in which it was publicly spelled out by the 
British Prime Minister in circumstances that could hardly have been 
more dramatic. 
In 1959, Macmillan decided to visit British territories in Africa. 
He included the Union on his itinerary despite some protests. After 
all, he could hardly ignore the Union as a member of long standing 
in the C9mmonwealth. On February 3, 1960, Macmillan addressed 
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the South African Parliament. In retrospect, it could not be 
called a particularly radical speech. The British Prime Minister 
spoke of 11 a wind of change", the rise of African nationalism on the 
Continent. His criticism of apartheid was mildly expressed. 
As a fellow member of the Commonwealth 
it is our earnest desire to give South Africa· our 
support and encouragement, but I hope you won't 
mind my saying that there are some aspects of 
your policies which make it impossible for us 
to do this without being false to our own deep 
convictions about the political destinies of free 
men to which in our ow~ territories we are 
trying to give effect11 • 
However, the implications of his speech and the fact that he had 
~hosen South Africa's Parliament to make it ensured a far-reaching 
reaction. 
"The South African Prime Minister was visibly 
dumbfounded and as Mr. Macmillan's words spread 
beyond the Parliament Africans received them with a 
jubilation that was all the greater because it sprang 
from surprise. The speech was a shock even to those 
who saw but dimly and could not have formulated its 
central point: that in future Britain, if forced to a 
choice between kith and kin and new states in Africa 
wohld choose the latter and that therefore the white 
minorities in the Union could not look to a mother 
country or a big white brother to succour them in 
times of trouble. An illusion was shattered". 5 
The grant of independence to states in West Africa while affecting South 
Africa's position in the Commonwealth and the United Nations could 
not be said to have posed a direct threat to the Union's security. 
The samejcould not be said with as much confidence of the grant of 
independence on a basis of majority rule to the territories in East, 
Central and Southern Africa and this was clearly enough what British 
policy pointed to. Indeed, ·the practical consequences of British 
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policy were spelt out that same month by the Colonial Secretary, 
Iain Macleod at a conference reviewing Kenya's constitution. The 
outcome was .a constitution that put the country on the road to 
majority rule and ultimately independence. Dependent on British 
military aid to maintain security, the settlers were powerless to 
resist. In Central Africa, Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime 
minister prepared to fight a rearguard action. 
Replying to Macmillan's speech, Verwoerd at once retorted that 
there were dangers inherent in British policy "in that the very objects 
you are aiming at may be defeated11 • 
6 
Later in the House of 
Assembly on 9th March, he made a fuller reply to Macmillan. 
11It seems to me", he said, 11 that the Western nations are prepared 
to abandon the whites in Africa11 , 
7 
and he went on 11We do not 
accept ••• that the white inhabitants must be satisfied as a minority 
in a multi-racial country to compete with the black masses on an 
8 
equal basis, which in the long run can only mean a black government11. 
Finally, to make his meaning quite clear, he later added "We will 
see to it that we remain in power in this white South Africa". 9 
Six weeks after Macmillan's speech in Cape Town, during a day of 
. protest against the pass laws South African policemen opened fire 
on a crowd of Africans outside a police station at Sharpeville in the 
Transvaal. . All told 67 were killed and 186 wounded. Sharpeville 
as it came to be called received immediate world-wide publicity. 
Dramatic pictures of the shootings appeared on the front pages of 
newspapers throughout the world. The reaction was one of horror. 
Brazil recalled its ambassador; in Norway flags were flown at half-
mast on the day of the funeral of the victims; in the United States, 
the Secretary of State issued a statement, to mention just a few 
reactions. In many countries, individuals and organizations proposed 
boycotts of South African goods. 
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At the United Nations, the Security Council met in emergency session 
and on April 1 passed a resolution deploring apartheid and calling 
on South Africa to abandon racial discrimination. 
1 
O It was carried 
by 9 votes to 0 (France and Britain abstained). The resolution was a 
triumph for the new independent African members of the U. N. and to 
South Africa a disturbing demonstration of their influence and 
effectiveness. 1960 was to be the year of Africa at the U. N. as well. 
In the aftermath;.of Sharpeville, foreign confidence in South Africa's 
stability slumped. 
11 The relation between domestic stability 
and external confidence emerged clearly in 
the months following the Sharpeville crisis of 
March 1960. In this period, capital left the 
country at the rate of 12 million Rand a month. 
By May 1961 gold and foreign exchange reserves 
had fallen from the January 1960 figure of R312 
to less than R153 million, and a severe balance 
of payments crisis was averted only by raising 
the bank rate and imposing import and foreign 
exchange controls''. ll 
The further shock on April 9 of an attempt on Dr. Verwoerd•s life 
added to the fears of investors. 
Sharpeville was undoubtedly a turning point in South Africa's relations 
with the outside world and particularly with Africa. Writing on 
South Africa's isolation in 1964, de Kiewiet attributes it partly to a 
propaganda victory oft the Afro-Asian block. "{They) have changed 
the whole frame of reference in which South Africa is judged. They 
have destroyed the concept of South Africa as a normal modern state 
and have gone far in substituting an African or Pan-African concept". 
12 
The starting point of this process was Sharpeville. It cast its shadow 
over most of South Africa's efforts in the early 19601s to project a 
fav.ourable image to the world. International interest in South Africa's 
domestic policies was enlarged by Sharpeville and in the months and 
I 
126 
years that followed the mas sac re, there was plenty to attract the 
attention of newsmen, whether it was a political trial or protests at 
new draconian security legislation. 
Internally, the government reacted to the crisis by declaring a state 
of emergency and by banning the African National Congress and the 
13 
Pan-Africanist Congress. In the longer term, the government 
greatly increased defence expenditure. 
Early in 1960, Verwoerd had announced his intention to hold a 
referendum on the question of making South Africa a Republic. 
It was held in October and by a narrow majority the all-white electorate 
voted in favour of the Union becoming a Republic, but the task of 
securing the agreement of other members of the Commonwealth to 
such a change proved to be more than just a formality. At the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in May 1960 
attended by Eric Louw as Verwoerd was still recovering from the 
attempt on his life, Macmillan succeeded in keeping apartheid off.the 
formal agenda, but Louw did not get what he wanted. South Africa's 
application to remain in the Commonwealth in the event of it becoming 
a Republic was held over as, at this stage, hypothetical. Further 
it was clearly hinted in the final communique of the conference that 
in the absence of a change in South Africa's racial policy, it might be 
rejected. The new African and Asian members of the Commonwealth 
were particularly hostile to South Africa's application. At the 
Conference, Nkrumah cancelled his invitation to Louw to visit Ghana. 
There were further blows to South Africa's position in world affairs 
at the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa, 
a meeting attended as well by African Nationalist leaders of countries 
not yet independent. The Conference adopted two resolutions aimed 
at South Africa. The first noted the intention of the Governments 
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of Liberia and Ethiopia to institute legal proceedings against South 
Africa at the International Court of Justice at the Hague over the 
question of South West Africa and set up a steering committee "to 
determine the procedures and tactics incident to the conduct of the 
. "d" 1 d" u 14 JUr1 ica procee ings . 
The second called on members to sever or not to establish diplomatic 
relations with South Africa. It further urged boycotts of South 
African goods and the closing of ports and airports to ships and 
planes flying the South African flag. It also invited African 
members of the Commonwealth to do all in their power to "secure 
the exclusion of the Union of South Africa from the British Common-
15 
wealth 11 • Although the implementation of a trade boycott was 
never, in fact, complete, it had a small but noticeable impact on 
South Africa• s trade with Africa. 
16 
A number of states took swift action to implement at least the 
spirit of the resolution. Somaliland announced that it would exclude 
South Africa from Commonwealth countries to be granted a 15% trade 
tariff preference. Nigeria decided to ban all imports from South 
Africa as did the Sudan and Ghana. Ghana went further and closed 
her ports to South African ships and aircraft. She also required 
South African citizens wishing to enter the country to sign a 
declaration that they opposed racial discrimination. Verwoerd 
retorted by warning that action would be taken against any South 
African citizen who signed such a declaration. There were 
unofficial boycotts of South African goods in Kenya and Tanganika. 
17 
The immediate practical effect on South Africa of the various 
boycott moves was not great. In fact, during 1960 South Africa's 
export trade increased. However, these moves were nonetheless 
important. Diplomatically, South Africa felt the cold shoulder 
and was effectively excluded from the affairs of the continent. 
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In more favourable circumstances, the South African government 
might have hoped that the withdrawal of the colonial powers would 
have resulted in 'better opportunities for South Africa to promote 
trade and technical co-operation with Africa. Leaving aside the 
unwelcome encouragement withdrawal gave to African nationalist 
movements on and within South Africa's borders, politically, too, 
the South African government was unable in the early 1960s to 
" exploit the vacuum left by the colonial powers. Alarming, also, 
from the South African government1 s point of view was the degree 
of influence the new states appeared to have on the West, particularly 
the United States. The honeymoon in relations between the West 
and Africa after independence in the early 1960s tended to obscure 
the weakness and vulnerability of the new states. 
On June 30, 1960 the Congo (Leopoldville) became independent. 
A week after independence African soldiers in the Force Publique 
the Congolese army, mutinied against their Belgian officers. They 
resented the fact that they were still subject to the orders of Belgians 
and felt that independence had passed them by. There was a break-
down of law and order through much of the country as Europeans 
who provided the backbone of the administration fled the country. 
In these circumstances, Kasavubu (the President) and Lumumba 
{the Prime Minister) appealed to the United Nations for help. 
Showing considerable diplomatic skill, the African states persuaded 
the Great Powers to agree to the intervention of a United Nations 
force. 
General: 
On July 14, the Security Council authorized the Secretary 
11 to take the necessary steps, in consultation 
with the Government of the Republic of the 
Congo, to provide the Government with such 
military assistance, as may be necessary, 
until, through the efforts of the Congolese 
Government •.• the national security forces 
may be able, in the opinion of the Government 
to meet fully their tasks. u 18 
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Adding to the Congo government's difficulties was the declaration 
of independence by the Katangese provincial authorities led by Moise 
Tshombe on July 11. In fact, Tshombe had made an abortive 
attempt to secede a few days before independence but had failed 
because of the opposition of the Belgian authorities in Elizabethville 
and the majority of businessmen. Following the mutiny the 
situation had changed and Tshombe secured the enthusiastic 
backing of the local European community and Union Miniere, the 
great Katanga mining corporation, which saw secession as a way 
to protect its investments. 
Both in the Federation and in South Africa, the declaration of 
ind~pendence was welcomed, and though South Africa never went 
quite so far as to officially recognize the new state, Die Burger 
19 
wrote that 11very cogent reasons 11 - could be quoted for 
supporting recognition of the new state. The Observer's 
correspondent in the Federation described the reaction there as 
follows: 
"There is widespread hope that Mr. Tshombe will 
achieve and maintain his independence. It would 
bring marked commercial advantages for the 
Federation particularly in the increased use of 
Federal power and transport. It would also 
present a staggering set-back for the Congo 
Government of Mr. Patrice Lumumba which is 
most cordially loathed herett. 2 0 
To Welensky and Verwoerd, Lumumba represented militant African 
nationalism sweeping south with as its ultimate aim the elimination 
of white rule from the continent. The hope was that Katanga would 
act as a buffer state ensuring the collective security of the white south. 
Added impetus was given to this thinking by the Angolan revolt in 1961. 
Katangese secession offered South Africa one of its first opportunities 
to take initiatives in independent Africa to consolidate her own position 
on the contin:ent. 
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It is not difficult to see the importance of the Congo strategically 
to South Africa. Occupying the centre of Africa, the Congo 
provides a link between Central and Southern Africa and East 
and West Africa. The long border with Angola means that the 
composition of the Congolese government can radically affect 
the ability of the Portuguese to maintain themselves in that country. 
Further, Angola provides a route south into South West Africa. 
However, it is fair to say that strategic thinking of this kind was 
still in its infancy, though by this time, the political differences 
that had inhibited close political links between the Portuguese, 
the Federation and South Africa had declined i:q. importance in 
the context of opposing militant African nationalism. 
In the months that followed, the new regime in Katanga consolidated 
itself and it seems probable that Katanga entered into trade agreements 
with South Africa, the Federation, and Angola to offset supplies 
unavailable due to the closure of the border with the rest of the 
Congo. The unity which had attended the initial efforts of African 
states to bring law and order to the Congo did not last long. 
It was disrupted by the dispute between Kasavubu and Lumumba. 
The more radical stat es led by Ghana and Guinea, formed themselves 
into the Casablanca block, while the more conservative, consisting 
of most of the former French territories, formed the Brazzaville 
group. 
These divisions did not bode well for a successful conclusion to the 
United Nations' operation in the Congo. In these circumstances 
Tshombe was well placed to entrench himself in 1961, which he did 
with some success. The Katangese regime maintained its close 
links with the Federation and South Africa, where it recruited 
_. ____ ______...i 
131 
mercenaries from offices in Bulawayo and Johannesburg. 
In August 1961, two members of Tshombe's Cabinet (Gabriel 
Kitenge and Jean Kitwe) visited Pretoria for discussions with the 
South African government. It was the first contact of this kind 
that South Africa had had with independent Africa. 
However, by the erid of 1961 Katanga 1 s position had deteriorated. 
U. N. troops in Elizabethville had become actively involved in 
ending secession, for which they had the support of the American 
government. The new Kennedy administration's backing for 
African nationalism clea:Hy had its mes sage for the South African 
government; 
"American backing for the United Nations 1 action 
in December demonstrated that the United States 
was not prepared to support white interests in 
Southern Africa indefinitely, particularly when 
this me ant incurring extensive hostility among 
the Afro-Asians and made communist penetration 
easier11 • 21 
So concludes Catherine Hoskyns in her study of the Congo between 
January 196:0 and December 1961. 
In fact, .secession only finally came to an end in January 1963 and 
the situation in the Congo was once again to favour South Africa when 
Tshombe succeeded in becoming Prime Minister of the whole of the 
Congo in 1964. In dealing with the first Congo ,~Jcrisis, I have strayed 
somewhat from consideration of the events of 1960 as they affected 
South Africa. To summarize the most important of these in the 
second half of the year; a large number of African states, mainly 
fo.r.m.er French territories attained independence. Inside South 
Africa, a referendum of white voters in the Union and South West 
\ 
Africa voted by a narrow majority for a Republic. Finally, 
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Ethi9pia and Liberia formally filed charges against South Africa at 
the International Court of Justice over South West Africa. 
22 
The impending court case ended the year on a note that stressed the 
difficulties faced by South Africa internationally. 
1961 was another uneasy year for the South African government. 
In that year, South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth. 
At the beginning of the year, there was a revolt against Portuguese 
rule in Angola. Tens of thousands fled into neighbouring Congo 
and thousands were killed by the Portuguese security forces. 
Riots in Luanda, in particular, caught the world's attention and 
although the revolt did not directly involve South Africa, by isolating 
the Portuguese internationally it brought the two countries (Portugal 
and South Africa) closer together politically. The situation 
in Angola was discussed a number of times during the year by 
both the U. N. General Assembly and the Security Council and 
on June 9 the Security Council adopted an Afro-Asian resolution 
23 
calling on Portugal 11 to desist forthwith from repressive measures" 
by 9 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (Britain and France). The 
resolution had the support of the United States, a pointed indication 
of the new Kennedy administration's attitude towards white rule 
in Southern Africa. 
In March (1961), Verwoerd flew to London to attend the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference. For South Africa it was a crucial 
meeting. The issue of South Africa's continued membership of the 
organization could no longer be deferred. South Africa had 
determined to become a Republic, and legislation to that effect had 
been passed through Parliament. During the referendum campaign, 
Verwoerd had made it clear that he hoped that South Africa would 
. be able to retain her place within the Commonwealth. However, in 
a broadcast in January 1961, he emphasized that South Africa would 
not be prepared to stay in at the price of allowing interference in 
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South Africa's domestic affairs 11 or of sacrificing principles on 
which her government had been elected repeatedly since 1948 
or of submitting to any reflection her sovereignty or her national 
24 
honour''. 
At the Conference, attempts were made by the older Commonwealth 
countries to satisfy the new states' criticisms of apartheid, but to 
retain South Africa in the Commonwealth. These failed partly 
because of Verwoerd1 s own refusal to compromise in any way his 
domestic policy and partly, too, because of the stand taken by 
Julius Nyerere, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, which.was soon 
to become independent. In a strongly worded letter to the 
Conference, Nyerere indicated that Tanganyika would not remain 
in the Commonwealth if South Africa did. 
When the extent of opposition to apartheid within the Conference 
became apparent, Verw,oerd decided to withdraw South Africa's· 
application to remain in the Commonwealth, rather .• than face a 
humiliating showdown on the issue of apartheid. 
communique described the outcome as follows: 
The official 
11 The Prime Minister of South Africa informed 
the other Prime Ministers ••.• that in the light 
of the views expressed on behalf of other member 
governments and the indications of their future 
intentions regarding the racial policy of the 
Union government he decided to withdraw his 
application for South Africa's continuing member-
ship of the Commonwealth as a Republic." 25 
Consequently, on May 31 when South Africa became a Republic, she 
ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth. It was the end of 
an era. On his return from the Conference, Verwoerd maintained 
that the rebuff he had received was really no defeat at all. He 
told a crowd of supporters at the airport "What happened in London 
was not a defeat but a victory ..••.• something greater than we could 
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have expected has happened ••••. We have freed ourselves from 
the Afro-Asian states." 
26 
Yet for all Verwoerd' s optimism, South Afr ica1 s virtual expulsion 
from the Commonwealth was a blow to the country's prestige. 
However, it is true that the value of Commonwealth membership 
to South Africa had declined considerably since the time of 
Smuts' premiership. The Commonwealth was no longer a small 
group of states linked by close ties of kith and kin and prepared 
to exchange confidences between one another. 
in size and had changed in nature. 
It had expanded 
As early as 1955, Die Burger had complained 110pen-hearted and 
fruitful exchanges have already become impossible on many matters. 
For example, we believe that mj,litary and African affairs cannot 
·with advantage be discussed in the presence of India11 • 
27 
Domestically, too, there were certain advantages to the Nationalists 
in leaving the Commonwealth. It satisfied a section of Afrikaans 
opinion that had always regarded any link with Britain with suspicion;,.., 
In addition, many Nationalists felt that the break with the Common-
wealth, while isolating South Africa still further, would bring 
many English-speaking whites into the Nationalist laager. One 
of the reasons why Verwoerd had pushed ahead the previous year 
with the referendum for a Republic was his belief that the link with 
/ the British crown was a divisive influence on the electorate, a source 
among English-speaking South Africans of divided loyalties. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that many English-speaking 
South Africans should feel that Verwoerd1 s efforts to keep South 
Africa in the Commonwealth had not been genuine. 
"Some of Verwoerd1 s bitter critics more than 
insinuated that he had gone to the conference 
(in March 1961) with the secret intention of 
taking South Africa out of the Commonwealth. 
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11 There is no evidence to support such a 
charge and much to the contrary. 
But to allay the alarm of those who feared 
that establishing a republic would mean the 
loss of Commonwealth membership, the 
Nationalists went far in declaring that there 
was no danger whatever of the latter. 
Verwoerd, as well as most white South 
Africans, was deeply shocked by the 
expulsion. Probably the best summary 
of the event is that the Prime Minister 
suffered a defeat but the National Party 
scored a victory. 11 28 
While I think Vandenbosch exaggerates the sense of shock felt by 
Verwoerd and indeed Afrikaner nationalists generally, I think he is 
basically correct in saying that Verwoerd1s application to keep South 
·Africa wasin essence genuine. It seems implausible that the 
humiliation suffered by Verwoerd at the 1961 conference was 
deliberately engineered to impress English-speaking voters at 
home of the sincerity of his declarations during the referendum 
campaign. However, though the loss of Commonwealth membership 
was a blow to the South African government internationally, it was 
a set-back viewed with rather more equanimity by Verwoerd 
especially in the domestic political context than Vandenbosch suggests. 
Further, Verwoerd1 s inflexible determination not to make any 
concessions over domestic policy at the conference lent credibility 
to criticisms that his efforts were insincere. 
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth did damage foreign 
confidence in the country upon which foreign investment depended. 
But the damage was temporary and Verwoerd proved correct in 
assuming that in the long run domestic stability would be a more 
important factor in determining the attitude of investors. On the 
establishment of the Republic, Verwoerd took great pains to 
re-assure investors by favourably contrasting South Africa's stability 
to "the chaos in the Congo" 
29 
But South Africa's position in 
international forums was lastingly weakened by the loss of Common-
wealth membership. She could no longer, as in the past, rely 
on the older Commonwealth members doing what they could to ease 
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her position. In the field of trade though, South Africa was 
hardly affected. Most of the agreements with other Commonwealth 
countries were bilateral and survived the change of status. 
Nor was there a radical change as such in South Africa1 s relations 
with other African states, but South Africa 1 s virttial expulsion 
from the Commonwealth was a victory for the new states and 
encouraged the belief that pressure on the West over the issue of 
South Africa could exact dividends. 
1961 saw further step_s by individual African countries to isolate 
South Africa, but little collective action. In June, the United 
Arab Republic withdrew her diplomatic mission from South Africa 
which meant that there were no representatives of independent 
Africa left in the country. Tanganyika, which became independent 
in 1961, ended labour recruitment by South Africa. Sierra Leone 
also gaining independence in 1961 barred her territory to South 
African ships and planes, and instituted a trade boycott, while 
Senegal barred South African passport holders from her territory 
and Liberia, in addition, closed her ports and airports to South 
Af . h" . d . f 
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r1can s ipp1ng an a1rcra t. 
In other respects 1961 was a better year for South Africa. 
As described above, Katanga's secession offered South Africa 
opportunities in the Congo. Further, the Congo crisis divided 
African states and took up their attention. The second half of the 
year also saw a substantial improvement in South Africa's economic 
position. Her reserves rose from less than Rl53 million in May 
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to over R316 million by February 1962. However, as yet her 
economic recovery was not complete. 
'.,;,._:) 
In 1962, the new African states once again looked south. 
u From 1962 on, as the situation in both 
Algeria arid the Congo begair~to ease, the 
differences between the various groups of 
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"African states grew less and there was 
fairly general agreement on a campaign to 
press the !Jnited Natbns into further action 
over South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and 
the Portuguese colonies". 32 
Initially, the African group at the U. N. directed their attention 
towards the situation in Central Africa. Southern Rhodesia became 
the main target of the Committee of Seventeen, which considered 
the position of non-self-governing territories, afte~.t a special U. N. 
sub-committee had decided that Southern Rhodesia came within 
the Committee's terms of reference. 
At the end of the year, South Africa once again came under the 
spotlight. The African group succeeded where they had failed the 
previous year. They persuaded the General Assembly to adopt a 
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resolution by the necessary two-thirds majority urging states 
to impose dipfomatic and trade sanctions on South Africa. However, 
it was somewhat of a hollow victory as it was opposed by most 
Wes tern countries, the Republic's main trading partners. The 
African group also succeeded in getting a special U. N. committee 
on aparthefd set up. Shortly after this in December 1962, the 
International Court of Justice found, though by the narrow majority 
of 8 votes to 7, that the case brought against South Africa by 
Ethi9pia and Liberia over South West Africa fell within its 
jurisdiction. This boost to African .states intent on a show-down 
in Southern Africa was reflected in a flurry of activity the following 
year at the U. N. 
In other spheres, too, African states were active. In January {of 1962) 
the Senegal government refused to grant visas to South African 
delegates for a meeting in Dakar of the International Communications 
Union. After threats of a move to expel! her, South Africa 
decided not to attend a meeting of the C. C. T.A. {Council for 
· Technical Co-operation in Africa) in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. 
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In February, the Republic decided not to send delegates to a meeting 
in Addis Ababa of the U. N. Economic Commission for Africa, 
because of the inclusion on the agenda of an item dealing with racial 
discrimination. During the year Tanganyika and the Somali 
Republic joined the ranks of countries w1th an official boycott of 
South African goods, but there were widespread reports in 1962 
that boycotts announced by African states were not being strictly 
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enforced. · The South African government could also take 
some heart from the visit to Pretoria of a Cabinet Minister from 
the Congo (Brazzaville) government; a reminder that independent 
Africa was not altogether united in its determin·~tion to ostracize 
South Africa. 
Economically, South Africa's position continued to improve during 
the year and undoubtedly, the fact that internafly, there were fewer 
disturbances than in 1960 or 1961 "contriTh~uted .. :."·to growing confidence 
in the country1 s stability. 
Durln.g this period, important. changes were taking place in the 
Federation which we should briefly consider, though, in fact, South 
Africa played little part in the drama of the Federation's final break-
up. South Africa had never looked on the Federation's experiment 
in racial partnership with favour. 
35 
To a certain extent, relations 
between the Federation and South Africa had improved under the 
impact of African nationalism. For example, the Federal 
authorities co-operated with the South African police by returning 
political ref~)g~~-~~,· to the Republic. Nevertheless, at no stage 
was there m.uch enthusiasm in South Africa for sustaining the 
Federation. After the review of the Federal constitution in 1960, 
Eric Louw "predicted that the time might possibly come when South 
Africaiiand Southern Rhodesia would have to stand together to maintain 
36 
white, civilisation in Africa. u 
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Towards the end of 1961 Verwoerd also indicated that he did not 
support the policies of the Federation, declaring that it pursued 
37 
11 a policy opposite to ours" 
Progress towards majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
following constitutional reviews in 1960 and 1961 also made 
Federation a less attractive proposition to whites in Southern 
Rhodesia and while the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir 
Edgar Whitehead secured approval of a more liberal constitution 
at a referendum, he succeeded partly because voters believed that 
the new constitution would provile the basis for independence. 
However, it soon became clear that this hope would be disappointed. 
· Further violence on the part of the African nationalist movement 
and attacks on Southern Rhodesia's racial policies at the U. N. 
contributed to a growing white backlash. This culminated in 
Whitehead's defeat at a general election in December 1962, 
which brought the right-wing Rhodesian Front to power. 
The policies of the Front were orientated towards those of South 
Africa and one cif its main objectives was independence for 
Southern Rhodesia. It had little interest or faith in the survival 
of the Federation. 
In Odober 1962, elections on a wide, but not universal suffrag~# 
had been held in Northern Rhodesia. Under the complicated voting 
system, the ruling United Federal Party had emerged with the 
largest number of se!its, 16. However, it was thrust out of 
office by a coalition of the two African nationalist parties, the 
United National Independence Party and the African National Congress. 
(U.N.LP. secured 14 seats; the A.N. C. 7) The new government 
under Kaunda, like its African nationalist counterpart under Banda 
in Nyasaland was committed to breaking away from the Federation 
at the earliest opportunity. Thus, by the end of 1962, all three 
_J 
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constituent governments of the Federation were, in varying degrees, 
opposed to its continuance. The Federal Prime Minister, 
Sir Roy Welensky was increasingly an isolated figure. He had 
obtained a hollow victory earlier in the year in federal elections 
which the m,\l.jority of both white and black voters had ignored. 
The British government1 s announcement in December 1962 that 
it would sanction Nyasaland1s secession from the Federation was 
simply a recognition of the inevitable. It was followed in March 
1963 by a similar announcement in regard to Northern Rhodesia 
which effectively set the seal on the Federation's demise. 
This action elicited the comment from Verwoerd that he had never 
believed the Federal experiment would succeed, while Louw 
predicted close co-operation between South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia. Finally, in June and July 1963, arrangements were 
made at a conference in Victoria Falls for the dissolution of the 
Federation in December. 
However, that is not quite the end of the story. In August of 1963, 
the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky visited South Africa 
for discussions with Dr. Verwoerd. Exactly what the purpose of 
the visit was is difficult to determine. The Round Table saw 
··the visit as "the harbinger of a strong 'white front' consisting of 
South Africa, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique with strong 
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economic, defence and intelligence links forming part of the scheme 11 • 
While developments in this direction may well have been discussed, 
it seems strange that Welensky should make the visit for that reason. 
After all, he was due to go our of office in a few months with no 
obvious place awaiting him in either Southern or Northern Rhodesian 
public life. It seems, at least possible that he was sounding Verwoerd 
out on the possibility of South African support for unilateral action 
to maintain the Fe.de ration. On a number of occasions, Welensky 
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had threatened unilateral action and in 1961 drawn up plans for such 
. 39 '" an eventuality. . But if Welensky was.-~tovfo:g ~with the idea _ .. ~-. •. ":_, .. :~ ' 
of unilateral action, i~ is certain Verwoerd would have discouraged 
·-
him from taking such a course, which in view of Welensky•s 
political isolation within the Fedention would almost certainly have 
led to disaster. 
In January 1963 Katanga 1s secession finally collapsed, and African 
states· were able to direct their attention to the achievement of 
Afric"an unity. In May, thirty heads of state met in Addis Ab<:i-ba. 
They represented a complete cross section of African opinion 
ranging from the radical Casablanca group and the Pan-African 
Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (centred on Tanganyika) 
to the somewhat more conservative Monrovia group (including 
Nige:da and Liberia) and the French-speaking African and Malagasy 
Union (the U.A.M. 
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). 
Despite differences of approach, an All Africa Charger was drawn 
up and agreed to. In terms of this, a central organization, the 
Organization of African Unity was set up to promote unity. 
A policy of non-alignment between power blocks was agreed to. 
It was also decided to set up an African Liberation Committee 
(directed at the white south) with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. 
It was to consist of representatives of nine states and each member 
state of the O.A. U. was to contribute 1% of its budget to the 
liberation fyng.~o:.:.. In addition, the heads of state adopted a 
resolution calling upon all states to sever diplomatic and economic 
relations with South Africa and Portugal, to close ports and airports 
to their ships and planes and to ban over-flights of aircraft to these 
countries. 
In fact, between. May and September a number of states announced 
that they were banning the use of over-flight facilities to South 
African aircraft. 
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In some cases, these bans were of little consequenc·e, but 
more serious were the bans imposed by Algeria, Libya, the 
United Arab Republic, Chad and the Sudan. They meant that 
South African aircraft could no longer fly by the direct route to 
Europe. The South African government responded to these bans 
by contributing R3. 8 million to the building of an airport on one 
of the Cape Verde Islands and by concluding agreements in terms 
of which South African aircraft could land at Luanda in Angola and 
at Brazzaville in the former French Congo. The conservative · 
government in the Congo (Brazzaville) refused to fall in with 
C. A. U. demands. However, South Africa was inconvenienced 
by the action of the other states. An average of approximately 
900 miles was added to each trip to Europe by South African 
aircraft. 
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South Africa was not immediately affected by other decisions of the 
0. A. U., but general stand of the organization was a cause enough 
for concern. The setting up of the O.A. U. was a considerable 
achievement for the radicals and the Pan-Africanists. However, 
the actual structure of the organization and the limitations set on 
· · fl 
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Cl 1 h it showed a conservative in uence. ear y, too, t e unity 
of African states was crucial to their ability to put pressure on the 
West to take action over apartheil (and, in the future, South We'St 
Africa, should the court decide in favour of Ethiopia and Liberia). 
In short, the formation of the O. A. U. put South Africa on the 
defensive and made it more difficult for her to take iniatives on the 
continent to ease her isolation. 
This was reflected in the second half of the year at the United 
Nations. In August, the Security Council met to consider the 
situation in South Africa. A resolution was adopted by 9 votes to 
O (Britain and France abstained) stating that the situation in South 
143 
Africa ser~ously disturbed inter national peace and security and 
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calling on all states to cease the sale of arms to South Africa. 
Following the adoption of this resolution, the United States 
announced that she expected to terminate all sales of military 
equipment to the Republic by the end of the }ea::r, while Britain and 
France said they w.ould cut off supplies of weapons that could be 
used for internal suppression. 
In October, the General Assembly of the U.N. met. It called 
for the release of political prisoners and an end to the trials of 
all those accused under the 11Sabotage 11 Act. Further, in 1963 
the South African government had put through legislation enabling 
the police to detain people without trial and this had~,,g iven added 
impetus to international criticism of apartheid, as had a series 
of political trials in the country. In December, the Security 
Council met again to discuss South Africa. On this occasion a 
resolution was unanimously adopted calling for an end not only to 
the export of arms to South Africa, but also to the export of 
equipment and materials that could be used in the manufacture of 
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This time Britain and France joined the United arms. 
States in voting for the resolution, though they did so with reservations. 
However, in the course of these debates the Great Powers made 
it clear that they did not regard the situation in South Africa as 
a direct threat to international peace and they were not willing to 
support military or economic sanctions against the Republic. 
As we shall see, the African states attempted to challenge that 
position during 1964. 
At the end of 1963, Kenya became independent. South Africa withdrew 
her Consul-General, which left her without diplomatic represenation 
on the continent outside Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. 
Kenya also joined countries imposing a boycott of South African goods, 
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a significant step considering that in 1962 the Republic had sold 
45 
Kenya goods worth an estimated R6i million. 
During the year, too, South Africa found herself forced to withdraw 
from the activities of U.N.E.C.A. and from the C.S.A. and C.C.T.A. 
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Further, the Plenary Committee of the Food and AgricultJirral 
Organization decided to exclude South Africa from regional meetings 
of the organization in Africa. There were also other more 
trivial moves against the Republic during 1963. 
On the surface then the actions of the African states through the 
O.A. U. and the U.N. posed something of a threat to the Republic 
in 1963. However, as yet none of the steps taken by the U. N. 
Security Council and supported by the Great Powers directly 
threatened South Afr ica1 s position and it was already clear that the 
Western powers were not prepared to countenance a confrontation 
with South Africa. Internally, while there had been outbreaks of 
sabotage, the government1s hold on the situation was secure and 
economically the Republic was moving from strength to strength. 
During 1963, South Africa had a growth rate of 8. 5% by any 
standards a considerable achievement and at the end of December 
the country's gold and foreign currency reserves stood at an 
impressive R516. 3 million 
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, ·more than three times larger than 
on the eve of the establishment of the Republic. 
In general, the moves against the Republic had been more symbolic 
than substantial, but they did have the effect of masking for a time 
South Africa's economic recovery. While the arms embargo was an 
embarrassment and inconvenience to the Republic, it did not, for 
all that, greatly impede the country's ability to strengthen her 
position militarily. 
Politically, 1964 proved to be the turning point for the Republic. 
In that year a concerted effort was made to cajole the Western 
J 
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powers into taking more substantial steps against South Africa. 
It failed. It was also a year in which a fresh crisis in the Congo 
shattered African unity and brought about widespread disillusionment 
in the west with Africa. In 1964 U Thant, the U.N. Secretary-
General appointed a commission chaired by Mrs. Gunner Myrdal, 
a Swedish diplomat to investigate the situation in South Africa and 
to suggest possible solutions. When the commission reported, 
it suggested that South Africa be given a deadline by which to hold 
a national convention of all races to draw up a new constitution, 
failing which the use of sanctions against South Africa should be 
considered. In April, a sanctions conference was convened by 
Ronald Segal in London with the Tunisian Foreign Minister, 
Mongi Slim, in the chair. 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June sanctions 
were discussed and the final communique records that there were 
11 a difference of opinion ••••.•• as to the effectiveness of economic 
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sanctions". Sanctions were caUed for at the O. A. U. conference 
of foreign ministers in Lagos in March, at the African Summit 
Conference in Cairo in July, and at a conference of non-aligned 
states in Cairo in October. Specifically, the July African SUi:nmit 
Conference urged oil-producing countrieslUto cut off supplies to 
South Africa. 
However, despite all these efforts to mount a sanctions campaign, 
it was made increasingly clear that South Africa's major trading 
partners were not prepared to support the sanctions proposals. 
At the United Nations, impatience among Western nations at the 
demands of the African group became apparent. The report of a 
sub-committee deploring Western investment in South West Africa 
was attacked by the United States representative as an "undisguised 
propaganda attack on the United States and the United Kingdom". 49 
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The United States, Britain, and France pointedly abstained on an 
African resolution in the Security Council calling for an end to the 
R
. . . 1 50 1von1a tr1a • 
Disillusionment among Western countries with the African states 
was not confined to their stance over South Africa. It flowed also 
from the reaction of some African states to a second crisis in the 
Congo and from the inability of African states to cope with the new 
crisis. In May 1964 Tshombe had been appointed Prime Minister 
of the Congo. His appointment was, to say the least, a 
controversial one in view of his part record as leader of 
secessionist Katanga, in which role he had openly maintained close 
ties with the south. He continued to do so as Prime Minister of 
the whole Congo. White mercenaries were recruited from South 
Africa and Rhodesia to help his army quell rebellion against his 
rule in the east. 
In this, Tshombe clearly had the support of the South African 
government, as indeed a Nationalist observer has pointed out. 
"The fact is that Tshombe 1 s government advertised 
for hiretroops in South African newspapers and the 
recruiting offices were set up openly in public 
buildings. Had the government of South Africa 
(and Rhodesia) wanted to, they could have put a 
stop to the recruiting immediately". 51 
A further indication of the South African government1 s goodwill 
towards the new government was the dispatch to the Congo of an 
aircraft full of medical supplies as a humanitarian gesture. 
In August, the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, made a speech 
proposing a multi-racial common market in Southern Africa 11 in 
which none of the member nations V\O uld have political control of 
any of the others, but in which all would co.0-operate to theill;ef mutual 
benefit' 1 • 
52 
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Undoubtedly, he was in part encouraged by the new government in 
the Congo, as well as by the stance taken by Kaunda in Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia) and Banda in Nyasaland (Malawi). In any event, 
Verwoerd1 s speech was the first important sign of South Africa 
developing an outward-looking policy towards Africa. 
Tshombe 1 s position in the Congo also helped the Portuguese in 
Angola where they were still battling with guerillas. Tshombe 
ended all previous help to the guerilla movements that the former 
Congo government had given and made their use of the Congo more 
difficult. What Tshombe did infuriated the radical African states 
alienating them from the more conservative states which were 
prepared at least to give Tshombe a trial. The unity that had been 
achieved by the O. A. U. the previous year was shattered. When 
in November 1964 there was a joint Belgian-American action in the 
form of an airlift to safeguard their nationals in Stanleyville, the 
reaction of African states underlined deep divisions in Africa, 
which were fundamental} 
11 The inability of the O. A. U. to cope with the 
crisis only served to emphasize the lack of 
agreement in Africa on aspirations and goals. 
The aftermath of the Congolese 'rescue operation' 
in November 1964 brought this message home to 
the United States. One part of Africa responded 
with what Ambassador Stevenson called an 
unprecedented 'torrent of abuse; 'verbal violence', 
'hatred', and 'malign accusations' against the 
United States. Another part silently acquiesced 
or openly approved the Belgian-American action. 
There is a prevalent feeling among Africans that 
after a brief encounter the United States has lost 
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interest and is having second thoughts about Africa". 
Writing in 1965, Rivkin concludes, 0 In Washington, Africa now has 
54 
the lowest priority of any area. 11 
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South Africa's new concern with Africa was not limited to the 
Congo. In October, the government concluded agreements with 
Portugal on closer economic relations between the Republic and 
Angola and Mozambique. Earlier, in February representatives 
of private business interests set up the South African Portuguese 
Economic Institute to promote industrial ties. On November 30, 
a new trade agreement was concluded between South Africa aid 
Southern Rhodesia. Further, during the constitutional crisis 
in Southern Rhodesia, Dr. Verwoerd urged her political leaders 
not to countenance interference from Britain or any other country. 
With the improvement in her own security position, South Africa 
began to show a more active interest in the position of her neighbours. 
Interesting, too from the point of view of South Africa's relations 
with the continent was the attitude taken by the leaders of Zambia 
and Malawi. Both Kaunda and Banda made it clear that they were 
not in a position to cut off their economic ties with the south. 
Banda was quite explicit at the O. A. U. 1s summit conference that 
he was not prepared to "commit economic suicide to be a loyal 
O. A. U. member11 • 
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Undoubtedly their attitude was, in part, 
the reason for Verwoerd1 s hopes of a Southern African common 
market. 
More surprisingly, perhaps, in view of what has since happened 
was Verwoerd1 s reaction to an offer made by Kaunda in January 
1964 that he would be prepared to exchange envoys with South Africa 
on condition that his diplomats enjoyed the same rights and treatment 
in the Republic as South African diplomats would expect in Zambia. 
Verwoerd made no direct reply to this offer, presumably because it 
was not made through official diplomatic channels·. However, he 
made his attitude towards the offer perfectly clear in the House of 
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Assembly in April. 11 It must be very clear to. representatives of 
other countries in South Africa that while we shall act in their 
countries in accordance with their customs, we expect them to act 
in South Africa in accordance with South Africa's rustoms." 
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Verwoerd thereby missed a golden opportunity to strengthen 
immensely South Africa's position on the continent, an opportunity 
that certainly would not be passed by to-day. Why was it that 
Verwoerd turned down Kaunda's offer? I think there are two 
basic reasons. Firstly, Verwoerd prided himself on his 
commitment to maintain apartheid without making any concessions 
to world opinion. At this stage, at least, he probably regarded 
the lifting of apartheid for a black diplomat as an unacceptable 
concession. Secondly, in the early 19602s ije concentrated on the 
task of ensuring internal stability, upon which foreign confidence 
and economic recovery depended. 
Consequently, when opportunities did present themselves for 
South Africa to improve its position on the continent, the government 
was somewhat slow to realize the implications of these opportunities 
and to take its chances, though by 1964 South Africa was beginning 
to realize that her security depended on what happened to her 
neighbours. 
There was, in fact, some criticism in South Africa of the government's 
conduct of foreign policy. The Johanne:Shurg Sunday Times 
complained 11 on this continent we hold most of the cards and all 
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we need to do is to see that they are properly played11 • 
That South Africa needed to concern herself with relations in Southern 
Africa was underlined by the outbreak of guerilla warfare in Northern 
Mozambique. The outbreak coincided with the declaration by the 
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African nationalist movement in Mozambique, Frelimo of a 
"general armed insurrection of the Mozambican people against 
Portuguese colonialismu. 
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I have dealt with South Africa1 s relations with the rest of the 
continent from the beginning of 1960 to the end of 1964 on a year-
by-year basis, largely because I believe it is important to understand 
what happened in its historical perspective. Let me now in 
conclusion to this chapter summarize the main strands of 
development. 
At the beginning of the decade, South Africa's marked hostility to 
the grant of independence to African states had waned to the extent 
that -s.he was resigned to accepting the inevitable and even concerned 
to develop relations with the new states on a low key basis of 
economic and technical co-operation. After Sharpeville, 
co-operation became virtually impossible and South Africa 
concentrated on securing internal stability to regain foreign 
confidence. Verwoerd also turned his attention to broadening his 
support among English-speaking South Africans. White unity in 
the interests of security was stressed in place of Afrikaner 
exclusivism •. Anti-communism was stressed above Afrikaner 
nationalism. These domestic considerations meant that, in 
general, few foreign policy initiatives were taken by the Republic 
during -this period, even in relation to the future of Central African 
Federation. 
Most of the ihiu:b'atives were, in fact, taken by the new African states. 
There were three basic elements in their attack on South Africa. 
The first was to isolate South Africa in the international community 
and to cajole particularly the Wes tern powers into adopting substantial 
rather than symbolic measures against South Africa, through the 
U.N. They we re fairly successful in isolating South Africa, but 
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unsuccessful in persuading the West to agree to more than an 
arms embargo. African action at the U. N. reached the peak 
of its success in 1963. 
Certainly, the South West Africa case had put South Africa on the 
defensive and by the end of 1964 the Court had yet to give its 
verdict, but the failure of the African states to pressurize the 
West into sanctions over apartheid already suggested that African 
states would face difficulties in forcing the hand of the Big Powers 
over South West Africa. 
The second element of the attack was the trade boycotts the African 
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states initiated themselves. Certainly, there is evidence 
that it had some effect on South Africa's trade, but it was little 
more than a pin-prick and failed to impede South Africa's 
economic recovery. Further, where boycotts were adopted, they 
were not always strictly enforced. It also became clear in 1964 
that states with strong traditional economic links with South Africa 
were not in a position to enforce much of a boycott, if any at all. 
The third element of the policy of African states was the decision 
by the 0. A. U. Conference in 1963 to set up a Liberati:m Committee. 
I have mentioned it in passing because ·the guerilla movements 
only really began to assume importance in the latter half of the 
decade. The fortunes of the Liberation Committee tended to 
fl"\J;:tc.tuat.e~ with those of the O. A. U., though it ran into some early 
difficulties when it was sharply attacked by Nkrumah in 1964. 
In general, these African initiatives, while they wiere something 
of a challenge to South Africa's ~osition, could not be described 
as a serious threat to the South Africa government!> survival. 
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After the improvement of South Africa!s economic position, the 
build-up of her military strength, and the restoration of domestic 
calm, the government began to look to Africa to take initiatives 
of its own. It did so with caution and the first steP;s in 1964, the 
improvement of relations with the Portuguese and Rhodesia and 
the encouragement of Tshombe in the Congo, were modest ones. 
Earlier, I mentioned that the Stanleyville ,operation had shattered 
African unity as well as contributing to Western disillusionment 
with Africa. Events in 1965 carried these developments a stage 
further. Tshombe's continuing leadership of the Congo during 
much of 1965 and his use of white mercenaries aggravated the 
split between the radical states and the more conservative, 
effectively immobilizing the O.A. U. Regional and language 
groupings that the O. A. U. had been formed to replace grew up 
again. In particular, conservative French-speaking states in 
West Africa launched a campaign against Nkrumah in Ghana, 
charging him with attempting to subvert their governments by 
giving refuge to opposition groups from their territories. 
Some went as far as to boycott the Accra meeting of African Heads 
of State. 
Adding to the difficulties of African states was the immobilization 
of the United Nations in 1965, du:f!oto a financial crisis over the 
payment of dues for the U. N. peac·e.-keeping operation in the Congo. 
Both France and the Soviet Unim refused to contribute. Although 
the dispute was eventually resolved, it did lasting damage to the 
United Nations• prestige. By the time Rhodesia unilaterally 
declared independence in November 1965, the African states were 
seriously divided. The O. A. U. was weak and in debt. 
Twenty-four countries (two thirds of the memberi5hip) had failed 
to pay their dues. It was against this background of revealing 
weaknesses in the position of the new states of Africa that South 
Africa began to develop an "outward-lookingU policy towards Africa. 
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FROM SOUTH WEST AFRICA TO NAMIBIA 
On November 4, 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia filed concurrent applications 
in the International Court of Justice at the Hague instituting contentious 
proceedings against South Africa over the status of South West Africa. 
1 
Previous decisions of the International Court on the territory had been 
advisory opinions, by which South Africa could not be bound in law. 
By contrast, contentious proceedings enable the court to make a 
compulsory judgement which binds the parties to the case under 
international law. The distinction is an important one, the significance 
of which the South African government did not fail to recognize when 
proceedings were instituted. The case placed South Africa on the 
defensive internationally in what was already a crisis-laden year for 
the Union. 
1960 had been the year of Sharpeville, of Macmillan's "wind of change" 
speech heralding the British government1 s intention to grant independence 
to her remaining colonies in Africa, and of an attempt on the life of the 
South African Prime Minister. Ethi9pia1 s and Liberia's action ended 
the year on a note that further aggravated the international climate 
of doubt and uncertainty about South Africa1s future. That is not to 
say the South African government was taken by surprise by the 
initiation of legal proceedings. Earlier in the year the two African 
states had clearly signalled their intention to file charges against 
South Africa. Indeed at the Conference of Independent African states 
at Addis Ababa in June, a steering committee of four African states 
(including Ethiopia and Liberia) had been established to co-ordinate 
political tactics in support of the legal case at the Hague. 
Legal action against South Africa over South West Africa had been 
proposed at the United Nations as early as 1953, but it first loomed 
as a serious possibility in 1959 when a special report of the Committee 
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on South West Africa suggested the practicality of legal action. 
The Committee's report in large part provided the basis for 
Ethippia's and Liberia's application to the International Court. 
The two African countries' charges against the Union were 
contained in eleven submissions to the court. The principal 
points were as follows: 
a) that South West Africa was a territory under the mandate 
conferred on South Africa by the League of Nations in 1920. 
b) that South Africa remained subject to the obligations under 
the mandate and that 11the General Assembly of the United 
Nations is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory 
2 
functions previously exercised by the League of Nations. u 
c) that consequently South Africa was obliged to submit annual 
reports on South West Africa to the United Nations and to 
transmit petitions from the territory's inhabitants to the 
United Nations; obligations which South Africa had failed 
to carry out. 
d) that the practice of apartheid in South West Africa'~Jivas a 
violation of South Africa's duty to promote the material and 
moral well-being and social progress of the territory's 
inhabitants as demanded by the terms of the mandate. 
e) that South Africa had adopted policies in the territory 
contrary to "orderly evolution towards self-government, 
the right to which is implicit in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the terms of the mandate and currently accepted 
3 
international standards. 11 
The South African government's reaction to the crisis took two main 
forms, one legal and the other political. Firstly, South Africa lodged 
preliminary objections with the Court to Ethiopia and Liberia's 
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submissions. The main theme of South Africa's preliminary objections 
was: 
11 The Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia have no 
locus standi in these contentious proceedings and that 
the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear, or 
adjudicate upon, the quest!i:nns of law and fact raised 
in the Applications and Memorials and prays that the 
Court may adjudge and determine accordingly. 11 4 
The political reaction came later. In September 1962, it was 
announced in the Government Gazette that the State president had 
appointed a Commission of Enquiry into South West African affairs: 
"to enquire thoroughly into further promoting the 
material and moral welfare and the social progress 
of the inhabitants of South West Africa, and more 
particularly its non-white inhabitants, and to submit 
a report with recommendations on a comprehensive 
five-year plan for the accelerated development of the 
various non-white groups of South West Africa, inside 
as well as outside their own territories ••••• and for 
the further development and building up of such Native 
Territories in South West Africa. 11 5 
Ostensibly, the enquiry bore no relation to the court cas.e at the Hague, 
but the fact that its terms of reference quoted, at times verbatim, the 
obligations of the Mandate suggested that it was indeed designed to 
meet criticisms of South African rule in South West Africa contained 
in Ethiopia's and Liberia's submissions. 
The need for a political initiative by South Africa to meet the African 
states' challenge on the substantive issues was underlined shortly 
after the Commission had been appointed. On December 12 (1962) 
the court gave its verdict on whether the case brought by Ethiopia 
and Liberia fell within its legal competence to judge after it had 
heard the final oral arguments and replies of the parties in October. 
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Its decision was that it had jurisdiction to decide on the merits 
6 
of the case. The Court's verdict was a set-back for the South 
African government which was still under sharp attack internationally, 
although the country had already largely recovered from the 
economic difficulties that had followed the mas sac re at Sharpeville 
and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth. That the 
court lacked the legal competence to decide on the substantive issues 
raised by the case had been the main pillar of South Africa's defence. 
Nevertheless, the narrowness of the voting on the decision - the verdict 
was adopted by 8 votes to 7 - afforded the South African government 
the hope that the Court's final verdict might yet be decided in South 
Africa's favour on one of the many legal technicalities involved in 
the case. 
The next major development was the completion of the Odendaal 
7 
Commission's report on South West Africa in December 1963, a year 
after the Court's verdict. It was a lengthy report. Indeed, all 
told, the Commission made some 47 5 recommendations. At the 
outset it considered how self-determination in South West Africa 
might best be achieved and concluded: "one mixed central 
authority for the whole territory would not further the aims of 
self-determination for each population group08 According to 
the commission, the population of South West Africa consisted of 
12 distinct ethnic groups "which differ from one another both 
9 physically and spiritually in one or more important respects" 
On these, it centred its proposals for the constitutional development 
of the territory. 
Firstly, the Commission recommended that the South African 
government should take over practically all the branches of 
administration which had previously fallen under the control of the 
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South West African administration. The Territory's Legislative 
Assembly, which was elected by whites, would be left with 
legislative powers in the 1white 1 area for 1whitet education and 
health, the envi:r@nment, local authorities and whatever else 
was not specifically taken over by the South African government. 
Secondly, for the future of the non-white peoples of the territory, 
the Commission recommended a programme of demarcating and 
developing reserves for the different: ethnic groups. While placing 
the responsibility for implementing such a programme on the 
South African government, the Commission nevertheless itself 
suggested boundaries for ll homelands and recommended the form 
10 
political institutions should take. Its scheme had some 
. 11 
obvious drawbacks; in particular, in the case of fiye~of the groups .. ,_ ... 
more than 50% of the group was resident outside of its proposed 
homeland. Finally, the Commission put forward proposals for a 
five-year economic plan and recommended increased governmental 
expenditure on educational, medical and social services. 
In the short term, the Commission's proposals implied a greater 
concentration of power in Pretoria, but the longer term objective 
was of a gradual decentralization of power along ethnic lines. 
Such a devolution of power within the framework of separate 
development mirrored the government's efforts in South Africa 
itself; in particular, the political proposals of the Commission 
closely matched the constitution setting up a Legislative Assembly 
in the Transkei in 1963. A common goal of convincing the world 
that South Africa could ul:timately meet demands for self-
12 
determination lay behind both schemes. Critics at the U.N. 
quickly latched on to the propaganda aspect of the Comm is si.orls 
report. They argued that: 
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11 To try to divide a population of 526, 000 into 
twelve homelands was an exercise not in 
trusteeship but in the 1divide and rule' 
technique of a past and discredited era and 
that the whole argument sounded suspiciously 
like a clever subterfuge on the past of the 
South African Government ••••.• to justify 
the denial of non-white :earticipation in South 
West Africa affairs". 13 
In the event, the South African government itself decided to defer 
implementation of the Commission's political recommendations as 
it feared implementation would complicate rather than assist South 
Africa's case in the International Court, However, the government 
did decide to implement the non-controversial recommendation of 
the Commission that the government increase expenditure on the 
medical and social services. 
While after 1960 the dispute over South West Africa largely centred 
on the International Court of Justice at the Hague, African states 
continued their efforts to put pres sure on South Africa over the is sue 
at the United Nations. Resolutions were passed in the General 
Assembly calling for the repeal of all apartheid laws in South West 
Africa and for elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
Further, tle African states endeavoured to have the situation in 
South West Africa declared an international threat to peace. In 
1962 the South African government finally responded to this pressure 
by issuing invitations to the chairman and vice-chairman of a newly 
established U.N. Committee on South West Africa to visit the 
territory. This the two, Dr. Carpio and Dr. de Alva did. 
What followed did much to damage the Committee's reputation. 
At the conclusion of their visit, Dr. Carpio and Dr. de Alva issued 
a communique in Pretoria stating that they 11had found no evidence 
and heard no allegations in the places visited that there was a threat 
to international peace and security within,,South West African. 
14 
The communique was later repudiated by the. chairman, Dr. Carpio 
t~ .. ~ 
,~~ •, --... < 
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but not by Dr. de Alva. 
Subsequently, without mention of the communique, the Committee 
recommended to the General Assembly that: 
"South Africa be given a short time in which 
to comply with Assembly resolutions, after which 
the mandate should be revoked, and the United 
Nations should assume direct administration of 
the territory, if necessary using collective 
measures at the same time to enforce South 
African compliance". 15 
In August 1963, the Security Council itself resolved that the situation 
in South Africa was seriously disturbing international peace and 
16 
security. However, the Council stopped short of calling the 
situation a threat to world peace that could warrant the use of 
enforcement powers under Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter. 
The Western powers indicated that they were not prepared to support 
the use of enforcement action in the case of either South Africa or 
South West Africa. In regard to South West Africa they were 
insistent that the outcome of the court case should be awaited before 
further action was contemplated. Under these circumstances, the 
high flown rhetoric of General Assembly resolUtions and Committee 
reports amounted in practical terms to very little. 
By 1964, the Western powers began to show signs of impatience in 
regard to the work of the U. N. Committee on South West Africa. 
In particular, a report on foreign investment in South West Africa, 
which concluded that "foreign companies .•.••• also bear responsibility 
17 
for the suffering of the people of the territory11 , was sharply 
attacked by both Britain and the United States. 
By the time the International Court of Justice came to give its 
verdict on Ethiopia and Liberia's case in 1966 the atmosphere 
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surrounding debate of Southern Africa had considerably changed. 
The early 1960s had been characterized by considerable idealism 
about Africa as a whole. Hopes had been high that the wind of 
change that had swept West and East Africa bringing independence 
in its wake would sweep away the last vestiges of white domination 
in the south. These hopes had been disappointed and when 
Rhodesia had unilaterally declared independence in November 1965, 
it appeared that the very opposite had occurred. Independence 
to the north had also brought disillusion in its train, when the scope 
of the political and economic problems the new states faced came 
/ 
to be appreciated. A plethora of military coups d 1 etat early 
in 1966 in West Africa added to Western doubts about the political 
stability, or reliability, of the new states. 
The court handed down its verdict on 18 July 1966 which was that 
"it was unable to give a decision on the merits of the dispute because 
Ethiopia and Liberia had no legal right or interest in the subject 
matter of their complaints 11 • 
18 
The court reached its decision 
by the narrowest of majorities, the casting vote of its President, 
19 
Sir Percy Spender. In effect, the Court had reserved its 
earlier decision in 1962 that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 
merits of the case. The minority of the 1962 judgement had 
become the majority in 1966, thanks partly to the death of one judge 
and the withdrawal of another. 
In short, the Court had decided the issue on a legal technicality, 
albeit an important one. It was something of an anti-climax. 
Following the 1962 judgement, both-parties to the dispute had 
assumed that the way was open to a definitive judgement on the 
merits of the dispute and had prepared their briefs accordingly. 
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After the 1962 decision, South Africa had filed an 11 volume counter 
memorial to that of the applicants and following their reply, 
a 2 volume rejoinder supplemented by lengthy documentary material 
including the long Odendaal Commission Report. 
From March 1965, 99 public sittings had· been devoted to oral 
hearings which included the arguments of both parties and the 
testimony of 14 witnesses. 
While the judgement could hardly have seemed to justify the 
expenditure of time, money and effort invested in the case by either 
party, this in no way detracted from the fact that the decision was 
a triumph for the South African government. Verwoerd hailed 
the verdict a great victory. 
11 The most important implication •.•. was that 
attempts to use the Court's machinery as a basis 
for a drastic attack against South Africa had 
failed ..••.• The purpose of Ethi_opia and Liberia 
had been to obtain a decisive decision against 
South Africa and if the judgement were not 
complied with, to exert pressure on members of 
the Security Council to apply coercive measures". 
20 
This raises the interesting question of what would have happened had 
there been a judgement adverse to South Africa. A number of 
writers have expressed doubts as to whether it would have been 
implemented. To Munger, writing after the judgement, it was 
"not at all clear that a decision hostile to South Africa would have 
21' 
been implemented" while Austin in 'Britain and South Africa•, 
wr:itten before the judgement, is sceptical that the Security Council 
would take the measures necessary for implementation of ave rdict 
against South Africa. 
22 
Considering the extent of disillusion in 
the West with Africa by 1966, I am inclined to agree. 
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On the other hand, three days before the verdict was due, the 
United States State Department took the unusual step of announcing 
that it was the United States' intention that the Court's decision 
be implemented. Whatever view one takes on this issue, this 
much is clear. A decision adverse to South Africa would have 
undermined South Africa1 s reliance on legality in defence of its 
racial policies and the serious possibility that coercive measures 
might be used against her would have put the Republic on the 
defensive internationally, at the very least. As it was, the 
Court's judgement considerably eased South Africa's position 
and gave added confidence to the development of an 11 outward-
looking11 foreign policy towards the African continent. 
The leader of the Republic's legal team at the Hague, Advocate 
D. P. de Villiers had described the importance of the outcome of 
the South West Africa case to South Africa as follows: 
· "The laager idea could never be permanent .•• 
one needs healthy communications with the world 
not only for economic reasons but because of the 
spirit of man. It was difficult to decide when to 
give up the laager but the South West Africa began 
an opening out process. We learned that we could 
practice this with success". 23 
Reaction to the verdict among African states was angry and bitter. 
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia described the court's decision as 
11 contrary to the interests of mankind, and particularly the African 
24 
people". At the United Nations African states registered their 
disapproval of the verdict by rejecting a proposed supplementary 
appropriation of some R52, 000 for the Court's 1966 budget. 
Then on October 27, 1966 the General Assembly gave its own verdict 
on South Africa's conduct of the Mandate. By ll4 votes to 2 
(Portugal and South Africa) with 3 abstentions (Britain, France and 
Malawi) the Assembly declared : "South Africa has failed to fulfil 
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its obligations in respect of the mandated territory . • • . . and has, 
in fact, disavowed the mandate". 
25 
It, therefore, terminated 
the mandate and placed South West Africa 1tunder the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations 11 • 
26 
The United States 
government supported the resolution, but its delegate indicated 
that it did so with reservations and it was immediately apparent 
that the major Western powers would not be prepared to support 
coercive measures to enforce the Assembly's action, which amounted 
to a reversal of the court's decision. 
The South African government responded by declaring that it 
regarded the Assembly's resolution as illegal and consequently would 
not co-operate with the ad hoc committee set up by the Assembly 
"to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should 
. 27 
be administered". The South African government• s position 
was succinctly summed up by Vorster shortly after he had become 
Prime Minister. 
11 The public may ask - what is the government's 
standpoint and what is it going to do? My answer 
is 'nothing'. The Republic will continue to 
administer the territory as it has always done and 
it will continue to implement what it has planned 
for the territory." 28 
For the next three and a half years the South African government was 
able to maintain this posture and it was only when the Security Council 
referred the question of South West Africa's status back to the 
International Court that the government found it necessary to take 
positive steps to meet the U. N. 1 s challenge to her jurisdiction over 
South West Africa. 
The ad hoc committee set up under the 1966 resolution after failing 
to reach agreement on a programme of action to oust South Africa 
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from South West Africa simply reported its deliberations to the 
Assembly in April 1967. In May the Assembly passed a fresh 
resolution on the territory setting up an 11 member Council on 
South West Africa 11 to administer South West Africa until 
independence, with the maximum possible participation of the 
people of the territory". 
29 
The Council was requested 
11 to enter immediately into contact with the authorities of South 
Africa .••.• (to secure) the transfer of the administration of the 
territory with the least possible upheaval". 
30 
The aim was 
to bring the territory to independence by June 1968. On this 
resolution both the Communist bloc (with the exception of Yugoslavia) 
and the Western powers abstained. An attempt by members of the 
new Council to enter South West Africa without South Africa's consent 
in 1968 predictably failed. 
The next step taken by the General Assembly was an appeal to the 
Security Council to take effective measures to end the Republic's 
rule of South West Africa. The Security Council met in March 1969. 
13 of its 15 members voted for a resolution calling upon the South 
African government to withdraw its administration of South West 
Africa immediately and threatening further action if South Africa 
failed to respond to this appeal. Britain and France abstained and 
though the United States voted for the resolution, her representative 
explained that his government believed sanctions would both prove 
to be ineffective and damaging to the people of South West Africa 
themselves. It was therefore plain that the African states would 
not win the support of the Council for mandatory sanctions against 
South Africa over the issue. Consequently South Africa was under 
little pressure to act on the resolution and when in August the Security 
Council set October 4 as a deadline for South African withdrawal, the 
South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller wrote to the U.N. 
Secretary-General declaring: 
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"We neither present any threat to peace nor 
are we a threat to any country. On no account 
will we abandon the people of South West Africa 
who for half a century have placed their trust 
in us to lead them on the path of progress, peace 
and stability. The results achieved fully
31 
substantiate my government's attitude. 11 
The deadline came and passed. 
Nonetheless, the Security Council's recognition of the General 
Assembly's decision to terminate South Africa's mandate had 
important repercussions as it opened the way to a fresh reference 
to the International Court of Justice on South West Africa's status. 
After the passage of a resolution (276 of 1970) re-affirming that 
South Africa's presence in Namibia, as South West Africa had been 
re-named by the General Assembly, was illegal, the Council by 
13 votes to 0 submitted the following question to the International 
Court of Justice with a request for an advisory opinion: "what are , 
the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 
(1970) ? " 
32 
This brought a more forceful response from the 
Republic. In September Muller announced that written statements 
would be submitted to the court and a legal team sent to the Hague 
to present South Africa's case. 
33 
As South Africa had based her 
refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions on South West 
Africa on the ground that the original General Assembly resolution 
depriving South Africa of the mandate was illegal, the government 
was determined not to lose the case by default. Further, South 
Africa could not, in any event, be bound by an adverse advisory 
opinion, while a decision in her favour would render ineffective 
African efforts to reverse the 1966 judgement. 
Action to oust South Africa from the territory was not confined to 
the United Nations. Sporadic guerilla activity on a small scale had 
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occurred in the north of the territory, dating back to September 1965. 
The first batch of guerillas 
"established a forest hide-out in Ovamboland 
where training ,was given to local Africans: 
this was captured by the South African Police 
about six months· later (i.e. the autumn of 
1966 ). Some of the men attacked Government 
offices in one village and tribal offices in 
another. One group infiltrated into the 
Southern sector and attacked the home of a white 
farmer. Guerillas wounded several people 
and killed an African tribal official u. 34 
Some of the guerillas were killed by the police; others arrest'ed. 
In 1967, the South African government brought in the Terrorism Act 
which defined "terrorism" in very wide terms and made it a capital 
offence. The Act, in addition, gave the police powers to detain suspects 
without trial for an indefinite period of time. The Act was made 
retrospective to July 1962 and expressly extended to South West Africa. 
Subsequently, 31 of those arrested from the first batch of guerillas 
. 35 
including Herman Ja Toivo, a leading member of the S. W. A. P.O. 
were convicted under the Act and sentenced to long gaol terms. 
It was the first in a series of trials of South West Africans who had 
resorted to violence to end South African rule. One of the reasons 
commonly given for the increasing resort to violence was the 
36 
"bitter disappointment11 that followed the 1966 decision of the 
International Court of Justice. 
In October 1968, the South African Minister of Police (Louwrens 
Muller) stated that there had been guerilla incursions into the 
Caprivi strip sector of South West Africa and disclosed that there 
had been some 37 arrests. Since then there have been intermittent 
reports of further guerrilla activity both in the Caprivi strip and on 
the Angolan - South West African border north of Ovamboland. 
In 1970 the government announced a Rl, 000 reward for information 
.-:; 
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leading to the arrest of Iyambo Israel, an Ovambo leader, described 
37 
by the government as "the most wanted terrorist in the country". 
More serious and widely publicized incidents occurred in 1971. 
In May two policement were killed and seven injured after their 
vehicles struck a landmine in the Caprivi Strip. In October the 
Prime Minister told a Nationalist Party Congress that a police 
captain had been killed and four police constables injured in 
further landmine explosions. He repeated a declaration he had 
made a year earlier that South Africa reserved the right to pursue 
terrorists wherever they might flee. 
38 
He went on to indicate 
that steps had been taken in this particular case to prevent further 
incursions. Hisremarks were widely interpreted in both the 
Afrikaans and English press as meaning that South African police~: 
had crossed the border into Zambia in pursuit. Despite a denial 
from the South African Minister of Police that this had happened, 
Zambia made an official complaint to the Security Council which 
passed a resolution calling on South Africa to respect Zambia's 
territorial sovereignty. 
39 
However, while these incidents received wide publicity and further 
strained relations between Zambia and South Africa, the scale of 
guerrilla activities was not such as to represent a serious challenge 
to South African rule in South West Africa. A greater challenge 
was presented by a strike of 13, 000 Ovambos in December 1971 
against the contract labour system. The strike brought the 
territory1 s mining industry virtually to a halt and forced the 
government to take emergency action to maintain essential services. 
The gravity of the situation can best be gauged from the fact that 
Ovambos constitute nearly half of the population of the territory and 
90% of its mine work force. Further, despite a denial by 
Nathaniel Mahuinn, President of S. W. A. P.O., that the guerrilla 
movement had be<in involved in the organization of the strike, there 
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was widespread concern in the government press that the two were, 
in fact, linked. After the unrest in Ovamboland that followed the 
strike, Die Burger concluded editorially that some such link was 
40 
anything but improbable. The unrest among the Ovambos 
particularly shook the government because whereas "people like 
the Hereros and the Rehoboths have always been non-co-operative 
41 
and vociferous in their hostility to the government11 , the 
Ovambos had no similar tradition of resistance to white authority. 
Indeed, prior to the strike Ovamboland had been seen as a showcase 
for separate development in South West Africa. 
42 
The first steps towards the development of Bantustans in South West 
Africa had followed the International Court's 1966 judgement when 
the South African government announced its intention to implement 
43 
constitutional proposals made by the Odendaal Commission. 
To this end, it introduced the Development of Self-government for 
the Native Nations of South West Africa Act in 1968. The Act 
establishes the boundaries of homelands for six ethnic groups in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. 
However, no mention was made in the Act of the Bushmen or Tswana 
people, and the coloured, Nama, and Rehoboth Baster people were 
judged to fall outside the scope of the Act, as the government planned 
that these three groups should fall under the administration of 
the Republic's Department of Coloured Affairs. The Act further 
provided for the establishment of Legislative Councils for the 
different communities by proclamation of the State President. 
The first, in Ovamboland, was created by a proclamation in October 
1968. The Council was to consist of 42 members; six nominated 
by each of seven traditional tribal authorities recognized by the 
South African government. 
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In response to the reference of the South West African is sue b:ick to 
the International Court of Justice, the South African government 
took three preliminary steps objecting to the conduct of proceedings. 
It asked for the recusal of thx:ee of the Court's judges in view of 
anti-apartheid statements they had made while representatives of 
the United Nations. This objection was rejected by the Court as 
was a request for the appointment of Justice Van Wyk as an ad hoc 
judge. The South African government also asked for a preliminary 
inquiry into the validity of the Security Council resolution requesting 
the advisory opinion, the propriety of the court1 s furnishing an 
advisory opinion and the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case. 
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Further, in a letter to the court the South African government proposed 
that in the event of these preliminary objections being over-ruled 
that a plebiscite of all races be held to ascertain whether the people 
in South West Africa wished to be ruled by South Africa or by the 
United Nations. It suggested that the plebiscite be jointly administered 
by the South African government and the Court. This bold proposal 
excited considerable comment in the South African press. It was 
sharply attacked by the leader of the Herstigte Nationale Party, 
Dr. Albert Hertzog and the party's paper declared: 
11 This government has shown a host:ile outside 
world which seeks the downfall of the white 
man in South Africa that it no longer has the 
inherent strength to withstand ;pressure from 
outside. 11 4 5 
However, in general the proposal was welcomed. Die Burger 
called it 11 a dramatic challenge .•••• the action of a country which is 
perfectly sure of its case 11 • 
46 
In the event, the court turned 
down the proposal as expected considering that a plebiscite had no 
obvious relevance to the legal issues before the court. 
On June 21, 1971 the President of the International Court of Justice, 
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Zafrulla Khan delivered the court's advisory opinion. It was: 
"by 13 votes to 2, 
(1) that , the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under 
obligation to withdraw its administration from 
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its 
occupation of the territory; 
by ll votes to 4, 
(2) that states members of the United Nati:ms are 
under obligation to recognize the illegality of South 
Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity 
of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, 
and to refrain from any acts and in particular any 
dealings with the Government of South Africa 
implying recognition of the legality of, or lending 
support or assistance to, such presence and 
administration: 
(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are 
not members of the United Nations to give 
assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) 
above, in the action which has been taken by the 
United Nations with regard to Namibia." 47 
The South African Prime Minister immediately rejected the opinion. 
Noting that an advisory opinion was not binding in international law, 
he argued that 11political, rather than legal, considerations had 
motivated the majority of the judges (and that) they had, once again 
evaded a thorough investigation of the facts of the situation. u 
48 
Nonetheless, in spite of the powerful dissenting opinions delivered py 
the French and the British judge, the decision was undoubtedly a 
considerable setback for the South African government as it undermined 
the legal basis on which South Africa had defended her position in 
South West Africa. But while the full legal implications of the 
judgement are not yet clear, it soon became apparent that politically, 
the advisory opinion had not ended the impasse over the issue at the 
United Nations. 
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At a meeting of the Security Council in September, the British and 
French delegates indicated that their governments did not accept 
the advisory opinion. By contrast, the United States government 
accepted the advisory opinion and re-affirmed its policy of 
officially discouraging new American investment in South West 
. 49 
Africa. However, it was also made clear that the United 
States' opposition to sanctions remained unchanged. In these 
circumstances, the latest initiative taken by the United Nations 
has been to enter into discussions over the issue with the South 
African government through its Secretary-General, Dr. Waldheim. 
This followed the passage in the Security Council of an Argentinian 
resolution proposing talks with all conce;r.ned parties to secure 
self-determination and independence for the people of Namibia. 
Whether this initiative will prove anymore fruitful than previous 
attempts to resolve the dispute' seems doubtful. The United Nations 
is not seeking self-determination on a Bantustan basis for each 
ethnic group but for the country as a whole, while South African 
government will plainly only consider constitutional progress along 
the lines of separate development. 
Since it is unlikely that the Western powers would countenance 
enforcement action against South Africa over the issue, there appears 
to be little prospect that U. N. action will substantially alter either 
the fact of South African rule in South West Africa or its nature. 
Indeed, the failure of sanctions against Rhodesia has considerably 
reinforced the determination of the Wes tern powers - and particularly 
those like Britain with a sizeable economic stake in South West Africa -
to avoid a confrontation with South Africa. Arguably, in fact, the 
U.N. 's countless resolutions on South West Africa present a greater 
danger to the organization's credibility than to South Africa's presence 
in the territory. In practical terms South Africa1 s hold on South West 
Africa has not been loosened. 
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Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance 
of the 1971 advisory opinion - itself the result of a Secur~ty Council 
resolution. The judgement opens the way to legal action in the 
national courts of the Western powers challenging, for example, 
50 
South Africa's title to exports from South West Africa. 
While it seems improbable that such action will succeed, South West 
Africa's position in international law as a responsibility of the 
United Nations is likely to inhibit foreign investment in the territory. 
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In part, indeed, South Africa's greater flexibility as evidenced by 
her offer of a plebiscite and her entry into discussions over the 
territory's future with Dr. Waldheim, reflects the government's 
realization that it is vulnerable internationally on this issue. 
This, of course, does not mean that the government would ever 
contemplate giving up South West Africa. Quite apart from the 
po~itical impossibility of justifying such a step to the electorate, the 
strategic position of South West Africa rules out a South African 
withdrawal. The importance of the territory to the Republic's 
defence was summed up by the New York Herald Tribune in an 
editorial in 1963: 
"South Africa says it needs the territory for 
defence purposes. It argues that the long coast 
line and desert stretches can help to keep a 
possible invader from the north at arm's length" 
This argument remains as relevant today. 
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Indeed. in recent years the South African government has strengthened 
its milit·ary base at Walvis Bay 
53 
and has built a base and an 
airstrip at Katima Mullilo in the Caprivi Strip close to the border with 
Zambia, the front line between militant black Africa and the Republic. 
South Africa's concern to maintain her hold on South West Africa is 
also reflected in the special importance she attaches to co-operation 
with Portuguese Angola to the north. In particular, both countries 
hope that the joint Kunene river scheme will provide the foundation 
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for extensive white settlement in southern Angola which will be a 
.b . t . t . th 5 4 B . d S h W contr1 ution o secur1 y in e area. es1 es out §st 
Africa's strategic importance, its immense mineral wealth, 
much as yet untapped, provides another strong incentive for South 
Africa to hang on to the territory. 
Indeed, precisely because of South Africa's determination to stay 
in South West Africa despite the vulnerability of her position legally, 
the battle between South Africa and the United Nations on this 
issue is of special significance. Commenting on the strike by 
Ovambo workers at the end of 1971 Die Volksblad declared: 
"South West is the first target of our enemies who would like to 
make trouble there, especially because of the international 
consequences for South Africa11 • 
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The fact is the progress of 
the dispute between the international community and South Africa 
over the territory is likely to provide a telling indicator of South 
Africa's overall international position. Finally, South Africa's 
response to international pressure over South West Africa may go 
some way towards indicating the probable direction of South African 
domestic policy should South Africa herself become subject to 
increased international pressure over the issue of apartheid as such. 
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INDEPENDENCE LESOTHO, BOTSWANA AND SWAZILAND 
Throughout the 1960is, the High Commission territories provide a 
sensitive indicator of South Africa1 s international position. In the 
crisis years of the early 601 s relations between the territories 
and South Africa deteriorated to a new nadir, but they improved 
swiftly when international pressure on South Africa began to ease 
in 1964-65 after calm had been restored internally. In fact, the 
improvement in relations with the territories was to herald South 
Africa's 11 outward-lookingU policy towards the African continent. 
South Africa's desire to incorporate the territories which had 
bedevilled relations in the early period, was not the major issue m 
the 19601s, though in the first years of the decade suspicion of South 
African intentions remained high. 
In 1961, Dr. Verwoerd finally indicated that South Africa had given 
up any hope of ever incorporating the territories. He "publicly told 
his followers that, in view of Britain's changed policies and South 
Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the Territories were 
legally lost forever to the Republic". 
1 
However, his speech 
also contained the warning that in future relations between South 
Africa and the territories would have to be on the same basis as 
those between foreign states. The implication clearly was that 
South Africa would not feel bound to maintain the privileges 
accorded migrant labourers from the three territories in South Africa. 
It was also to become apparent that Verwoerd had not given up hope 
of influencing political development in the territories, short of 
South Africa actually directly taking over the administration of the 
three territories. 
In September 1962 Verwoerd told a Nationalist Party Congress, "We 
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2 
do not aspire to incorporation, which is clearly not practical politics". 
Yet a year later, he declared "if South Africa were to be, or to 
become, the guardian, the protector or the helper of these adjacent 
territories, instead of the United Kingdom, we could lead them far 
better and much more quickly to independence and economic 
pro£>perity than Great Britain can do. n 
3 
At the same time he 
maintained "I have most clearly stated on behalf of my Government 
that South Africa has no territorial ambitions with regard to these 
areas''. 
4 
There was further evidence to suggest that South Africa had by no 
means lost interest in the constitutional development of the territories. 
After South Africa had become a Republic, the government brought in 
legislation 
5 
to repeal any enactments that impinged upon the change 
in the country2 s constitutional status. However, specifically 
excluded from repeal were those sections of the Act of Union and 
the attached schedule that provided for the transfer of the territories 
to South Africa. To Hailey, 
11 It is possible that in so doing the Union government 
desired to keep alive the implications contained in the 
Schedule; or it may be that it desired to put on record 
a reminder that it had in its Memorandum of 1939 
explicitly accepted the terms embodied in the Schedule 
for regulating the process of transfer of the Territories 
to the Union. 11 6 
Similarly, the British government took no steps to repeal the 1909 
Act of Union, but a British government spokesman explained 
11we consider that as a result of the constitutional change this Act 
7 
is spent and we have so informed the South African Government." 
It was pointed out that the schedule contemplated transfer to a 
Dominion, a status South Africa no longer enjoyed after becoming 
a Republ.ic outside the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, this did not 
allay everyone's suspicions. In June 1962, the U.N. Committee on 
Colonialism pointedly declared that any attempt to annex the three 
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territories would be an act of aggression, a violation of the 
U. N. Charter. Further allegations in the Trusteeship committee 
that it was the aim of British and South African policy that the 
territories be transferred to the Republic brought a categorical 
denial from both governments in December 1962. 
In short, there was a wide divergence of opinion as to South 
Africa's intentions towards the territories during the early 60•s; 
a divergence that sprung from how often conflicting speeches by 
Dr. Verwoerd on the subject were interpreted. However, the 
same difficulty does not arise in regard to British policy. 
There is little reason to suppose that the British government 
regarded incorporation as a possibility, though, admittedly, the 
decision to develop the territories towards self-government and 
independence was taken reluctantly. The evidence does not justify 
the placing of a sinister connotation on Britain's failure to repeal 
the 1909 Act. 
Understanding South African intentions is admittedly more difficult. 
The Republic's position was anyway far more complex. On the one 
hand, the impossibility of securing British agreement is grounds 
for believing that Verwoerd was genuine when he stated that South 
Africa did not regard incorporation as being in the realm of practical 
politics. On the other hand, it is clear from his 1963 speech that 
Verwoerd did not believe that this ruled out the possibility that the 
territories could be included within South Africa's sphere of influence 
as Bantus tans. Further, the South African government was 
apparently prepared to exert pressure on the territories to this end 
through its control over migratory labour. It is also clear that 
during this period ( 1960-63) South Africa remained deeply apprehensive 
about· the development of the territories as indepe.ndent states. 
For example, in 1962 Verwoerd expressed the fear that on becoming 
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independent the territories "could well become a danger to South 
Africa, for a weak neighbour could become a danger if good relations 
were not maintained". 
8 
Naturally engug9;, South African attempts to influence constitutional 
development were seen by the territories as an effort on the part of 
the Republic to deny them independence. 
Aggravating mutual suspicion between the territories and South Africa 
was the position the territories occupied as a safe haven for political 
refugees from South Africa. In fact, it was this rather than the 
incorporation issue that was the major cause of the deterioration 
in relations, though it was those incidents which revolved round the 
question of sovereignty that created most resentment in the territories. 
The first widespread use of the territories as a haven for refugees 
' from South Africa followed the state of emergency after Sharpeville 
in 1960. 
11As police swoops began, leaders of the African 
National Congress Alliance and the rival Pan-
Africanist Congress took refuge in ever-increasing 
numbers in the High Commission Territories. 
No passpo~rts were at that time required for entry 
and any visitor could stay for up to thre~ months 
without applying for a special permit". 
In addition• Bechuanaland came to be used (by Nelson Mandela among 
others) as an es cape route to the north. 
Halpern as follows: 
The route is described by 
Uby car or, even better, on foot across the 
long South African-Bechuanaland border; then, 
if guards permit, by chartered private plane 
from the notrthern most landing field in Bechuana-
land, at Maun, across neighbouring Northern 
Rhodesia and into now independent Tanganika; and 
from there, to Accra, Cairo, London or, in fact, 
anywhere 0 • lO 
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The South African government bitterly resented the use of the 
territories by refugees and as an escape route and put strong 
pressure on the British government to return all refugees to 
South Africa, but these efforts failed. The British government 
stood firm on the principle of refusing to hand back political 
refugees, though it did take steps to restrict the political 
activities of refugees in the territories. For example, in 
Swaziland which had the largest contingent of refugees, each 
refugee was required to sign the following declaration: 
11in the exceptional circumstances of my 
presence in Swaziland, I shall, so long as I 
remain in the Territory, refrain from taking 
an active part in the politics of this Territory 
or of either of the other High Commission 
Territories or of any other territory bordering
11 
on any of the High Commission Territories. " 
This was not sufficient as ;&ar as the South African government was 
~ . .... .. . \.. 
concerned. The Minister of Justice declared that 11 the state 
of Emergency could not be lifted until the 1Communists and agitators' 
. 12 
in the British territories had been apprehended". The 
government then took steps to prevent easy access into the territories. 
Police road blocks were set up on all the main entry roads into the 
territories while mobile patrols kept watch on the borders. 
If that had been the full extent of South Africa's response to the 
situation, it seems unlikely that the refugee issue would have become 
such a major source of tension. However, on more than one 
occasion, South Africa showed herself less than willing to respect 
the territorial integrity of her neighbours where refugees were 
involved. Further,. a series of incidents occurred in the early 60Js 
which highlighted the position of the refugees and strained relations 
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almost to breaking point. These incidents were followed by further 
limited British action to curb the political activities of refugees, 
while South Africa took additional measures to close the borders. 
The first major incident involving a refugee occurred in August 1961, 
when Anderson Ganyile, a>',.former Fort Hove student and opponent 
of Bantu Education, and two companions of his were kidnapped by 
six masked men from their isolated mountain hut in Basutoland. 
They were taken at gunpoint across the border and handed over to 
the South Afric@:;police. Ganyile was then detained in Umtata under 
the Transkei's emergency regulations. It was some time before the 
full story of the kidnapping came to light. When it did, a full bench 
of the South African Supreme Court called on the Minister of Justice 
to justify Ganyile's detention to the court on 18 January (1962). 
In the meantime, Ganyile had been brought before a magistrate's 
court in Umtata for a preparatory examination on charges of 
attempted murder and incitement to murder. 
The day before the South African government was due to justify its 
action before the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice announced 
that the charges against Ganyile had been dropped and that he would 
be allowed to return to Basutoland. In addition, the South African 
government expressed its regret to the British ambassador that the 
incident had occurred. The reason for the South African government's 
about face on the issue -- earlier it had denied that Ganyile had been 
kidnapped -- appears to have been belated British representations 
after persistent Opposition pressure in the House of Commons and 
after it had been established beyond doubt that Ganyile had indeed 
O< 13 
been kidnapped. 
Later in 1962, there was a clearer indication of Britain's determination 
to safeguard the rights of refugees in her territories. In November, two 
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Hereros and a coloured man who had fled from South West Africa 
were arrested in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
They were then placed under police escort on a train passing through 
Bechuanaland, but bound for South Africa. Acting on the 
instructions of the Brit:l.sh High Commissioner, Sir John Maud, 
Bechuanaland police boarded the train and freed the three men, 
who were then granted political asylum in Bechuanaland. 
This demonstration of British firmness was the subject of bitter 
comment in South Africa. Following the Ganyile case, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs had announced that it was the 
government's intention to take further measures to control 
movement across the borders and in October tourist visiting 
Basutoland were told they would require passports. 
Even more disturbing than these last two incidents as far as the 
South African government was concerned was the holding at the 
end of 1962 of a secret conference in Lobatsi (Bechuanaland) by the 
African National Congress. Further point was given to South African 
government fears that the territories might be used as bas~ for 
attacks on the Republic the following year. In an extraordinary 
press conference in Maseru early in 1963, Potlako Leballo, a 
leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress, announced that he had 150, 000 
underground supporters under his command in South Africa and that 
they were on the point of staging a general uprising. Leballo2 s 
speech led to a furore in South Africa and considerably aggravated 
British-South African relations. It was followed by a much tougher 
policy on the part of the 'British authorities in the three territories 
towards refugees. Leballots home and office in Maseru were 
raided and a number of documents were seized by the police including, 
it was revealed, a list of P.A. C. - Poqo members in South Africa. 
On 3 April, South African police staged a series of raids on P.A. C. 
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members throughout the Republic. However, both the British 
and South African governments denied that these raids were linked 
with that on Leballo, though there is some evidence to suggest that 
there was a measure of co-operation between the two governfu~J.!is. 
In particular, the ready access of all three territories to the 
members of South Africa's Special Branch suggested co-operation 
going beyond purely criminal matters. 
In June, the British government announced that Patrick Duncan, 
who had been a prominent member of the South African Liberal 
Party, was to be banned from all three High Commission territories. 
In addition, the British authorities informed two South African 
refugee_s, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Hodgson that they would become illegal 
residents when their temporary residence permits to slay in 
Bechuanaland expired. However, when the Hodgsons refused to 
move, the British government balked at returning them to South 
Africa and flew them to England at government expense. 
Further evidence of Britain's tougher attitude towards refugees came 
in July when the British government gazetted a Proclamation for the 
Prevention of Violence Abroad, whl.ch made it an offence for people 
in Basutoland or Swaziland to plan or bring about or to incite 
violence against persons or property outside the territories. 
A few weeks later it was extended to Bechuanaland. 
In July 1963, the South African Police had arrested a number of 
people in connection with the activities of the A. N. C. 1s sabotage 
group, the Spear of the Nation, after a raid on a house in the 
Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia. 
14 
Four of those arrested 
(A. Goldreich, H. Wolpe, M. Moolla, and A. Sas sat) dramatically 
escaped_ from their cells on 11 August. It was subsequently 
established that they had bribed a young police constable to let them 
go. An intensive man-hunt was launched to recapture Goldreich 
and Wolpe. Rich rewards were offered for their return to custody 
and a close watch maintained on borders. However, it was to no 
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avail. Disguised as priests, Goldreich and Wolpe safely arrived 
in Swaziland. From there they flew on a charter flight to 
Bechuanaland on 20 August, where an East African Airways plane 
was due to collect them and a number of other refugees. However, 
the night before the plane was scheduled to leave, saboteurs 
gelignited the aircraft. Nevertheless, Goldreich and Wolpe 
eventually succeeded in making their way to Tanganyika and thence 
to Britain. 
There was an angry response to their escape in South Africa. 
In September, the Minister of Transport announced that South African 
aircraft licences would be withdrawn from holders who transported 
refugees. As a consequ,ence East African Airways was banned 
from operating flights to South Africa from October. Further, 
the government banned over flights between the three territo::des 
over South African territory. In future, all planes would have to 
land in South Africa on their way. Finally, the government 
established 36 additional control posts on the borders. 
In August, 1963 another case of kidnapping came to light. Dr. 
Kenneth Abrahams had fled after the issue of a warrant for his 
arrest from South West Africa to Bechuanaland, where he was seized 
on the road between Ghanzi and Lobatzi. His kidnappers handed him 
over to the police on their arrival on South West African territory. 
As in the Ganyile case, representations by the British government 
resulted in the release of Dr. Abrahams who was due to be charged 
with sabotage, and his return to Bechuanaland. The Minister of 
Justice, Mr. Vorster announced that the decision to return 
15 Dr. Abrahams had been made 11 in the interests of good relations" 
with the governments of South Africa's neighbours. 
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Clearly, however, Goldreich and Wolpe's escape and the Abrahams 
case contributed to a deterioration in relations between Britain and 
South Africa. At the end of August, the head of the South African 
Security Police, Col. van der Bergh bitterly attacked the British 
government at a press conference for permitting the use of 
16 
Bechuanaland as a "free port for runaways, Reds. and saboteurs". 
Van der Bergh 1s indignation was understandable. In 1962 and 1963 
the flow of refugees through the High Commission territories had 
been particularly large. In November (of 1963) Amnesty 
International estimated that the number of refugees that had 
passed through Bechuanaland alone since the 1960 state of emergency 
•:j 
was in excess of 1200, while Vorster told the Se:!1ate early in 1964 
c... ) 
that 562 people, who would have been charged with sabotage, had 
fled the country. He added that estimates of the numbers who 
had left for military training abroad varied from 900 to 1500. 
South Africats preparedness to use any measures (legal or illegal) 
at her disposal to prevent the leakage of refugees through the High 
Commission territories was underlined by an editorial in Die Burger 
in August 1963. 
"It must be obvious that an underground war 
that recognizes no borders also necessitates 
underground defence ••• South Africa will 
perh.aps have to go deeply and professionally 
into this business, for no games are being 
played by the other side. The less that is 
said in public about such countermeasures 
the better it would be, but one aim should 
probably be to deprive the revolutionary of 
his sense of security once he has left South 
Africa. u 17 
In 1964, there were a number of further incidents involving refugees. 
In particular, a new refugee centre in Francistown called the nwhite 
House" was gelignited by saboteurs shortly before it was due to 
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open and Rosemary Wentzel, a refugee in Swaziland alleged that 
she was kidnapped from the territory. She subsequently gave 
state evidence in a South African sabotage trial. However, in 
general 1964 saw a decline in the flow of refugees into the three 
territories and a consequent easing of tension between the 
British and South African governments. The year also saw a!l 
improvement in the position of South Africa's internal security 
which made the refugee question less of a burning issue. 
One of the other is sues affecting South Africa1s relations with the 
High Commission territories was that of migratory labour. 
It was an issue of great importance to the territories, two of which, 
Basutoland and Bechuanaland, were heavily dependent on the earnings 
of their citizens in South Africa; a dependence the South African 
government on occasion threateningly pointed to at times of tension 
between the territories and South Africa. In May 1961, the South 
African government had appointed an inter-departmental committee 
on Foreign Africans, which became known as the Froneman 
Committee after its chairman, Mr. G.F. van L. Froneman M.P. 
Its report was tabled in Parliament in January 1963. 
Of particular concern to the Committee was illegal immigration into 
South Africa, most of which was from the High Commission territories. 
It consequently recommended the establishment of depots on South 
Africa's borders for the detention of Africans entering the Republic 
illegally prior to their expulsion from the country. The committee 
estimated the number of foreign Africans at 836, 000 of whom 
431, 000 were from the High Commission territories and paid 
particular attention to the privileges they enjoyed, concluding that 
"the lawful presence in South Africa of so many foreign African 
families necessarily involves the Republic in large expenditure 
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which could otherwise be utilised for its own purposes!!. 
However, while the Commission recommended "the admission 
of African children and juveniles from outside South Africa 
19 
should be stopped completely" and in general argued that 
the government's priority should be to find employment for 
unemployed South Africans, it stopped well short of any 
suggestion of any wholesale repatriation of foreign workers. 
Consequently, though there was·~onsiderable anxiety in the three 
territories over the position of migratory labour, it was never 
on its own the cause of a major crisis in relations between South 
Africa and the territories. In fact, on the contrary it can be 
argued that as the use of migratory labour is a distinct benefit 
to the Republic, there exists a coincidence of interests between 
South Africa and the territories that serves to cement rather than 
disrupt relations. 
Of primary concern to South Africa were the constitutional changes 
taking place in the territories. I shall deal with the changes in 
each territory individually and South Africa's response in each case 
before dealing with the more general question of the change in 
South Africa's attitude to the grant of independence to the three 
-territories. The first country to feel the effect of the reluctant 
British decision to develhp the territories towards self-government 
and independence was Basutoland. In 1959, the British government 
had promulgated a new constitution for the territory which provided 
for an 80-member Legislative Council, 40 of whom were to be 
elected with 9 District Councils acting as electoral colleges. 
The first elections under the new constitution were held in January 
1960. The majority of candidates (188) stood as independents while 
the next largest group (125) supported the Basutoland Congress Party, 
the successor to the country's first modern African nationalist party, 
the Basutoland African congress which had been formed in 1952. 
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Securing 36% of the popular vote, the B. C. P. won 73 of the 162 
District Council seats and with the help of independents was able 
to elect 30 of the 40 elected members of the Legislative Council. 
The electoral system tended to overstate the real strength of the 
African nationalist movement, which in::terms of seats had won 
an overwhelming victory, a situation which could hardly have 
commended itself to the South African government, which feared 
the emergence of radical or unstable governments on the Republic's 
borders. 
However, while the election had tended to overstate Congress's 
position, the composition of the Legislative Council was balanced 
by the nominations made to it by the Paramount Chief. In fact, 
ironically, the B. C. P. 1 s sole representative on the Executive 
Council subsequently defected from the party and consequently, 
the elected majority in the Legislative Council found itself without 
representation in the government which remained a strongly 
conservative body. 
After the elections the B. C. P. reiterated the call it had made in 
the campaign for early independence and pressed for a further 
constitutional review. This came in 1962 when a constitutional 
commission under Walter Stanford 
20 
was appointed. 
Against the background of uneasy relations between South Africa 
and Britain over the question of refugees and the new border 
restrictions, the commission issued its report in October 1963. 
Its main recommendations were 1) independence in 1965 
2) a constitutional monarchy under Moshoeshoe II and 3) a 
bicameral Parliament consisting of an elected lower house and 
an upper house of chief and nominees of the King. The commission 
proposed a cabinet system on the Westminster model and the 
abandonment of the prevailing male suffrage for universal suffrage. 
Constitutional talks on the basis of these proposals began in London 
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in April (of 1964). "After several weeks of heated debate, in the 
cause of which Britain admitted her inability even at the moment 
to defend Basutoland militarily against South Africa, agreement 
21 
was reached on all major points. 11 At first, the British 
government had been reluctant to accept the swift development of 
the territory to independence in the belief that it could further 
aggravate her relations with the Republic, but in the end Britain 
agreed to all the proposals except the date of independence. 
However, it was agreed that 12 months after elections under the 
22 
new constitution "independence would be granted on request". 
The date provisionally set for elections was late 1964 or early 1965. 
However, elections took somewhat longer to arrange and the date 
subsequently set was 29 April, 1965. Already, a perceptible 
change was evident both in South African attitudes towards the 
territory's constitutional development and in Basuto attitudes 
towards the Republic. South Africa.ill:was by this time (mid 1964) 
coming to terms with the fact that Basutoland's constitutional 
development would take place within the framework provided by 
the British government, while in Basutoland there was a greater 
awareness of the country3 s inevitable dependence on South Africa. 
Sensing that these changes were weakening his party1s position, 
Mokhehle, the B. C. P. leader pressed for immediate elections. 
Delay until April 1965, he argued, would allow South Africa "to 
23 
play as big a part as in the recently held Swaziland elections". 
That election had resulted in the triumph of the traditionalists. 
However, Mokhehle1 s protests were to no avail. 
Although Mokhehle stated his concern 11to negotiate ;;on an equal 
footing with the Republic on matters of common interest", 
24 
fears that the B. C. P. 1 s African nationalism and its commitment 
to Pan-Africanism might lead to retaliation by South Africa became 
a significant factor in the elections. Sympto:tnatic of this attitude 
was formation in November 1964 of "The Sons and Daughters of 
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Moshoeshoen in South Africa, a Basuto organization dedicated to 
seeing that good relations were maintained with the Republic. 
Further, the B. C. P. faced the formidable opposition of the 
Roman Catholic Church which had a strong hold in the rural 
areas and over women, who would be voting for the first time. 
In these circumstances, conservative opinion organized in the 
Basutoland National Party under Chief Leabua Jonathan made 
. considerable headway. 
Nevertheless, the B.N.P. 1 s narrow victory infue elections came 
as a surprise. The B.N.P. won 31 seats; the B. C.P. 25 and the 
smaller Marema-Tiau Freedom Party 4. The result was a triumph 
for the South African government considerably enhancing Verwoerd1s 
hopes for a Southern African common market. In speeches after 
the election Jonathan indicated that he was in favour of direct talks 
with the South Africa government and his strong hostility to 
communism, in which category he placed some of the more radical 
African states including Ghana and Tanzania. South Africa's 
stake in the maintenance of the B.N.P. government was 
demonstrated dramatically soon after the election. Jonathan himself 
had been defeated in the election. To allow him to take his place 
in the Assembly, a sitting B.N.P. member had resigned, thus 
allowing Jonathan to contest a by-election in a safe B. N. P. seat. 
Jonathan duly won the seat, but not without creating a storm over 
his relations with South Africa. 
During the campaign, Jonathan appealed to Verwoerd for famine 
relief. The South African governmentjduly responded with a gift of 
some 100, 000 bags of grain worth over £150, 000. Evidence that 
this was a political gesture and had little to do with humanitarian 
considerations was overwhelming. In the first place, the gift 
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was not made to the Basutoland government but personally to 
Chief Jonathan as leader of the B. N. P. The gral.n was accompanied 
by leaflets with the message 11Leabua is feeding the people". 
25 
Secondly, the need for famine relief and especially on this scale 
was to say the least highly suspect. British officials reported~ 
that the food situation in the territory was normal and that they had 
no requests for help. This was underscored by the fact that a month 
after the announcement of the gift only 6, 854 of 100, 000 bags had 
been moved to the territory and only a small proportion of that 
(5%) distributed. 
26 
In the National Assembly, Jonathan 
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described the gift as a "generous gesture" on the part of 
Verwoerd amid a storm of protest from the Opposition. 
Early on, Jonathan made it clear that he intended to take a tough 
stance towards refugees. In December 1965 a circular was sent 
to all refugees requiring them to report to the police. They were 
finger-printed and photographed and required to reveal the nature 
of their political activities in South Africa. They were further 
told that if they engaged in politics, they would face deportation. 
Jonathan's stand on this issue served to considerably enhance his 
reputation in the South African Nationalist press. 
Basutoland's foreign relations during the period prior to independence 
were handled by Britain. However, Jonathan and Verwoerd did 
finally meet in Pretoria for highly publicized ·talks in September 1966. 
As the first contact between a leader of a black-ruled state and the 
South African Prime Minister, the talks enjoyed wide coverage not 
just in the South African press but abroad. Jonathan was careful 
to stress that the talks were as between equals and he made the 
following interesting comment on them at a London press conference 
in October. 
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"when I went to see the late Dr. Verwoerd, he 
said to me, 1Now look, even if we would consider 
coming to your help financially, I just won't think 
of it because it would confirm the allegations 
levelled against you •. both you and us •. that you 
are going to sell out to us. So far as financial 
aid is concerned just forget all about South Africa~ 
(Chief Jonathan then said} I am not scared myself. 
Even if the South Africans were to come to my aid 
tomorrow I would accept it. (sic} I am n2B an 
apartheid man; I am a.tprincipled man. tt 
If an accurate account of the meeting, it indicates that Verwoerd 
took a cautious view of the new situation in Basutoland and was 
wary about committing the Republic to Jonathan's survival. 
Soon after the 1965 elections, Jonathan made it clea;r that he would 
seek early ind~p.endence from Britain; a demand that had the. 
backing of the South African government now recognizing that 
independence rather than a threat to the Republic provided the 
opportunity for the expansion of South African influence. For the 
same reason, the B.C.P. (supported by the Regent Chief and 
Marema-Tlou Freedom Party) just as ironically opposed the giant 
of independence 1o Jonathan's government. However, it was 
unable to change the British government's determination to withdraw 
when asked. Consequently, after resolutions were passed in the 
Basutoland parliament for independence, the country was granted 
independence on 4 October 1966 as the Kingdom of Lesotho. 
Constitutional reform was to begin with, somewhat slower in 
]3ce§~uanaland than in Basutoland, though the two territories, in fact, 
secured independence almost simultaneously. 
29 
Change in 
Bechuanaland rested on the position of the Khamas; Tshekedi who 
became Chief Regent of the powerful Bamangwato tribe in 1926 ahd 
his nephew, Seretse, endorsed as the rightful chief by a kgotla (tribal 
gathering} in 1949. 
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In the ordinary course of events Tshekedi would have stood down as-~ 
chief and Seretse taken his place. However, the marriage of Seretse 
to an English girl resulted in his being barred from the territory by 
the British government acting under South African pressure. 
Serets e was supported by Tshekedi who renounced his chieftainship 
and was forced to follow Seretse into exile. In 1956 the Khamas 
were allowed to return to Bechuanaland as private citizens. 
Both did so and then pressed for the er eation of a Legislative Council, 
a demand the British government eventually acceded to in December 
1960. 
The same month saw the creation of the territory's first political 
party, the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (the B. P. P. ). Its formation 
reflected the politicization of the towns from the flood of refugees 
into Bechuanaland that had followed South Africa's 1960 state of 
emergency. The majority of the members of the new Legislative 
Council, which met for the first time in June 1961, was white. 
Out of a council of 35, there were 10 elected African members and 
10 elected white ones. From the outset, there were strong protests 
against the council{s composition, especially from the B. P. P. 
Originally, the British government had planned the next constitutional 
review for 1968. However, the growing strength of the B.P.P., and 
growing political awareness in the territory generally, forced the 
British government to alter its plans radically. In August 1962, 
the Resident Commissioner announced that there would be a 
constitutional review in 1963. A major reason for the British 
decision was the formation in 1962 of the Bechuanaland Democratic 
Party (B.D.P.) under Seretse Khama, who had been elected to the 
Legislative Council on which he acted as spokesman for the 
Bamangwato tribe. Khama 1 s good relations with the government 
were reflected in his appointment to the Executive Council of the 
territory in 1961. His emergence as a popular party leader was 
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consequently soon followed by British agreement to a review of the 
constitution. 
The fact that Khama, though a deposed chief, was now a private 
citizen worked - somewhat ironically - to his advantage. 
"While enjoying all the charismatic attractions iOf chieftainship, 
he had all the political advantages of being free from ceremonial and 
uninvolved in the usual petty disputes which so complicate the life of 
a chief. Indeed, his removal from the succession facilitated his 
acceptance as a modern political leader of a country-wide party. 
Moreover, he could disavow rigidly traditionalist decisions by 
chiefs without being disloyal to the institution of chieftainship, 
and thus could compete with the growing BPPU. 
30 
The 1963 constitutional review gave Bechuanaland a new constitution 
whose main feature was the far-reaching non-racialism Hand which 
in terms of representative procedure, was probably one of the most 
advanced proposals yet submitted in British Africa 11 • 
31 
The constitution provided for a Legislative Assembly of 38, 32 of 
whom were to be elected on a single member constituency basis under 
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universal adult suffrage, a cabinet system, and a house of chiefs 
with responsibilities only in the field of tribal affairs. No special 
representation was laid aside for the territory's white population, 
which numbered some 6, 000. White representatives at the 
constitutional conference seemed content that white interests would 
be protected by the incorporation in the constitution of a Bill of Rights. 
However, by no means all of the territory's white settlers were 
prepared to accept the new constitution. During the talks a number of 
settlers called for the independence of the Tati district or 
alternatively the merger of this area into South Africa or Rhodesia. 
They based their claim· on a concession made to the Tati company 
by Lobenguela in the 19th century; a concession which pre-dated the 
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inclusion of the Tati district into the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
In 1964 Ta ti's white farmers organized a petition and sent a 
delegation to Pretoria. However, the South African government 
showed no enthusiasm for backing their claim. This can be seen 
as a significant pointer that South Africa was by this stage 
reconciled to the development of the territory to independence. 
It was also, no doubt, in part, an expression of confidence that 
Seretse :Khama, already the dominant political figure in 
Bechuanaland, would exercise moderation in relations with South 
Africa. Further, following the hostile reaction to Verwoerd1 s 
1963 proposals in Bechuanaland, the South African government 
was probably more sensitive to the danger to future relations that 
might arise from interference in the territory's constitutional 
development. 
Elections under the new constitution were held in March 1965. 
The B.D.P. under Khama as widely expected gained an overwhelming 




three seats were won by the more radical B.P.P. On 
becoming Prime Minister, Seretse Khama stated that Bechuanaland 
would accept investment from all countries including Rhodesia and 
South Africa, and would be 11 favourably disposed towards an 
economic grouping of Southern African states. 11 
35 
He also 
re-affirmed that temporary asylum would be granted to political 
refugees, but that they would not be allowed to use Bechuanaland 
as a base for subversion. 
The response in South Africa to Khama 1 s election was generally a 
favourable on·e. In particular, the Nationalist press "ceased to 
36 
treat his wife with scorn", and Verwoerd sent a message of 
congratulations to the new leader. The problem created by Khama's 
marriage which had resulted in a ban on his entry into South Africa 
was smoothed over. The Minister of the Interior, Senator de Klerk 
blandly announced that the ban had been lifted in October 1964. 
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Verwoerd even went so far as to endorse early independence for the 
territory as "this was in accordance with the policy of sep'arate 
development''. 
37 
As in the case of Basutoland, South Africa's attitude towards 
independence changed. Pretoria now recognized that South African 
interests would best be furthered by an early British withdrawal, 
which would maintain Bechuanaland1s dependence on the Republic 
and strengthen Khama1 s position in relation to the opposition. 
For its part, the African nationalist opposition fearing precisely 
that independence would strengthen South Africa's hold over _the 
country (and some chiefs who felt that their power was being eroded 
by the Khama government) pressed for a delay in the grant of 
ind~cpendence. New proposals for an independence constitution had 
in fact been put forward by Khama shortly after the elections. 
They included the change to a republican form of government under 
a President to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. In other 
respects, there was little change proposed to the 1965 constitution. 
The British government accepted these proposals at a constitutional 
conference in London in February 1966. Under the new name of 
Botswana, the territory became independent on September 30, 1966. 
Swaziland's constitutional progress was much slower than that of 
either Basutoland or Bechuanaland. It also took a somewhat 
different form. This was largely because of the development in 
the 19601 s of a powerful alliance between Swaziland's white settlers 
and the tribal authorities under King Sobhuza II. Historically, the 
whites in Swaziland had occupied a'much _stronger position in the 
territory's administration than in either of the other two High 
Commission territories, while Sobhuza was only too aware that 
elsewhere in Africa a decline in chiefly power and authority had 
followed self-government and independence. 
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In a speech in 1959 Sobhuza blamed unrest in the Federation as 
11due to people forgetting their own African customs and grasping 
at European customs with which they were not fully familiar". 
38 
His extremely conservative response to African nationalism was 
well received by the white community, which. moved promptly to 
suggest'IBrms for constitutional advance to pre-empt any proposals 
emanating from an African nationalist source. In 1960, the 
European Advisory Council proposed the creation of a joint 
advisory council that would include representatives of the Swazi 
National Council, a body comprising the territory~ s tribal authorities. 
Sobhuza himself argued for the establishment of a legislative council 
composed along similar lines. 
of one man and one vote. 
He emphatically rejected the idea 
The only political faction in the territory that campaigned for a 
non-racial constitution was the small Swaziland Progressive Party 
formed in 1960. However, its position was weakened by splits in 
the African nationalist leadership in 1961. In fact, the main 
stumbling block to the triumph of the settler-traditionalist alliance 
proved to be the British government. It refused to accept either the 
E.A. C. proposals or those of Sobhuza. Negotiations with the 
different parties to reach agreement on a new constitution proved 
fruitless and in the end the British government put forward 
proposals of its own in May 1963 which were in effect a compromise 
between the views of the traditionalists, the African nationalists, and 
the settlers. The proposals envisaged the creation of a legislative 
council "composed of a Speaker, twenty-four elected Members, 
39 
together with four Official Members and Nominated Members". 
Of the elected members 8 would be Swazi elected by traditional 
methods, 8 whites, and 8 persons of any race elected on a National 
roll. 
The British proposals were rejected both by the settlers and by the 
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Swazi National Council and led to a worsening of relations between 
King Sobhuza and the British government. In September 1963, 
Verwoerd put forward his proposals for guiding the High Commission 
territories towards independence. It seems probable that Verwoerd 
was encouraged to make his offer at least in part because of the 
situation in Swaziland. The emergence of settler-traditional 
alliance must have seemed to him to represent a fulfilment of the 
ideological justification of separate development and at the same 
time to provide a powerful counter :challe,nge to African nationalism. 
Certainly, Swaziland was the only territory where there was not a 
strongly hostile response to Verwoerd's proposals. The settler 
leader, Carl Todd, welcomed them, while Sobhuza remained silent. 
Notwithstanding the opposition to its proposals the British government 
decided that no further purpose would be served by additional 
negotiations. Consequently, in January 1964, the British 
government issued an order-in-council imposing a new constitution 
on Swaziland based on its May 1963 proposals. Britain's action 
encountered strong opposition from Sobhuza who organized an 
unofficial plebiscite on the new constitution; the plebiscite, though 
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hardly fairly conducted, recorded an over whelming rejection 
of the British proposals. However, Sobhuza soon found a far ··more 
effective means of circumventing the intent of the constitution. 
This was to enter politics himself and for the Swazi National Council 
to sponsor its own candidates in the elections for National roll seats . 
To this end, the Imbokodo National Movement was formed led by 
Prince Makhosini Dhlamini to compete with the African nationalist 
parties. Further the S. N. C. acted to prevent the African nationalists 
from putting their case to the people in the Swazi .reserves. 11Yvi th that, 
perhaps some 80 per cent of the population was virtually delivered 
to the traditionalists. n 
41 
In these circumstances, the Imbokodo 
registered a clean sweep in the elections in June 1964. 
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After the elections the Imbokodo began to press for internal self-
government. The British government accordingly drew up a 
new constitution to this end in 1966. While conferring wide 
powers on the King, the new constitution did away with reserved 
white seats. The House of Assembly was to consist of 24 
representatives elected by universal suffrage in three-member 
constituencies and 6 members nominated by the King. The 
absence of "white" seats under the proposals served to underlie 
a certain degree of estrangement between the white populatbn and the 
Imbokodo, which was proving to be less conservative in its outlook 
than some whites had hoped. 
Nevertheless, during the campaign for new elections under the new 
constitution in April 1967, the new Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini 
Dhlamini Ustressed that Swaziland could not live without her two 
neighbours, South African and Mocambique, and that the government 
wanted friendly relations with both countries 11 • 
42 
The April 
1967 elections like those in 1964 resulted in a clean sweep for the 
Imbokodo. The generally conservative outlook of the Swaziland 
government was underlined in a speech by Prince Dhlamini shortly 
before independence in September 1968. He stated that "Rhodesia 
and Angola are being attacked by terrorists • • • . • • if they come to 
Swaziland, they would not come and mess us up alone. They would 
be on their way to neighbouring countries and in those circumstances 
South Africa would come to our aid". 
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Consequently, the 
South African government has shown considerable enthusiasm for the 
new government despite the fact that the kind of settler-traditionalist 
alliance that seemed possible in the wake of the 1964 elections has 
not materialized, though Imbokodo retained the backing of most 
settlers in the 1967 elections., 
Thus, by the time the High Commission territories attained independence, 
. d d" . l" 44 h d . h d 1 conservative an tra itiona ist governments a tr1ump e in a 1 
three; a situation certainly not envisaged at the beginning of the decade. 
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In conclusion, therefore, I intend taking a closer look at the change 
in South Africa's attitude towards the territories during the period 
1963-1966, in other words from Verwoerd1 s important speech in 
September 1963 to Botswana's and Lesotho's independence. 
I have already discussed Verwoerd1 s speech in the context of the 
possible incorporation of the territories into South Africa. 
{In this context it backfired badly awakening old fears that South 
,Africa had territorial designs on the territories - not a surprising 
response in view of South Africa's attitude towards the refugee 
issue.) 
However, Verwoerd1 ,s proposals were more than just a "final 
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challenge" as Halpern has put it. They were the statement 
of an ideological position. 
Verwoerd envisaged "natural native democracy~;:..,. as in the Transkeiu. 
He went on 
11We would steer them away from the principle of 
multi-racialism •••• where whites would be needed 
and must remain for some time in those areas and 
occupations, they would become voters in the Republic 
of South Africa, just as the Bechuanas, the Basutos, 
or the Swazis will - - when they work in t:he
4
fepublic 
be voters in their respective homelands. u 
He further suggested land adjustments between the territories and 
South Africa so that in their final boundaries the r'l:e1-w states would more 
accurately reflect ethnic divisions. South Africa would Urepurchase 
or exchange areas now wrongly occupied in order to include them 
in the white area or the black. u 
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This was followed in March 1964 by an extraordinary attack by Verwoerd 
on the United States and Britain. He alleged that they had attempted 
Uto exclude and undermine fi'.iendship with South Africa" and he asked 
11whether for once they would not act wisely and instead of the chaos 
they left behind elsewhere in Africa, they would not allow Southern 
48 
Africa to develop naturally". 
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was seen the very much more moderate of the two. Not only 
was Banda associated with the most radical brands of African 
nationalism but "was regarded by whites as being an ogre, the 
1 . . . 11 lo . 1 . f 1 u timate in extremism : a reputation resu ting rom the fa se 
but widely believed accusation that there had been a conspir.acy 
in the late 50 1s to murder- Nyas~land1 s white community in which 
he was implicated. Further": it was Kaunda who in January 1964 
stated that he would be prepared to exchange diplomatic 
representatives with South Africa provided they received equal 
treatment; an offer rejected by Verwoerd who stuck to the proposition 
that the use of roving ambassadors provided the answer to relations 
with new states. u 
South Africa's first response to events in Central Africa (i.e. in the 
Congo, Zambia and Malawi) in 1964 was to propose economic 
co-operation rather than the forging of direct political links. It 
was not a surprising reaction. The prospects for economic 
co-operation were at the time much mo~e promising and while it 
was recognised that there were benefits to be derived from political 
co-operation, the development of economic ties was seen as the 
indispensable fore~unner of political ones. In general, most 
commentators saw little chance of South Africa securing any 
immediate political breakthrough, given the limits both of South African 
foreign policy and those of the African states. Spence is typical. 
"Trading links may have to be tolerated, but these 
states (Zambia and Malawi), no less than those of 
West and East Africa, will no doubt be suspicious 
of any attempts at South African neo-colonialism, 
however attractive the package deal that is offered 
to them. South Africa would gain a major 
diplomatic advantage if she could persuade some 
of the new states of Southern Africa to abstain 
from debat'.es in the General Assembly demanding 
tough action against the Republic, but this is 
highly unlikely. n 12 
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The Conservatives were pledged to one last attempt to reach a 
settlement by negotiation but also indicated that they would not 
maintain sanctions indiefinitely if the attempt failed. It was a 
weak bargaining position as Enoch Powell pointed out. The 
British government was saying to Smith, he said, " 1 This is your 
very last chance. This time you had better settle or else we 
shall have to consider removing sanctionsu. What an arm-
23 
breaking clinch. What an irrestible argument. 11 Contacts 
between the Rhodesian regime and the British government were 
renewed shortly after the Conservative victory, but negotiations 
only got beyond an exploratory stage in June 1971 when the British 
governmen-es envoy, Lord Goodman visited Salisbury. By November, 
the ground had been sufficiently prepared for the final rcmnd of 
negotiations between Smith and Sir Alec Douglas Home in Rhodesia, 
though by this time the British government's leverage on Rhodesia 
had been further eroded by a vote of the United States Senate to lift 
the embargo on Rhodesian chrome. 
24 
Nonetheless, proposals for a settlement were agreed. These 
involved very substantial concessions to the Rhodesian regime 
including the retention of separate racial rolls and the continuation 
of the system whereby half the African representatives in parliament 
25 
were elected through electoral colleges of chiefs and headmen. 
They offered little pro~·pect of majority rule in the foreseeable future. 26 
The agreement was warmly welcomed in South Africa where the 
Prime Minister declared: 
'I am glad that Britain and Rhodesia have reached 
a settlement, for the sake of Rhodesia, states in 
Southern Africa and the free world. I want to 
congratulate the leaders on both sides for the 
statesmanship they have shown. 11 27 
However, the settlement was subject to the condition that an independent 
commission appointed by the British government should find its terms 
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However, the settlement was subject to the condition that an independent 
commission appointed by the British government should find its terms 
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acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. u 
28 
This proved to be more than simply a formality as was immediately 
apparent when the Commission headed by Lord Pearce arrived 
in Rhodesia in JanuaryC1972. It was soon clear from the chorus 
of noes that greeted the commissioners wherever they went that 
. 29 
the settlement was in serious Jeopardy. The developments 
in Rhodesia caused considerable alarm in South Africa. Rapport, 
for example, headlined its report of the commission's first weeks 
in Rhodesia : "Blacks talk of revolution in Rhodesia - it looks 
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like War - little hope left of settlement. 11 What shocked 
South Africa was not just the threat to the settlement itself. 
Indeed, with the gradual erosion of sanctions and the pas sage of 
time, the dispute over Rhodesia's constitutional future was arguably 
no longer as great an embarrassment to South African policy-
makers as it had been in the 1960 1s. More important, perhaps, 
was the spectre of instability in Rhodesia; the widespread belief 
that Rhodesia would never be the same again. 
Important though the differences between Rhodesia and South Africa 
that arose out of U. D. I. were, this in no way altered the trend 
towards greater Rhodesian dependence on South Africa economically. 
With the winding up of the Central African Federation, the pattern 
h h "ff d l" . d 
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h h d h h of ig tar1 s and ec 1n1ng tra e t at a c aracterized t e 
Federation's economic relations with South Africa was reversed. 
In November 1964 a new trade agreement providing for a lowering of 
tariff barriers between the two countries was signed by South Africa 
and Rhodesia. It reflected according to Dr. Diedrichs 11 a growing 
desire ,:on the part of South Africans and Rhodesians to strengthen 
their relations in all fields of common interest. u 
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It was 
followed in March 1965 by South Africa1 s grant of a RS million loan 
to Rhodesia "to establish the Triangle irrigation development scheme 
at Chiredzi. 11 
33 
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U. D. I itself considerably advanced the economic coalescing of 
South Africa and Rhodesia. South African exports and re-exports 
largely replaced British exports to Rhodesia and South African 
firms provided much of the post- U. D. I. capital investment in 
Rhodesia. 
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The inevitability of her economic dependence on 
South Africa was quickly recognised in Rhodesia. In a speech to 
the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce in September 1967, the 
Chamber's President declared: 
11South Africa will become Rhodesia's principal 
future source of development capital, and she is 
capable of exploiting the investment opportunities 
which we can provide even if only on a small 
scale to begin with. u 35 
He went on to indicate his support for some form of Southern African 
Common Market. 11 
I personally believe our future lies as a member of a strong Southern· 
African economic unit under the umbrella of South Africa. u 
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This was a significant conees sion to political reality; the recognition 
that the risk that under regional integration "industrial development 
would tend to bee ome concentrated even more in South Africa, with 
the other territories supplying primary products and labour and 
falling even further behind" 
37 
was unavoidable because of 
Rhodesia's isolation under sanctions. Subservience to South Africa 
of this kind had been precisely what the economic policy of 
Federation had been designed to avoid. 
As in the case of Rhodesia, the 1960 1s was closer political and 
economic, .. co-operation between South Africa and her Portuguese 
neighbours of Angola and Mozambique. Of primary importance 
was the change in Portuguese policy towards foreign capital investment.-~ 
In 1962 Portugal began a reform of the laws which stringently 
restricted foreign investment;O 
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11 By 1965 these laws had been redesigned to 
act as an incentive to foreign investors. 
Foreign enterprises are no longer bound to 
have participating Portuguese capital and 
administration; they may repatriate capital, 
profits and dividends freely." 38 
The changes reflected Portugal's concern after the African 
nationalist revolt in Angola in 1961 (and the latter revolt in 
Mozambique) to secure greater foreign financial support for her 
position in Africa. In particular, they opened the way for joint 
schemes involving South African and Western capital to exploit~-
the two territories 1 economic potential. Two of these schemes, 
the Cabora-Bassa dam project and the Kunene River project have 
assumed a political and strategic importance for Southern Africa 
that transcends their immediate economic significance. 
Politically, Portugal's relations with South Africa have been 
transformed by her growing isolation in the 1960 1s. After the 
Angolan uprising in February 1961 Portugal came under sharp 
attack internationally. Portugal's failure to devefop her territories 
in Africa towards self-government, the outbreak of guerilla warfare 
in Mozambique towards the end of 1964, her refusal to participate 
in sanctions against Rhodesia, and the resurgence of guerrilla 
activity in Angola, after Tshombe 1 s removal from power in the 
Congo towards the end of 1965, have all since contributed to making 
Portugal's Africa policies a regular feature of the U. N. agenda. 
Further, the failure of Portugal's Western allies in N.A. T. O. to 
come to her defence has led Portugal progres,sively to lose her 
previous inhibitions, in view of South Africa's racial policies, 
about close relations with the Republic. During a visit to South 
Africa in July 1967, the Portuguese Foreign Minister claimed 
that "in this tormented world, the co-ope ration between South Africa 
and Portugal stands out as an example of what co-operation between -
39 
nations should be. u This statement stands in :marked. contrast 
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to a declaration just over a decade earlier by Nogueira that 
''the moral condemnation of having to accept aid from South Africa 
40 
would be too high a price to pay. 11 
The first signs of a break-through in relations were modest. 
In February 1964 the South African-Portuguese Economic 
Institute was estabHshed by private business interests with 
official backing. Opening the new institute i.11; Johannesburg the 
Portuguese Consul-General indicated its political dimension: 
11 in the economic field there is a vast potential 
to be developed between the Portuguese territories 
and South Africa. Economic co-operation will 
lead to the establishment of a stronghold a1ainst 
the disturbances from Northern Africa. 11 4 
In October 1964 there was a new governmental agreement between 
South Africa and Portugal to promote trade and in the same year 
the South African government announced that it would provide 
finance for the building of a R5 million dam on the Kunene rive.r 
bordering Angola and South West Africa - part of a wider scheme 
to utilize the river for the development of the area. 
"~~,:"I\.,...........-:) '~ 
The possibilities these developments opened up were spe'lt·out1in 
·-'C>'tJ"w J 
an article by Austin Coates in Optima (March 1965). He saw the 
extension of South African capital into Angola and Mozambique as 
"destined possibly to be regarded as the most significant historical 
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development in Southern Africa since colonial disengagement. n 
In particular, the entry of South African capital into the two 
territories brought the prospect that their economic pot~ntial 
could be developed to provide for further extensive white settlement, 
which the Portuguese regard as an essential element in their 
campaign against guerrillas and in bolstering their position in Africa. 
24! 
In fact, projections of the future white population of Angola 
and Mozambique (by the mid 60 1s 225, 000 and 100, 000 respectively)
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have tended to centre on one scheme, the Cabora-Bassa dam 
project. (Cabora-Bassa is the narrow gorge of the Zambesi 
in the Tete province of Mozambique across which the dam will 
be built.) The scheme was first mooted in the late 19501s. 
Since then the Portuguese have spent over RlO million researching 
the project. The changes in the Portuguese law on foreign 
investment in the 1960 1 s made the scheme a financial possibility 
and its implementation was finally assured early in 1968 when the 
South African Industrial Development Corporation guaranteed to 
contribute over R50 million to the cost of the first phase of the 
scheme and to buy 1000 megawatts of power annually from the 
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scheme up to 1980 and thereafter, 1, 800 megawatts annually. 
Details of the agreement were released in the House of Assembly 
by Vorster in April 1968 and in the same year tenders were sought 
for the construction of the first phase; tenders since awarded to 
a consortium of South Africa's mining and finance empire. 
The first phase involving the construction of the main dam and the 
generating plant is due to be completed by 197 4 at the cost of over 
R250 million. Later subsicfury dams will bring the eventual 
output of the scheme to 45 million kilowatt hours. Further, the 
dam is scheduled to irrigate 3. 7 million acres of farmland. 
It is on this that the extravagant claim that the dam will attract 
a million new white immigrants to Mozambique is based. 
It was General Deslandes, the chief of the Portuguese defence staff 
"who started the hare about one million whites being settled in 
Mozambique as a result of the Cabora-Bassa hydro-electric scheme. 
This hare has since been shot by Caetano. tt 
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Nevertheless, 
should the scheme result in a trebling of the white population of 
Mozambique by the 1980s, to :make a more conservative estimate 
of its potential, it would make a significant contribution to Portugal's 
/ ___ .... ·-·":to, 
(_,.--J' 
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battle against the guerrillas. It is hardly surprising that the 
Governor of Mozambique should claim that 11 to speak of Mozambique 
46 
is to speak of Cabora-Bassa. u 
Politically, the dam has acquired an importance to Southern 
Africa similar in some ways to that of the Aswan dam to the 
Middle East. (In fact, on completion Cabora-Bas sa will 
generate 70% more electricity than the Egyptian dam). 
The scheme has become a prime target of the Frelimo guerrillas 
and as early as 1968 according to the Economist the South African 
government sent two battalions to Tete province to meet the 
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threat tI'.e guerrillas posed. The Portuguese offensives against 
the guerrillas in 1970 and 1971 were largely designed to cle.ar the 
Tete area. While protecting the actual building of the dam should 
not present too ma:!fy problems, the 800 mile power lines taking 
the electricity to South Africa seem very likely to prove vulnerable 
to guerrilla attack. Indeed, the impact the guerrillas might make 
has been underlined by their success in ambushing trucks carrying 
equipment to the dam site and by their effect on the smaller Kunene 
river hydro-electric scheme. 
In March 1968, the executive member responsible for power in 
the South West Africa Legislative Assembly (E. van Zijl) announced 
that the project would be unlikely to come into operation bef©re 1978. 
The delay - it was originally hoped that the scheme would become 
functional in July 1971 - was attributed partly to guerrilla activity 
on the Angola - South West Africa border. 
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Nevertheless, 
a formal agreement to secure implementation of the scheme 
was signed between South Africa and Portugal in January 1969. 
Like Cabora-Bassa, the scheme will irrigate large areas of land 
for farming (1. 23 million acres) and like Cabora-Bassa it is hoped 
that it will attract large Ii~~,t~~~,f white immigrants. A highly 
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A highly optimistic figure, to say the least, of half a million 
new settlers is given by Rhoodie and Cockram. 
Zambia holds an important key to the success or failure of 
both schemes as the infiltration route of guerrillas both into 
southern Angola and Tete province. The site of Cabora-Bassa 
is in fact only 70 miles from the Zambian border. The two 
schemes alone provide compelling reasons for South African 
efforts to secure Zambia's inclusion in her sphere of influence. 
Indeed, Rhoodie optimistically assumes Zambia's inclusion. 
11let Cabora-Bassa1 s message is more than 
merely electric. Recognising similar 
possibilities for Zambia and Kariba, and 
looking as well to the Kunene as a further 
power source, Van Eck1 s reasoning begins 
to have meaning on a far wider scale. 
It implies a closely knit Southern Africa and 
it implies too a signal contribution by an 
outward-looking Republic to all the African 
countries clustered in the south. Malawi, 
Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mozambique 
can all benefit by South Africa being used 
as a first stage buyer of power that they for 
the moment cannot consume.'' 49 
However, tempting though the pro~pect of cheap power from the 
scheme might be, Zambia has steadfastly opposed Cabora-Bassa 
and taken a leading r.Ole in the campaign against it. The 
campaign is based, in part, on the fact that Rhodesia will be 
supplying cement and skilled manpower for the first phase and 
will be able to make use of the dam's cheap elect:dcity in breach 
of sanctions. (It has met with limited success securing the 
withdrawal of a Swedish and an Italian firm.) 
2417 
Cabora-Bassa is crucial to Portugal's position in Africa. 
Currently Portugal maintains 115, 000 troops in Africa -
55, 000 in Angola, 40, 000 in Mozambique and 20, 000 in Guinea -
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Bissau • She spends 45% of her national budget on defence, 
over 7% of her entire gross national product. There is fighting 
in 10 of Angola's 15 provinces and Frelimo at times virtually 
j. ~;.:-"';;i 
controls up to;_gne-fifth of Mozambique. In these circuml3tances 
it is not surprising that doubts are often expressed about 
Portugal's staying power in Africa. 11 In the end Portugal must 
surely be driven out, if not entirely defeated. More effective 
guerrilla activity in the last year has even suggested the possibility 
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of such a defeat. u 
However, there are others, who believe that Portugal's ability 
to survive in Africa has once again been underestimated. 
"I believe that the Portuguese are now w,inning the war against 
the guerrillas in Mozambique and that it will probably be over 
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in, say, two years" Another visitor to Mozambique, Major 
Patrick Wall reported that Frelimo had "been reduced to small 
53 
groups whose offensive spirit seems to have been broken 11 
But a resurgence of guerrilla activity in September 1971 in Tete 
province on approach roads to the Cabora Bassa dam site made 
both these assessments (admittedly by two Conservative politicians) 
appear unrealistic. It seems, there fore, that much will depend 
in the end on South Africa's attitude towards the conflict in 
Mozambique, as it will in the case of Angola as well. 
Whitaker believes that "before a Portuguese defeat could come, 
however, one must foresee the deplorable if not frightening 
probability of massive South African intervention. 11 
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In the event of the guerrillas wars' continuing Portuguese - and 
for that matter South African - readiness to defend the status quo 
in Angola and Mozambique must depend in part on the success of 
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schemes like Cabora Bassa, which would both help offset the 
costs of the war and contribute to foreign business confidence 
in Portugal's political stand. 
In 1968, Caetano succeeded Salazar as Prime Minister of 
Portugal after the latter's illness. Despite initial hopes to the 
contrary, he soon indicated that he intended to pursue his 
predecessor's policy and maintain Portugal in Africa. 
In a speech shortly after he came into office, he spelt out his 
own commitment to white supremacy. 
11At many points our interests coincide with 
those of South Africa and Rhodesia, based on 
the conviction that progress in that zone needs 
the ·stable presence of the white man. 
That is why for example, we cannot be indifferent 
to the fate of Rhodesia, whose main outlet to the 
sea is through our port of Beira. u 55 
Like Muller, he made clear fue importance he attached to a 
settlement of the Rhodesian dispute. In our interests, in that of 
Southern Africa and on behalf of world peace, we would truly like 
to see Rhodesia and Britain agree on a formula to permit an 
56 honourable settlement and end the present grave situation. u 
Nevertheless, in this context domestic pressures in Portugal 
that favour disengagement from Africa should be mentioned. 
In particular, the business community would like a closer 
association with the European Economic Community especially 
in view of its enlargement and the running down of the European 
Free Trade Association of which Portugal is a member. 
They have, therefore, pressed for a relaxation of ''the present 
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strictly centralized Portuguese administrative system" 
as a step towards greater economic integration with Europe. 
In 1971 Caetano acceded to some of their demands by announcing 
constitutional reforms granting greater autonomy to Portugal's 
African territories. However, at the same time Caetano 
made it clear that there was no question of Portugal's ending 
its commitments in Africa. Despite this there were some 
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mumblings on the right against the very modest step taken. 
The strengthening of relations between Portugal and South Africa 
has been reflected in a number of top level visits between the 
two countries including a visit by Vorster to Lisbon in June 1970 
and in improved communications. A tarred road between 
Lua:q.da in Angola and Windhoek in South West Africa is nearing 
completion, while in February 1969 a R50 million undersea 
cable linki~ South Africa and(metropolitan) Portugal was opened 
with a conversation between Vorster and Caetano. There has 
also been a large expansion of air traffic between the two countries. 
In 1969, Dr. Muller visited Lisbon where he was awarded the 
Grand Cross of the Order of Christ. A theme of the visit, 
which reciprocated that of Dr. Nogueira to South Africa in 1967 
was anti-communism. Dr. Muller declared: 
11 0ur forces stand as a bulwark ~gainst the 
domination of the African continent by foreign 
powers. We may justly claim that we patrol 
a gap in the free world's defences wh~_9.h no 
major power has yet seen fit to fill. 1 1 59 
In short, co-operation between Portugal and South Africa goes very 
much further than South Africa's involvement in the Cabora-Bassa 
and Kunene river projects. Implicit in South Africa's relations 
with Portugal has been a political commitment to the maintenance 
of the status quo in Angola and Mozambique, despite speculation 
about where South Africa's ultimate interests lie. 
It is a point that needs to be underlined. Not only has insufficim t 
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attention been paid in studies of South African foreign policy 
to the coalsecing of white-ruled Southern Africa in the second 
harf of the 1960 1 s but the limited success of the outward-looking 
policy has led to suggestions that the existence of black 
governments in Angola and Mozambique might make no 
essential difference to South Africa's co-operation with the 
two territories. It is an a$,gument that has even penetrated 
verligte circles. The discovery that South Africa could evolve 
friendly relations with African states and that black no less than 
white governments have to take account of economic realities 
and resentment that South Africa was being forced to bear part 
of the cost of Rhodesia's reckless unilateral act of independence 
led some verligtes to the conclusion that South Africa might in 
the end be better off with a Banda-type government in Salisbury. 
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It is a short step to the application of a similar argument to the 
Portuguese territories and the realisation that what happens to 
South Africa's three white neighbours will not necessarily 
determine the Republic's future. 
Certainly, the argument that black governments in the three 
territories by virtue of their economic dependence on South Africa, 
would be forced to come to terms with the Republic and might, 
in fact, in certain circumstances, create a more effective 
buffer against guerrillas than white rule is quj;te persuasive 
and provides a ready answer to proponents of a crude domino 
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theory. However, the argument does have essential short-
comings and limitations. Firstly, it should not be taken to mean 
62 
that verligtes who have speculated in this way about the future 
would be in favour of black rule in these three countries becoming 
a goal of policy. On the contrary it is a question of pointing out 
that if the worst came to the worst, there is more than one option 
open to the South African government. 
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Secondly, economic realities in the case of Angola certainly 
would not dictate that she should align herself with South Africa. 
In fact, Angola's economic ties with the Republic are as yet 
relatively insignificant. Further the option of re-orientating 
their economic develop~nt to the north over a number of 
years would be open to Rhodesia and to a lesser extent 
Mozambique (i.e. doing what in a modest way Botswana is 
d . ) 63 omg Thirdly, (and most importantly) there is the 
question of transition. It seems inconceivable that the white 
settlers in th~ three territories would peacefully acquiesce in 
changes to a black government. The Fearless terms, which the 
Rhodesian regime rejected, stopped well short of envisaging 
majority rule in even the near future. Further, unilateral 
action by the settlers of Angola and Mozambique could not be 
ruled out if Portugal sought a compromise with the African 
nationalists. 
In these circumstances, the argument under-estimates the 
emotional context of foreign policy formulation. It seems 
doubtful whether in fact the South African govern~ nt would 
have any option (or would even consider any alternative) 
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but to commit the Republic, were white rule to be seriously 
threatened in any of the three territories. Indeed, the 
common adherence of the Portuguese and Rhodesia to a 
doctrine of white supremacy is an important and, thanks to the 
outward-looking policy, sometimes under-rated aspect of 
co-operation in Southern Africa. As far as economic benefits 
to South Africa are concerned, these depend perhaps more on 
the stability of the governments in power in these territories 
than on their composition, though economic co-operation with 
black governments might prove more difficult, especially after 
any South African involvement to uphold white rule. 
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The Outward-Looking Policy in Practice 
The foundations of the outward-looking policy were laid by Vorster's 
meeting with Jonathan in January 1967. Since then, the policy 
has achieved a measure of success in securing friendly or at least 
pragmatic, relations with a number of African states, which have 
contributed to some improvement in South Africa's international 
. . 1 
pos1t10n. South Africa has also had some success in 
exploiting divisions of opinion in independent Africa. However, 
the success of the outward-looking policy should not be exaggerated. 
Since the meeting with Jonathan, South Africa has as yet secured 
only one really major breakthrough, the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Malawi. And while theh- dependence on South Africa 
has dictated to the former High Commission territories their 
policies of pragmatic relations with the Republic, they:,have stopped 
well short of giving South Africa wholehearted support in international 
organizations. 
Indeed, South Africa's relations with the former High Commission 
territories since independence have not been without their difficulties. 
Both Lesotho and Botswana have at different times given cause for 
concern in Pretoria; Lesotho largely because of her political 
instability, Botswana because of the independent attitude taken by 
her President Sir Seretse Khama. Shortly after Lesotho attained 
independence, the King's demands for greater powers led to 
disturbances in December 1966 resulting in the death of ll people. 
Jonathan's response to the crisis was to place the King under 
house arrest and to arrest the leaders of the two opposition parties. 
The crisis was resolved when the King agreed "to sign a pledge to 
adhere to his role of constitutional monarch" 
2 
In South Africa, 
there was a sigh of relief that the dispute had been so quickly 
resolved, but uneasiness that instability would recur. 
') 
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It did in January 1970 after the country's first general election 
since independence. When it became apparent that the opposition 
Congress Party was winning, the Prime Minister (Chief Jonathan) 
stopped further counting of votes, suspended the constitution and 
declared a state of emergency. He alleged that there had been 
irregularities and intimidation of voters and declared the elections 
3 
invalid. Members of the opposition were gaoled. Although 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation rushed to defend 
Jonathan's actions the South African government was not directly 
implicated in Jonathan's seizure of power. Indeed, the coup 
was an embarassment to Vorster and his colleagues as it made 
their task of selling the outward-looking policy to the electorate 
4 
more difficult. The fact that the Congress Party, which 
Vorster described as being composed of Peking Communists, 
in effect won the elections gave the United Party1s argument that 
Bantustans could become springboards for communism a new 
lease of life in the run-up to the South African general election. 
While Jonathan, in fact, stayed in office, the manner in which he 
did so hardly inspired confidence in the future peace and stability 
of Lesotho. At first there were widespread fears that the country 
would be plunged into chaos and civil war. However, while there 
were some riots and attempts to resist the regime, over a period 
of time Jonathan did finally succeed in consolidating his hold on power. 
The British government recognized his government in June and 
resumed aid in August. By September, Jonathan was sufficiently 
confident of his position to attend the O. A. U. summit in Addis Ababa 
and to visit Ghana and Nigeria. From the outset, the South African 
government stressed itt? non-involvement. Vorster told the House 
of Assembly in February 11we are simply c;ontinuing as if nothing 
5 
has happened" Indirectly, however, Jonathan owed much to 
South Africa. n She (South Africa~ has also given assistance -
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financially and with transport - to Chief Jonathan's Police Mobile 
6 
Unit in suppressing popular opinion to his coup. u That is to 
say, South Africa provided Jonathan with the original support 
for the setting up of and equipping of the unit. Secondly, the 
fact that key positions in the civil service were held by white 
South Africans helped Jonathan to maintain power. 
"In Lesotho ••..• the Chief Justice, Chief 
Electoral Officer, head of the radio, Chief 
Legal Adviser, Manager of the Lesotho National 
Development Corporation and several advisers 
are all White South Africans. These South 
Africans played an important part - albeit 
generally by acts of omission rather than 
commission - in Chief Jonathan's coup in 1970, 
For example, the recall of the Chief Justice on 
the day of the coup meant that Chief Jonathan's 
action could not be tested in Lesotho nor could 
the plea of habeas corpus on behalf of the 
detained opposition be brought before the courts. 
This was a significant factor in entrenching 
Jonathan in the early days of the coup. 11 7 
However, despite his dependence on South Africa, Chief Jonathan 
has not been a willing tool of the South African government. He 
has repeatedly declared "I am not a Matanzima11 
8 
and has 
fiercely resisted South African suggestions that he pay a "state" 
visit to the Tran-s:k.ei. He has also jealously maintained his 
country1 s position in the O. A. U. and in October 1971 he even went 
so far as to warn South Africa that "the end result of its policy 
of apartheid would be a violent confrontation, internally, between 
the blacks and whites. u 9 This unusual attack - in general, 
Jonathan while not defending apartheid had avoided direct criticism 
of South African policy - brought a warning, in turn, from Vorster. 
11 1 want to say in all friendliness to Chief 
Jonathan that there are many things I can 
say about Lesotho, but I do not do so for the 
sake of friendship, Do not tempt me too 
far in this connection. u 10 
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But far more disturbing to South Africa than Jonathan's verbal 
attack on apartheid has been his ambivalent attitude towards 
dialogue. At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 
January 1971, for instance, Jonathan - no doubt hoping to 
re-establish his credibility with African states after the coup 
in Lesotho the year before - disassociated himself from 
Houphouet-Boigny's call for a dialogue with South Africa. 
"I do not go along with the proposition for 
a dialogue as outlined by the President of the 
Ivory Coast. I stand fully behind the Lusaka 
Manifesto, whose terms I fully endorse for a 
dialogue. What I would now like to see is for 
the 0. A. U. formally to convey the Lusaka 
Manifesto to Pre~0~-±a to get their official reactions. 
I have had talks with leaders in Pretoria. 
My own impressions from these talks is that l l 
the views of Pretoria are likely to be divided. u 
Nonetheless, later in the year Chief Jonathan made it clear that 
his understanding of the Lusaka Manifesto differed considerably from 
that of Houphouet-Boigny's main critics, Kaunda and Nyerere. 
Indeed, at the O. A. U. Council of Ministers in June, Lesotho opposed 
a resolution from Tanzania which declared the dialogue proposal 
to be contrary to O. A. U. decisions regarding South Africa. 
Once again, however, Lesotho failed to give her backing to Houphouet-
Boigny1 s initiative. 
"of those who spoke in favour of a dia!;ogue, 
only Malawi, and Madagascar supported the Ivory 
Coas;t1 s approach. The rest, led by Lesotho, 
strongly insisted that any negotiations should be 
held within the framework of the Lusaka Manifesto. 
They also insisted that an essential precondition 
for starting talks was a positive indication 
by Mr. Vorster that >:he was willing to state 
publicly that he accepted the right of Africans 
to full political rights in the Republic. u 12 
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Yet after the conference there appeared to be a shift, at least in 
emphasis, in Lesotho's policy. In October, Maseru was the 
venue for informal discussions among delegates from ten African 
states on a suitable formula for dialogue. 
13 
In South Africa 
Chief Jonathan's role in bringing together pro-dialogue states 
was widely applauded. However, evidence 
14 
has subsequently 
come to light that Jonathan waged caution and argued in favour of 
a postponement of further moves towards dialogue until a joint 
approach by the O. A. U. could be worked out. "There is no doubt" 
concludes Africa 11 that Lesotho's attitude contributed to the fact 
15 
that dialogue has not got off the ground so far. u 
Nonetheless, Jonathan's displays of independence, 
16 
galling 
though they must be to Pretoria, shoilld not be exaggerated. 
There is no question, for instance, of Lesotho's abandoning her 
policy of peaceful co-existence with South Africa or that Lesotho 
geographically and economically the Republic's captive, would 
take steps to diminish her economic dependence on South Africa. 
Indeed, the economic development of the territory largely rests 
on the success of co-operation with the Republic. In this context, 
the proposed Oxbow hydro-ele.ctric scheme is of particular 
importance to Lesotho. The feasibility of the scheme, which has 
been under discussion during the last decade, depends on the sale 
of water and power to South Africa. In April 1970 a World Bank 
Team visited Lesotho and South Africa and after talks with the 
South African Department of Water Affairs gave the go-ahead to 
the first phase of the scheme, a water supply project. This phase 
is expected to cost approximately R25 million and when completed 
to supply South Africa with between 100 and 150 million gallons of 
water daily. The decision on the main phase of the scheme, the 
hydro-electric project has been deferred and there are doubts that 
17 
it will be developed. 
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But whatever happens, the mainstay of Lesotho's dependence on 
South Africa will remain migratory labour. Each year 
approximately 150, 000 Lesotho citizens 
18 
or nearly half the 
territory's adult male population are absent from their families 
to earn a living in South Africa. The contribution this makes 
to Lesotho's economy can be gauged from the fact that in 1964 -
the last year for which comparative statistics are available - "the 
remittances of Basu.tho workers employed in South Africa was ••.. 
one-and-half times larger than the value of Lesotho's exports of 
goods and services." 
19 
A plea$!by Lesotho's Minister of Works 
in 1968 for an extension of South Africa's policy of border industries 
to Lesotho exemplifies the place of migratory labour in the 
territory's economy. 
"We want South Africa to encourage industrialists 
to build close to our borders, so that family ties 
need not be broken through workers havinB to 
travel hundreds of miles to seek jobs. u 2 
In addition, Lesotho receives technical and financial aid from South 
Africa including a modest contribution - under half a million rand 
to her annual budget. In these circumstances, it is very unlikely 
that any Lesotho government will make any fundamental changes 
in its basic policy of friendly relations with South Africa. 
Swaziland's relations with South Africa since her independence in 
September 1968 have largely been uneventful. In 1969 an agreement 
was concluded between South Africa and Swaziland whereby "the 
Republic will recruit, pay and equip South Africans to work in 
21 
Swaziland's local administration." Swaziland- also receives 
considerable technical assistance from South Africa in other fields; 
most notably, there is close co-operation between the police forces 
of the two countries. 
22 
In March 1971 Swaziland's Prime Minister, 
Prince Makhosini Dlamini had talks with Vorster in Cape Town, 
reportedly about the construction of a rail link between the two 
. 23 
countries. Politically, Swaziland's conservativeJgovernment 
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has maintained low key relations with Pretoria. Like the 
government of Lesotho it has jealously guarded its position in the 
0. A. U. while giving cautious approval to the principle of dialogue. 
Economically, Swaziland is relatively well endowed with natural 
resources and consequently not especially dependent on South Africa 
for employment with less than 20, 000 Swazis working each year in 
. 24 
the Republic. Aside from her geographical position it is from 
the involvement of South African companies in exploiting her 
resources and the ownership of land by South Africans that Swaziland's 
dependence springs. And it is over this is sue that tension between 
the two countries might conceivably develop in the future. 
25 
In December 1971 the Swaziland government introduced controls 
that made land deals invdving non-nationals subject to the approval 
of a special board. Tougher action would almost certainly 
provoke a South African protest. 
Botswana has gone very much further than either Swaziland or Lesotho 
inasserting her independence from South Africa, while at the same 
time maintaining f.riendly relations with the Republic. During 1968, 
Botswana's President, Sir Seretse Khama, was treated in a private 
11white 11 ward in Johannesburg's General Hospital for a serious 
liver complaint. His wife also received V. I. P. treatment, in 
marked contrast to that the Khamas received twenty years earlier 
when they were declared prohibited immigrants by the Malan government. 
After his illness, Sir Seretse met and held discussions with Vorster. 
He thanked Vorster for the treatment he had received in hospital 
and expressed his desire for friendly relations. In general though, 
the Botswanan President has balanced his readiness to co-operate 
economically with South Africa and to prevent Botswana's use by 
guerrillas, with a policy of strengthening his country1 s relations 
with independent Africa, particularly Zambia with whom she shares 
a common, though disputed, boundary. 
In particular, Khama has expressed his determination not to compromise 
the non-racial basis of his state and has explained his reservations 
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about establishing full diplomatic relations with South Africa. 
"I have made clear that Botswana will never 
in word or deed give any comfort to the advocates 
of face supremacy. Our position makes it 
essential to maintain diplomatic contacts with 
South Africa. But since independence we have 
always made it clear that we shall not consider 
an exchange of diplomatic representatives with 
South Africa until we are entirely satisfied that 
South Africa c·an fully guarantee that Botswana's 
representatives will in all respects, at all times 
and in all places be treated in the same way as 
diplomats from other countries. n 26 
He has also indicated that he intends to diminish Botswana's dependence 
on South Africa as far as possible. Significantly, he is prepared to 
make sacrifices to achieve this objective. 
"While heavily dependent upon South Africa as an 
employer of its able-bodied men, as a source of 
imports and specialized services, and through 
membership of the customs and monetary union, 
Botswana does not look to the Republic for 
development aid to a great extent. st 2 7 
Certainly, the remittances of migrant workers in South Africa - some 
52, 000 in 1964 - make an important contribution to Botswana's 
28 
economy amounting to a quarter of the value of the country's exports. 
However, Botswana is by no means as dependent on this source of 
income as Lesotho and indeed, Botswana's as yet undeveloped 
mineral potential hold out the prospect of a considerable reduction 
in the importance of remittances. In addition, by exploiting his 
country's geographical link with Zambia, Khama hopes to establish 
another -outlet for Botswana's imports and exports "which will 
permit us to enlarge our trade with independent Africa. 11 
29 
Politically, while not departing from a policy of peaceful co-existence, 
Khama has adopted positions clearly opposed to South Africa's 
major foreign policy objectives. He has gone on record in support 
of the Lusaka Manifesto and in opposition to the Cabora Bassa 
scheme, the Rhodesian regime, British arms sales to South Africa 
and to dialogue. 
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Khama 1s independent attitude has not gone without notice in South 
Africa where the Nationalist press has carried increasingly hostile 
comments on his attempts to lessen Botswana's reliance on South 
Africa. Indeed, a marked deterioration in relations between the 
two countries took place in 1970 following Botswana's decision in 
March to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and South 
Africa's claim that Botswana had no common border with Zambia 
. 30 
except at a pomt. South Africa1 s claim was first made in 
Feb'.!:'.uary and repeated in April after an announcement "that the 
United States had offered to assist Botswana to build an international 
highway linking the country with Zambia, with a bridge near 
31 
Kazungula. 11 Following the announcement the South African 
government put strong pres sure on Botswana not to build the 
bridge (of which the border claim was just an aspect) and it now 
seems probable that Botswana will content herself for the moment 
with the highway and an expansion of the existing ferry with Zambia. 
The kind of pressure the Republic is capable of putting on Botswana 
has been recorded by Africa Confidential SB wbicl(Jnentions in some 
detail a previous example of South African arm-twisting. Between 
1967 and 1969 the South African army was engaged in building a 
forwa:ifd strike base in the Caprivi Strip. The convoys of equipment 
were sent through Botswana. When Khama objected, the South 
African government threatened to withdraw South African Railways• 
refreigerated cars from the Botswanan rail network; cars -
absolutely essentail to the country's beef export industry, should he 
attempt to stop the convoys. 
While the difficulties South Africa has encountered in her relations 
with Botswana and Lesotho should not be exaggerated, an underlying 
uneasiness about relations with all the former High Commission 
territories is detectable beneath the surface of the propaganda of 
endless photogr4phs of the leaders of the different countries 
S:iaking hands with Vorster or Muller. 
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Claims like Vorster's in November 1968 that 11South Africa got 
along better with former protectorates than when they were 
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under British control." mask South Africa's concern that 
relations with the former High Commission territories may yet 
prove explosive. The concern stems from the realisation that 
expediency and economic necessity and certainly not political 
acceptance lies at the hea:rt of the territor.jes 1 policy towards 
the Republic. 
The Nationalist press 1s reaction to the United States Government's 
announcement that it intended to help the three territories to reduce 
their dependence on South Africa brought these thoughts to the fore. 
"It is an illusion that sees Botswana's and even Lesotho's love for 
South Africa as anythingt·i:1more than cupboard love." 
American policy "could be interpreted by these states as a green 
light to lessen ••••. their ties with South Africa ..•••••• It will 
raise them to a position where they too will be able to join Africa's 
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militancy against us. 11 However, revealing comments of 
this kind which recognize the existence' of a fundamental incompatibility 
between South Africa's white supremacist policies and majority 
rule elsewhere on the continent are rare - especially in verligte 
papers like Die Beeld. 
Much has also been made in propaganda terms of South Africa's 
g·enerosity in providing technical assistance and aid both on an official 
b . h f H" h C · · · · 
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and voluntary as1s to t e ormer ig omm1s s1on terr1tor1es. 
A more critical test of South African policy towards the territories 
is provided by the re-negotiation of the terms of the customs union. 
In December 1969 representatives of the governments of Lesotho, 
Botswana, Swaziland, and South Africa signed a new customs union 
agreement which replaced that of 1910. The old agreement provided 
for the application of a common external tariff at South African 
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rates for the whole customs union area and laid down what percentage 
share of the customs and excise revenue pool each member would 
receive. By contrast, the new agreement does not rigidly insist 
on a free exchange of goods and contains provisions to protect the 
infant industries of the three less developed partners. In addition, 
it incorporates a more complex system of revenue distribution 
that is more generous to the former High Commission territories, 
as can be seen from the table below. 
Percentage share of pooled 
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revenue 
Country 1910 formula New agreement * 
South Africa 98.68903 97.42 
Botswana 0.27622 !i). 74 
Lesotho 0.885575 0.89 
Swaziland 0.14900 0.95 
>:< Calculated from data for the fiscal year 1965 - 6 
However, South Africa1 s generosity in making these concessions 
should not be exaggerated. Indeed, it was the price of preventing 
either Swaziland or Botswana leaving the union altogether. 
Nonetheless, Landell-Mills believes that "the 1969 Agreement is 
a considerable advance on that of 191011 , 
37 
though it "cannot be 
regarded as adequately tackling the regional differences within the 
Southern African geographical unit." 
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In short, South African 
goodwill did not extend to significantly loosenillg her dominant 
economic grip on the three territories. 
The major achievement of the outward-looking policy has undoubtedly 
been the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi. 
The first indication of such a breakthrough by South Africa on the 
continent was a top level Malawian trade mission to Cape Town in 
March 1967, though there were earlier indications that Malawi's 
~-c_·~~·~_. _· __ ) 
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President Dr. Banda would not pursue a policy of strong opposition 
to the South African government. In fact, by 1965 Dr. Banda1s 
disillusionment with militant African nationalism had become 
apparent and as early as 1966 South Africa provided the finance 
for a sugar mill in Malawi. The trade mission - led by three 
Malawian Cabinet Ministers - had highly publicized talks with 
Vorster and other members of the South African governrre nt. 
In practical terms the result was a new trade agreement between 
the two countries which replaced the restrictive 1960 agreement 
between South Africa and the former Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. In particular, the new agreement provided for the 
entry into the Republic 11 of certain Malawian commodities either 
free of any customs duty, or at South Africa's most-favoured-nation 
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tariff. 11 As a consequence 11Malawi has achieved a slightly 
larger market for some of her agriculture exports - notably tea, 
b ff d d ·1 II 40 to acco, co ee, groun nuts an tung 01 • 
Politically, the visit was a great success and the Malawian minister~ 
evidently made a favourable impression on the South African Prime 
Minister. After the visit it became clear that the South African 
government was considering exchanging diplomatic relations with 
Malawi. It was a step South Africa had previcu sly been reluctant 
to take (for example, Verwoerd had ruled it out), in view of the 
difficulties likely to arise in South Africa from the presence of black 
envoys. However, in this case the opportunity offered to South 
Africa of dramatically ending her isolation in Africa and the z:est 
with which Banda was prepared to defend his links with South Africa 
proved decisive and in December 1967 Dr. Banda was able to announce 
in Parliament that South Africa and Malawi had agreed to exchange 
diplomatic representatives. Faced with right-wing criticism 
Vorster argued that he was simply following the policy of his 
predecessor. 
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11Such relations are not established overnight 
but are established after a long process of 
negotiation and preparation. It is true that 
these relations were established in my time, 
but the negotiations did not commence in my 
time. If my predecessor had still been there 
the establishment of these relations would have 
taken place in his time. 11 41 
It was not altogether convincing and probably a more important 
factor in re-assuring the South African electorate was Banda1s 
attitude towards the new links. He has not just attempted to excuse 
the links expediently on grounds of Malawi's economic dependence 
on the white south, but has made a positive virtue of 1ris stance towards 
the Republic. Further, instead of attempting to loosen his country's 
economic ties with the south, he has strengthened them so as to enable 
Malawi to extract the greatest possible benefit out of her position 
. . 42 
as "the Devil's d1sc1ple. 11 Banda has vigorously defended his 
actions, and made strong attacks: on the policit:ts of his critics.'' 
11My first duty is to look after the interests of 
four million people •••• I have to be realistic. 
Colonial geography and history are against us. 
We cannot boycott South Africa, Rhodesia or 
Portuguese Mozambique - that would mean the 
breakdown of Malawi's economy.(~Se.cohdly) 
boycotting South Africa because Sb~tn~A'-ir.i/ca has 
apartheid •••••• (wouki be) apartheid in reverse 
on our part. If discrimination is bad when 
practised by white on black, is it good when 
practised by black on white?" 43 
There is nonetheless a certain irony in Banda's advocacy of links with 
South Africa for in part the benefits Malawi derives from her 
special relationship with South Africa depend on her remaining out 
of step with the rest of Africa. Were many other African stafres 
prepared to follow her lead, the price the Republic is prepared to 
pay in terms of financial aid for Malawi's political support would 
most certainly drop. South African aid in.eludes an 8 million rand 
loan to finance the first phase of Malawi's new capital at Lilongwe 
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and an ll million rand loan from the South African IndustrM.l 
Development Corporation to meet the costs of a rail link between 
Malawi and the Port of Nacala in Mozambique. 
44 
Malawi has 
also been able to attract a limited amount of private investment 
from South Africa, particularly in her tourist industry, thnugh 
which she hopes to expand local employment and add to her foreign 
exchange earnings. 
However, much more important than even financial aid is Malawi! s 
dependence on the remittances of migrant workers in South Africa. 
The value of these remittances was estimated in 1970 to be 7 million 
rand 
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, almost the value of Malawi's total imports from South 
Africa in that year. Indeed, the chief feature of Malawi's economy 
is the export of labour. Compared to 180, 000 in wage employment 
in Malawi, there are estimated to be 300, 000 Malawians working 
in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia. 
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Of these approximately 
129, 000 
47 
are said to work in South Africa or co.fifiderably in 
excess of the minimum figure of 80, 000 that is cited by some writers. 
But whatever the correct figure is, the contribution of migrant 
workers in South Africa to Malawi's economy is clearly massive, 
especially as the earnings and remittances of those in Zambia and 
Rhodesia do not match those in South Africa. Further political 
pressures in Zambia and Rhodesia may well make it more difficult 
for Malawians to secure employment in these countries 
49 
In fact, in economic terms Malawi is arguably as dependent on South 
Africa as either Swaziland or Botswana, despite her comparative 
geographical remoteness from the Republic. 
South Africa's main quid pro quo from Malawi has been political 
support in the Organization for African Unity, the United Nati::ms and 
the Commonwealth. For example, Malawi even refused to support 
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the moderately worded Lusaka Manifesto of June 1969 and in the 
Commonwealth has supported the British government's decision 
to sell arms to South Africa. Like Lesotho, the Malawian 
government has placed white South Africans - seconded from the 
Republic's civil service - in a number of important positions. 
Malawi's Director of Information, David van der Spuy is a South 
African as is the head of the National Malawi Airways, Garth van 
Rooyen. So, too, is the head of the Malawi Development 
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Corporation, A. C. F. Cornish - Bowden. 
A further indication of the growingties between the two countries 
was the establishment of a direct air link between Zomba and 
Johannesburg in November 1969. 
The possibility of military co-operation between the two governments 
has also been raised. Following a speech by Dr. Carel de Wet 
that Malawi was "South Africa's most forward springboard 
against the communist dangers threatening from over the Indian 
51 r~ 
Ocean" there were 1 rumours [that South Africa was to be 
~ ?':':::·.~ _, 52 
granted base facilities at Lilongwe airport. 11 They were 
officially denied. Earlier, during 1969 there was a top level 
military mission (in civilian clothes to avoid recognition and comment) 
to Malawi after insurgents led by a former Cabinet colleague of 
Dr. Banda1 s had eluded Malawi's security forces. Thicre were 
rumours then ihat South Africa would be prepared to give Dr. Banda 
military support for his· position; a view given added credibility 
by the presence of a top level military attache Colonel van Niekerk, 
S Af . I f" d 1 . . M 1 . 
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in outh r1ca s ive man e egation in a aw1. 
But the most spectacular as:pect of relations between the two countries 
has undoubtedly been Dr. Banda1 s visit to South Africa in August 1971 
which followed trips to Malawi by Dr. Hilgard Muller in 1969 and 
Vorster in May 1970. His triumphal progress through South Africa 
was applauded by widely differing shades of opinion. 
267 
Rapport declared: 
"South Africa stands within a completely new 
era. And it is President Kamuzu Banda who 
has made us realise this. The tremendous 
success of the small Africa leader!:s visit has 
shown the government that the country is 
prepared for what separate development is 
ultimately going to mean." 54 
The view was expressed m the Rand Daily Mail that "South Africa 
will never be the same again. 11 
55 
while Japie Bas son typified 
Opposition comment in declaring that "no man has made apartheid 
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look so out of place as Dr. Banda has. 11 According to 
Rapport , however, "people who say that Dr. Banda came to shake 
apartheid do not know what it is about. 11 
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Indeed, Banda 1s 
major achievement was that his presence sparked off a lively debate 
about the domestic consequences for South Africa of his trip. 
The debate reached absurd }.proportions when Banda held a multi-
racial banquet in honour of his hosts. The Nationalist press 
insisted that the banquet was "multi-national (veelvolkig)" 
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rather than multi-racial. Only slightly less absurd was a 
description of the banquet in the Rand Daily Mail. 
"Most of the white were of exalted rank and 
for most of them it was the first time they had 
sat down to a meal with black people. For 
most of the blacks it was their first venture 
into a white dining-room. And everyone got 
f 1 II 59 on amous y •.•.• 
The temporary - and calculated - relaxation of apartheid for the 
Malawian President by the South African government did create 
some doubts about the revolutionary implications of the vis it. 
That these doubts did not gain wider currency in the English 
language press was in part due to Banda1s own dominant personality 
and his occasional displays of independence through ironic~i:<:l.;U'ip~.1 
~ ..._~.~~·~:~;J] 
about apartheid. Malawi's dependence on South Africa and the 
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fact that one of the purposes of Banda1s visit was a request for 
further financial aid was almost completely overshadowed by the 
apparently radical impact of the visit on South African society
60
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In retrospect, the propaganda value of the exercise, though that 
too can be exaggerated, would seem to have been a good deal 
more concrete than any psychological threat to apartheid. 
After all, few would suggest that the experience of public integration 
abroad by increasing numbers of white South Africans through 
foreign travel, represents a serious challenge to apartheid. 
The impact on black South Africa is, admittedly more difficult to 
gauge. My own feeling is that the trip may have raised black 
expectations in a more lasting way than can be said of its impact 
on white attitudes. 
Finally, South Africa's relations with Malagasy Republic should 
be mentioned. Malagasy's President, Philibert Tsiranana was an 
early convert to Banda'~ point of view on South Africa and since 
1968 when a Malagasy trade mission visited South Africa and a 
twice weekly air service between the two countries inaugurated 
has taken steps to form closer ties with South Africa. In November 
1970 the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller, visited 
Malagasy reaching agreement on R2, 320, 000 loan to Tsiranana1 s 
government for the improvement of transport facilities on the 
island of Nosse Be. In addition, the South African Industrial 
Development Corporation has agreed to provide credit facilities 
for a five-star hotel. 
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Like MalaWi, Malagasy hopes to 
become a haunt for wealthy South African tourists. Muller's 
visit was reciprocated by a Malagasy diplomatic and economic 
mission to South Africa in August 1971, which led to the creation 
of a permanent commission to explore further avenues of co-
operation. 
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Apart from re-paying Tsiranana 1 s support for dialogue, a 
further motive has been suggested by Africa Confidential for 
South Africa's generosity towards Malagasy and that is, that the 
South African navy is seeking 11bunl\iering and other shore 
facilities in Northern Madagascar for its patrols watching the 
sea lanes into Dar-es-Salaam" 
52
, though, despite the 
obvious strategic attraction of Malagasy's position in the Indian 
Ocean, it needs to be said that suggestions of this kind always have 
to be treated with caution. In any event, recent events in 
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Malagasy have dramatically set back the prospects of future 
co-operation between the two countries providing a revealing 
example of the vulnerability of the outward-looking policy to 
political instability in Africa. 
Z7D 
DIALOGUE AND CONFRONTATION. 
The original purpose of the outward-looking policy may 
be seen to have been firstly, an attempt to find a modus vivend; 
with black states on South Africa's borders and secondly, an 
attempt to colplteract the organized efforts of African states 
through the O.A.U. to isolate the Republic diplomatically, poli-
tically, and economically. Further, winning acceptance in Africa 
has increasingly come to be seen as offering the Republic the 
opportunity of restoring some of her international prestige -
severely damaged by world reaction ~o the policy of apartheid and 
the massacre at Sharpeville. In part, too, South Africa recognizes 
that friendly relations with other African states are necessary if 
South Africa is to present to the world an image of stability; an 
important precondition of foreign business confidence. Finally, the 
realization has grown that South Africa's political and diplomatic 
relations with Africa ultimately help to determine the economic role 
the country is likely to play in the continent's future. 
Since the outward-looking policy has come to the fore 
African states themselves have been forced to reconsider their own 
strategy towards South Africa. The first major reassessment of 
policy involving the main body of African states took place at a 
meeting of East and Central African states in Lusaka in April 1969. 
It was prompted in particular by Zambian and Tanzanian fears that 
South Africa and Portugal planned massive retaliation against guerilla 
havens within their borders. The result was a remarkable joint decla-
ration by the countries 2 taking part in the conference. The decla-
ration which has become known as the Lusaka Manifesto, was a signi-
ficant recognition by the African states that they could not expect 
immediate success in their campaign against the white-ruled states of 
Southern Africa. 
"On the objective of liberation ••••• we can 
neither surrender nor compromise. We have 
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always preferred and we still pre.fer to 
achieve it without physical violence. We 
would prefer to negotiate rather than 
destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do 
not advocate violence; we advocate an end 
to the violence against human dignity which 
is now being perpetrated by the oppressors 
of Africa. If peaceful progress to emanci-
pation were possible, or if changed circum-
stances were to make it possible in the 
future, we would urge our brothers in the 
resistance movements to use peaceful methods 
of struggle even at the cost o~ some compro-
mise on the timing of change". 
In Septemper (1969) the manifesto was endorsed by the O.A.U. While in 
November a resolution was passed by the United Nations General Assembly 
welcoming the declaration and commending it to the attention of all 
states and peoples. Two states (.Portugal and South Africa) voted 
against the resolution and two more (Cuba and Malawi) abstained. 
However, the almost universal approval given the Lusaka 
Manifesto masked the fact that interpretations of what it meant 
widely differed. The more conservative African states, which had 
always been uneasy about a policy of confrontation towards Southern 
Africa, saw the document as representing an implicit recognition of 
the failure of the O.A. U's strategy and a step towards a policy of 
negotiation. Attempting to exploit the differences of opinion in 
Africa, the South African Prime Minister made a speech in September 
1970 inviting African states to discuss non-aggression pacts with the 
Republic. Vorster's speech did not initially achieve any success 
and his offer was for the most part roundly denounced by .African 
Leaders.4 However, on November 4, the often artificial solidanity 
of the main body of .African states on the question of Southern Africa 
was finally and apparently irretrievably broken. In a speech in 
Abidjan, the Ivory Coast's President, Houphouet-Boigny declared that 
"we will not achieve the-solution to the problem of apartheid in 
South Africa by resorting to force of arms 115 and called for a 
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dialogue with the South African government. His speech was 
hailed as a major break-through in South Africa, while it resulted 
in heated recriminations in much of the rest of Africa. Initial 
reports suggested that in addition to states with whom South Africa 
already had close ties, Houphouet-Boigny could count on the support 
of the Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Togo, and Gabon, 6 though from 
the outset the list of states apparently prepared to back the Ivory 
Coast President's initiative was to change from week to week. 
In December in a speech to Ghana's National Assembly, the 
Ghanaian .Prime Minister, Dr. Busia indicated his support for dialogue, 
but he did so in terms that carefully preserved the O.A.U. 1s objective 
of the liberation of Southern Africa. 
"Let me emphasize that dialogue, as we 
conceive it, is neither a declaration of 
peace nor an acceptance of the status quo, 
but another weapon in the armoury of the 
strategy for the elimination of apartheid 
and the erection of a multi-racial society 
in South Africa. Dialogue and armed 
pressures are not necessarily incompatible 
in this strategy. 11 8 
He went on "There can be no question of a dialogue calculated to 
maintain the status quo in Southern Africa or to the acceptance of 
apartheid in any shape or form 11 • 9 Busia's speech underlined the 
fact that a wide gulf existed between the Republic's understanding 
of dialogue and that of most African states. 
In January 1971 a meeting of o.c.A.M. 0an economic 
community of 15 francophone African states) would only "take notett 
of Houphouet-Boigny's proposals in its final communique. lO Before 
this, The Star had come to the conclusion: 
"South Africa's over-enthusiastic welcome 
of the Ivory Coast's proposal has seriously 
compromised any chance of its success. The 
.Portuguese view that the proposals from 
Abidjan were a grim reply to the vociferous 
stand of Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda 
has also done Ivory Coast's peaceful 
diplomacy initiative little good and 
experienced French observers consider that 
Mr. Houphouet-Boigny's backers are not as 
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numerous as he had perhaps hoped. Gabon 
for example gave unqualified support 
almost immediately the policy was 
announced then later said Dr. Kaunda'f 
ideas also deserved consideration." 1 
In April, in an effort to discredit Zambia, a leading oppo-
nent of dialogue, Vorster disclosed correspondence between himself and 
Kaunda and accused the Zambian President of being a "double-dealer". 12 
However, this attempt to isolate Kaunda, a significant reversal of the 
South African government's previous policy of attempting to convert 
the Zambian President to a policy of pragmatic relations with the 
Republic failed, partly because the Zambian government itself 
immediately took the initiative by publishing the correspondence.13 
Further, Vorster's disclosure seems likely to have the result that, 
as an article in ~he Star ~Ja.c-oni.'caIIy put it, "few African leaders 
will trust lVIr. Vorster as a pen-friend".14 
A more decisive blow to dialogue came in June at a meeting 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa. The 
outcome was succinctly summarized by Colin Legum• 
"The size of the defeat of the Ivory 
Coast's initiative for a dialogue is 
revealed by these figures: of the 
O.A.U's 41 members, 37 were present 
(absentees were Congo-Kinshasa, 
Uganda, Central African Republic, and 
Mauritius), five walked out of the 
debate (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Dahomey, 
Togo, Upper Volta) and five favoured 
some form of a dialogue (Malawi, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Ghana, and 
Swaziland). The remainin~5 27 were uniformly antagonistic." 
After Banda's visit to South Africa in August, General 
Amin of Uganda cautiously emerged as a supporter of dialogue but 
after South Africa rejected his plans to send a fact-findings 
mission to the Republic, immediately reversed his policy. Other 
efforts to revive dialogue including a private visit in October to 
South Africa by a Minister of State in the Ivory Coast government 
have similarly made little headway, partly because the majority of 
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African states still in favour of dialogue wish to avoid a 
conflict with the O.A.U. over the issue and partly because while 
the South African government has 'indicated its willingness to 
explain the policy of separate development, it has made clear that 
there is no question of changing the policy. In January 1972 
dialogue suffered a further setback with the overthrow of the 
Ghanaian Prime Minister, Dr. Busia in a military coup. Indeed, at 
present the divisions among African states over dialogue appear to 
have diminished and there seems little immediate prospect of the 
South African government's repeating its success of 1971 of splitting 
the O.A.U. on the issue or that it will succeed in seriously under-
mining support for the guerrilla movements in Southern Africa. 16 
The most controversial aspect of South African foreign 
policy on the continent is the outward-looking policy. As a 
consequence the Republic's support for the Portuguese, for instance, 
has tended to be neglected as has South African activity outside 
normal diplomatic and economic channels. "As early as 1965, (South 
Africa) set up a Rt m fund to support sympathetic elements in other 
states. The use to which these funds, voted annually, are put have 
never been disclosed 11 • 17 When the Bureau of State Security was 
established in 1969, it was admitted that one of the functions of the 
new organization would be to operate inside, independent Africa. Of 
course, the earliest instance of South African involvement of this 
kind in independent Africa was her support for Katangese secession in 
1960. The purpose was obvious enough - to thwart the militant policies 
of the Congo's new Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. 
"Lumumba had once proclaimed that the 
liberation of the Congo would be the 
first phase of the complete independence 
of Central and Southern Africa and he 
had set his next objectives very precisely; 
support of the nationalist movements in 
Rhodesia, in Ang.~q,, in South Africa. A 
unified Congo having at its head a militant 
anticolonialist constitued a real danger 
for South Africa. 11 J8 
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Far more opportunistic and more secretive has been the 
support. South Africa gave Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. 
"Although the details of South 
Africa's efforts to capitalize upon 
the three year Nigerian civil war have 
not been fully revealed, by late 1969 
three arms shipments a week were 
reportedly leaving South Africa for 
Libreville, Gabon for transhipnent to 
Biafra. Had the Biafran secession 
succeeded South Africa would undoubtedly 
have made considerable progress in 
securing a grateful ally in a rich 
corner of Africa." 19 
In the event, Biafra•s secession like that of Katanga failed and 
South Africa's actions have rebounded to her disadvantage. Nigeria's. 
militant opposition both to Britain's decision to sell arms to South 
Africa and the Ivory Coast's call for dialogue has come as no 
surprise. 
In putting together the different elements of South 
African foreign policy on the continent it is important to remember 
that it is at its most basic level directed towards the survival 
of white supremacy and not an end in itself. Despite the ideologiual 
terms in which it is sometimes seen, the outward-looking policy is 
essentially pragmatic.. Even so convinced ait advocate of the policy .. 
as Dr. Hilgard Muller has made it clear that South Africa applies a 
stringent test of self-interest to her contacts with African states. 
11 You can rest assured that the 
Government will not exchange diplomatic 
mission with an African state or any 
other state unless the country concerned 
gives sufficient proof of its desire to 
promote only friendly relations with 
South Africa and unless such state 
subscribes to the recognized principle 
of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of others and gives effect to 
it in practice." 
Self-interest alone though is not the reason for the 
government's cautious approach. As important has been the need to 
meet right~wing criticism of the policy at home. The outward~looking 
foreign policy has been one of the prime targets of the verkramptes, 
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right-wing critics of government policy who came to the fore during 
Vorster's first year as Prime Minister. While the most extreme of 
these were heavily defeated when they stood as the members of 
Herstigte Nationale Party in the 1970 elections, some of the 
verkramptes who stayed in the Nationalist Party still occupy 
influential positions both in the government and elsewhere. The 
verkrampte attack on the policy rests on four main points. Firstly 
they argue that South Africa's involvement elsewhere on the 
continent compromises her support for Rhodesia and the Portuguese. 
Secondly, they see the policy as committing South Africa to support .. 
black African states such as Malawi and they believe this could 
involve the Republic in dangerous and unnecessary risks. The 
verkrampte monthly, Veg has compared the policy to British 
imperialism arguing that like British imperialism it will lead to 
South Africa•s,interests not being put first. 21 Thirdly, they see 
the policy as leading domestically to what they regard as unprincipled 
breaches of apartheid in regard to black diplomats which are bound to 
affect the attitudes of South Africa's own black population. Lastly, 
they regard it as an attempt to accommodate to world opinion and as 
such the thln end of the wedge. Thus the verkrampte editor of Hoofstad, 
Dr. Treurnicht argues "As Afrikaners are ideally an exclusive group, 
they need a measure of isolation to preserve their cultural identity." 22 
The government has respond.ed to these pressures by making 
breaches of apartheid by black envoys as unprovocative to its right-
wing as possible. 
"It is recognized by foreign di·plomats 
in South Africa that the creation of 
diplomatic suburbs (in Pretoria and 
Cape Town) is a device to make the 
exchange of diplomatic representation 
with as many independent African 
states as possible more palatable to 
the government's right-wing following." 23 
Clearly, too, the extensive publicity given to discussions in African 
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states of dialogue as a strategy directed against apartheid has 
been an embarrassment to the South African government and has 
arguably limited its room for manoe 1.:wr.e in responding to the 
demands of African states that discussion of apartheid should 
be on the agenda of any meeting with the South African government. 
Distinct from, though not unrelated to, dialogue and 
South Africa's diplomatic offensive in Africa are the Republic's 
efforts to sectire a dominant economic and political position in the 
southern third of the continent. This theme has been most notably 
developed in a book by·a senior South African diplomat, The Third 
Africa by Eschel Rhoodte. He takes as his starting-point Verwoerd's 
call in 1964 for a common market of Southern Africa and. concentrates 
on an enthusiastic portrayal of the region's economic potential. Much 
the same approach is adopted by the journal, Africa South: 
"Our economic and political objectives 
in Southern Africa are to harness all 
natural and human resources from Table 
Mountain to the border of the Congo 
River •••• Countries like Rhodesia, 
Malawi, Portuguese East Africa, will be 
amicably persuaded. to adopt the Rand as 
their currency ••• There is already a 
Resources Planning Council for Southern 
Africa to avoid duplication of certain 
industries, which duplication could lead 
to extravagance and unnecessary competi-
tion between countries. Member countries 
of the Common Market could compliment one 
another. For example, the Republic of 
South Africa could manufacture machinery, 
chemicals, and electrical appliances -
while the Transkei could produce jute, 
Swaziland sugar, Botswana beef, and 
Lesotho water." 24 
However, the failure of South Africa to secure the inclusion 
of Zambia in her sphere of influence has in part proved the undoing of 
the "Third Africa" idea. The importance of this failure has been widely 
recognized. 
2. IB 
"The really valuable "conquest" 
and the one which would consoli-
date the bloc (of Southern Africa) 
and make it almost impregnable 
would be Zambia, the wealthiest of 
the African states, but the 
Rhodesian affair has finally cooked 
that goose. Zambia still agonizingly 
dependent on the South, is ostenta-
tiously turning its back, behind 
which terrorists operate freely from 
its territory". 25 
A major effort was made by South Africa during 1968 to per-
suade Zambia of the advantages of co-operation. 26 
approaches were firmly rebuffed by President Kaunda. 
These 
"In South Africa the Prime Mini-
ster, Mr. Vorster, has of late 
consistently declared that he 
favoured. friendship with Zambia. 
This declaration is welcome, but 
I have to say quite clearly that 
nothing stands between South 
Africa and Zambia in fostering 
friendship and co-operation 
except that Government's policy 
of apartheid which, frankly, is 
the policy of oppression and 
exploitation •••• Let Afrikaners 
show respect to Africans in South 
Africa and manifest genuinely the 
spirit of co-operation among all 
sections of the South African 
community including the African 
majority. Then I will be more 
than ready to extend in full my 
hand of friendship on the basis of 
true equality and for mutual 
advantage." 27 
Following Kaunda's rejection of inclusion in South 
Africa's sphere of influence, a tougher attitude towards 
Zambia was perceptible in 1969 and "Talk of an attack against 
Zambia (was) heard with increasing frequency in Salisbury and 
Pretoria". 28 The Financial Gazette's comment was not 
untypical of that in the Nationalist press generally. 
" A growing question is : how long 
must South Africa endure this pro-
vocation before swinging into action 
to eliminate the terrorist base camps 
in Zambia? There is a strong under-
current of feeling in political 
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circles that Zambia must be 
warned finally to refrain from 
supporting terrorists in its 
territory or take the consequences 
of having them wiped out by South 
African retaliatory forces". 29 
Minor instances of bard.er violations and sabotage in recent 
years have reminded Zambia of her vulnerability to attack 
from the south. In these circumstances, Zambia's efforts to 
cut off her ties with the south has assumed considerable 
political importance. One project in particular aimed at 
increasing Zambia's independence has captured the limelight, 
the Tanzam railway. Construction of the railway which will 
link Zambia to the port of Dar-es-Salaam was launched on 
October 26, 1970. The line due to be completed by 1975 at a 
cost of over R284 million - is being financed and built by 
Communist China, after Zambia and Tanzania had failed to 
interest Western countries in the project. 
The project which politically speaking matches in 
importance the Cabora-Bassa dam scheme is China's largest 
ever overseas aid commitment and provides an important entry 
for China into Africa. It may also mean that the issues of 
Southern Africa could become deeply bound up with East-West 
competition. The importance of the railway for South Africa 
is not only its effect on Zambia. In particular, it could 
enable Botswana further to loosen her links-with South Africa. 
Recently, Malawi has made an effort to improve her relations 
with Zqmbia and has asked for tenders for the construction of 
a railway line from Salima (on Lake Malawi) to the Zambian 
border. Malawi is clearly interested in the possibility of a 
link-up with the Tanzam railway once it's built, though this 
would not fundamentally alter her pattern of independence on 
the south. 30 
At present, the states of Southern Africa divide 
into two basically antagonistic constellation of states. 31 
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Dependent on and tied to South Africa are the Portuguese 
territories of Mozambique and .Angola, Rhodesia, South West 
Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. The other constella-
tion, which has been steadily increasing its ties with East 
African economic and political structures, consists of the 
Congo (Kinshasa), Tanzania and Zambia. However, Botswana does 
not fit neatly into either camp. She has maintained close 
links with independent Africa, particularly Zambia. Kaunda, 
for example, has spoken of the possibility of there eventually 
being a United States of Africa consisting of Zambia, Tanzania 
Kenya, Uganda and Botswana. At the same time, Botswana has 
maintained pragmatic relations with South Africa without, like 
Malawi, antagonizing independent Africa. 
Whether these alignments will last remains to be 
seen. Most of all, perhaps, Zambias's position seems precarious. 
The continued slump in the price of copper, which accounts for 
approximately 95% of the country's earnings from exports, might 
yet force Zambia to re-appraise her policy towards Southern 
Africa, as Kaunda acknowledged in a conversation with Richard 
Hall in 1969. Asked whether he would aceept South African aid 
if low copper prices precipitated a financial crisis in Zambia, 
Kaunda replied: 
"It would be a really serious 
challenge - obviously it would be -
but I hope we get beyond that point 
with our rural development before we 
are overtaken by such things. I 
would find it very, very difficult 
indeed to use Sou.th African money!'" 32 
Further it cannot be assumed that Kaunda himself wou.ld remain 
in power and the possibility always exists that his successor 
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might be attracted by the immediate economic advantages of 
an accommodation with South Africa. 33 Equally, however, a 
widening and intensification of the conflicts in the 
Portuguese territories and Rhodesia could place the South 
African government on the defensive and pose it an uncomfor-
table dilemma as to how far it should commit its own forces 
in defence of its white allies. 
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CONCLUSION •. 
A wit once declared that a speci~list was someone 
who knew more and more about less and less. For good or ill 
such a concentration of effort is not possible for the student 
of politics. Paradaxically, in an age of specialization he is 
required to enlarge. rather than narrow the field of his inquiry 
as each year his assumptions are threatened by developments in 
other fields and by the interaction between events in opposite 
corners of the globel Further, in a world in which the 
operations of the computers are measured down to pico-seconds 
(millionths of micro-seconds) 2 , he is faced with a bewildering 
variety and multitude of variables that defy quantification. 3 
In particular, the artificiality of the traditional division 
between foreign and domestic policy has become especially 
apparent. 
"Almost every day incidents are reported 
that defy the .mir,:Pnciples of sovereignty. 
Politics everywehere, it would seem, are 
related to politics everywhere else. 
Where the functinning of any political 
unit was once sustained by structures 
within its boundaries, now the roots of 
its political life can be traced to 
remote corners of the globe. Modern 
science and. technology have collapsed 
space and. time in the physical world 
and thereby heigntened interdependence 
in the political world. Political 
science however has yet to accommodate 
itself to this shrinking world. Even at 
the level where the changes appear most 
pronounced - the functioning of national 
units - events abroad are still regarded 
as external to, rather than part of, a 
nation's politics. To be sure, it has 
long been recognized that national 
political systems, like all organized 
human groups exist in, are conditioned 
by, and respond to a larger envirolment. 
Nor is it denied that international 
political systems, like all interdependent 
groups are shaped by and are reffponsive to 
developments that occur within the units of 
·1 0 J 
't:- 7 
which they are comprised. Yet these 
national -international linkages have 
never been subjected to systematic, 
sustained and comparative inquiry". t~4 
As an illustration of the need for linkage theory 
Rosenau Cites the rash of Coups d' etat in West and Central 
Africa at the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966. He argues 
that'the power of example' , which he claims is what the traditional 
approach is likely to offer as an explanation of the coups' 
coincidence in time, is no answer to the question as to how the 
emulative process works. 5 However, it cannot be said that 
linkage theory has yet made much progress in this direction 
beyond suggesting various ways of classifying linkage phenomena. 
Indeed, arguably the theory's major contribution has been simply 
to draw attention to kinds of relations that are all too easily 
neglected in studies of both foreign and domestic policy. 
As far as South African foreign policy is concerned, 
perhaps the most interesting linkage is that between the outward-
looking policy aJ?.d separate development. This goes conside;rably 
further than the role separate development has played in helping 
White South Africans adjust to the establishment of relations with 
black states (by making meetings between black leaders and white 
Cabinet Ministers un-extraordinary). The South African Government 
itself sees separate development as a fundamental part of its 
policy towards Africa as an article in Rapport demlaring that 
Ilf.tinisters saw Band.a' s visit to South Africa as "the natural and 
actual inescapable result of the success of the separate development 
policy116 suggests. l\~erle Lipton noting that South Africa has 
made considerable progress in Africa in recent years argues that 
South Africans are "mistaken in thinking that this has been due to 
their separate development policy 11 • 7 Nonetheless, she too sees 
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an important connection between the two policies. 
"In so far as the African states have 
shown any interest at all in the 
Bantustans, it has been in the 
potential leverage they might offer. 
Mr. Mungai, the Kenyan Foreign 
:Minister recently suggested that the 
Bantustan leaders should be invited 
to the next o.A.u. meeting. This 
would not imply acceptance of the 
policy or official recognition of 
them, he said but would help and 
encourage them. T~ey might, he 
argued, provide 'a great new weapon 
against South Africa' or alternately 
'a real bridge in a dialogue'. (The 
qorollary of this could be that as 
Africa became the key to improving 
South Africa's relations with the 
West so the leaders of the Bantustans 
- or at least black leaders in South 118 Africa - could become the key to Africa). 
Because African states supporting dialogue justify their 
policy by the claim that it "will help change South African 
attitudes and lead to multi-racialism", 9 they mve made it 
clear that concessions by the South African government on the domestic 
front would greatly strengthen their hand in Africa. Indeed,ia 
the case of some states concessions are a pre-condition of their 
support of dialogue. This applies whether a desire to bring 
about a change in South Africa is a principal motivating factor 
in their adoption of the policy of dialogue or not. In particular 
it is natural that the more conservative African states attach 
\ considerable importance to the rele of the Bantustan leaders like 
Matamzima and Buthelezi as they offer perhaps the best hope of 
prizing concessions from the South African government, which, if 
only modest, would represent a significant propaganda victory 
for the dialogue states. 
As far as the South African government is concerned, 
it is faced with the uncomfortable dilemma of weighing the risks 
of domestic changes, for example, from strengthening Buthelezi's 
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and Matamzima's position, against the benefits of a 
breakthrough in Africa that could further help to 
0 
rehabilitate South Africa's image internationally. To 
complete the picture, it is my own belief that the influence 
of verkramptes makes its greatest impact on the outward-looking 
policy not directly through their stated opposition to close 
contacts with black Africa, but indirectly by limiting the 
concessions the South African government is able to make in 
the domestic field within the framework of separate development. 
In particular, persistent criticism by verkramptes of increased 
expenditure on the Bantustans and the opposition of the 
Mineworkers Union to the training of Africans for skilled work 
in Bantustan mines lO und.erline the difficulties the government 
faces if it is to take domestic steps to give dialogue, a new lease 
' ' ' ·' 
of life after its recent setbacks." 
The linkage between Bantustans and dialogue is itself 
only one aspect of a more fundamental and persistent feature of 
South African foreign policy; the frustration of its objectives 
due to the fact that South Africa's domestic policies are 
at odds with the present international order. What was called in 
Ethiopia's application to the International Court of Justice in 
1960 "currently accepted international standards". 12 The 
implications for the conduct of South African foreign policy 
have been spelled out by Marquard: 
"In these circumstances, our foreign 
policy has been to try to persuade the 
world that we are not as bad as it 
thinks and not even as bad as some 
other countries. We try to make 
friends and alliances in the normal 
diplomatic way and by a heavy output 
of glossy propaganda designed to 
show how prosperous and happy South 
African non-white citizens are. 11 13 
However, Marquard goes on, the nature of South African domestic 
policy is never wholly obscured and in the long run undermines 
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South Africa's diplomatic efforts. 
"Every now and then someone in 
high authority will blurt out what 
apartheid means in practice, and 
months and years and millions of 
words, of propaganda will be 
undone ••• All the fine words of 
our foreign policy fail to obscure 
the ugly facts of mass removals, 
break-up of family life, pass laws, 
and all the multitude of laws and 
regulations designed to enforce 
apartheid. In so far as our foreign 
policy seeks to enable us to live 
on friendly terms with our neighbours 
and with the rest of the world, it 
must in the long run fail. If we 
maintain apartheid and fail to 
give the world a convincing hope 
that non-white South Africans, 
four-fifths of the population, will 
soon be emancipated, our foreign 
policy will increasingly be forced 
into the narrow mould of defence 
to ward off possible attack". 14 
His analysis is, I believe, essentially correct that 
unless the government takes measures to devolve power to non-
whites on a more meaningful basis South Africa will be forced 
increasingly on the defensive. In fact, an underlying defensiveness 
about South African foreign policy can be traced back to the 
Second World War and. its aftermath when the colonial world of 
which South Africa was in a sense a part began to crumble. 
"Future historians may well :(j.udge that 
for South Africa the decisive theatre 
of war in the great holocaust of 
1939-45 was not Europe but the 
Far East. For it was there, with 
the Japanese attack on South-east 
Asia that the first of the death 
blows were struck at the world of 
European political ascendancy in 
which the South African system had 
had its appropriate place." 15 
The principal criticisms of this approach, however, 
are that it fails to take account of changes in the international 
environment that directly or indirectly have made a favourable 
impact on the Republic's international position and, more 
importantly, of economic realities. To take the point first, 
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it is argued that Western disillusionment with Africa 
as a result of the continent's political instability since 
independence, the racial crisis in the United States, the 
controversy over immigration in Britain, South Africa's 
isolation from the main sources of conflict in Asia and the 
IVIiddle East, and the increased importance of the Cape sea 
route because of the closure of the Suez Canal make it 
possible for "the wider international scene to be interpreted 
as favourable to a shift by the South African government away 
f . 1 d f . •t• '' 16 rom a simp e, e ensive posi ion. 
nology these are examples of linkages.) 
(In Rosenau's termi-
The election of a 
conservative President in the United States in 1968 and of a 
Conservative party government in 1970 may be given as further 
evidence of changes in the international environment favourable 
to South Africa as, more obviously, it is argued that the failure 
of sanctions has strengthened South Africa's position.· 
Against this, the emergence of China as a world 
power and particularly her involvement in Africa through the 
Tanzam railway represents a development fraught with some danger 
for South Africa, especially were that involvement to re-awaken 
competition among the great powers in Africa of the kind that 
characterized the Congo crisis in the early 1960's. Intensified 
competition for influence in Africa, would, one suspects, make 
an unfavourable impact on .American-South African relations as 
distancing herself politically from the white regimes of the 
south as far as possible would be obvious step for the United 
States government to take were it competing for the support of 
African states. Houphouet-Boigny, it is true, has giv~n the 
combat of communism as a reason for dialogue with South Africa,17 
but it is to be doubted that this point of. view would cut much ice 
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with the majority of African states in the event of an 
intensified competition for influence among the major 
powers. Further, while it is time that South Africa 
benefits indirectly from reports of racial conflict elsewhere 
because of their impact on public opinion in Western Europe 
and North America, the benefit is, I believe, no more than 
short term because, whatever else, racial crises in other parts 
of the world do not represent steps towards the re-creation of 
a colonial world, which alone would make South Africa's 
international rehabilitation fully possible. In short, what 
I am arguing is that while some changes in recent years in the 
international political environment may be seen as favourable 
to South Africa, none offers the prospect of a permanent 
improvement in the Republic's position. 
More substantial is the economic argument that: 
"the retention within the international 
capitalist system of so profitable a 
field of investment and source of 
strategic raw materials as the Southern 
African complex occupies the dominant 
position in the structure of Western 
capitalist interests in sub-Saharan 
Africa (and that) in consequence 
their main concern vis-a-vis 
independent Africa is to prevent the 
growth of strong politico-economic 
systems independent of Western 
capitalist hegemony in the countries 
bordering upon the Southern African 
complex ••• which could, among 
other things, seriously threaten 18 white rule in Southern Africa. 11 
Put more simply, Amighi's and Saul's argument is that the priority 
Western powers give to their economic interests in Southern Africa 
leads them both to oppose measures again South Africa that would 
threaten these interests and to action in independent Africa to 
prevent, if they can, a head-on clash between black Africa and 
the White regimes of the south. The first point is borne out by 
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the oft-stated opposition of successive governments in 
Britain, the United States, and the other principal European 
powers to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. 
This opposition first became apparent in 1964 when African 
states launched a major campaign to win international support 
for collective enforcement measures against the Republic over 
apartheid. While by contrast the imposition of sanctions 
against Rhodesia after U.D.I in 1965 would appear to contradict 
Amighi's and Saul's thesis, the peripheral nature of Western 
interests in Rhodesia compared to those in South Africa itself 
and indeed the failure of sanctions against the Smith regime 
do not suggest that the Rhodesian case can be regard.ed as a 
precedent for similar action against the Republic. Evidence 
as to the second point (steps to avoid a major conflict in 
Southern Africa) is provided by the persistent public 
declarations of the American, British, and French governments 
in support of negotiation as the solution to the problems of 
Southern Africa and by their general diplomatic support for 
dialogue with South Africa. l9 
Of the three governments France appears to bave gone 
the furthest in promoting Houphouet-Boigny's initiative. In 
fact, such have been the reports of French involvement that " 
"opinion (is) rife in Africa that the powerful influence in 
support of dialogue reaches far beyond Abidjan and that 
11 20 President Houphouet-Boigny is merely a convenient megaphone. 
One strong pointer has been the key role South Africa's Ambassador 
in Paris has reportedly 21 played in sounding out African states 
on dialogue; another the fact that initial support for dialogue 
was centred on francophone states that had retained strong 
political and economic links with Paris. But while mystery still 
surrounds the detailed role played by western governments in 
support of dialogue, there is nothing surprising about their 
298 .. 
general policy positions which are to reconcile as far as 
possible their interests on both sides of the Southern 
African divide. 22 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that 
their positions rule out, or are inconsistent with putting 
pressure on South Africa over her domestic policies short 
of sanctions or of allowing a conflagration in Southern 
Africa. Indeed, the importance they attach to their interests 
north of the Zambezi precisely leads to gestures in this 
direction. 23 Further, account has to be taken of the 
political pressures on Western economic interests in Southern 
Africa. These are not confined to the pressures African states 
are able to mount, but also stem from western domestic sources. 
This is particularly true of the United States where the demand 
of Polaroid workers that the corporation cease operating in 
South Africa was widely publicized. 24 Decisions of a number 
of .American companies to pay rate for the job in South Africa 
reflect according to the Financial Mail, mounting domestic 
pressure on American firms to "treat their employees here (in 
South Africa) on the same basis as in the u.s : complete 
11 25 equality in all spheres. To sum up, while Western 
economic interests may be said to set limits to the inter-
national pressure to which South Africa is likely to be subjected 
the extent to which they might provide the basis for an 
improvement in South Africa's international position is 
altogether less clear. Indeed, if Polaroid proves to be a 
precedent for other foreign firms, they may even,provide a 
further source of pressure on South Africa's domestic policies. 
A very different economic argument to that of .Amighi 
and Saul is the fashionable theory that South Africa's outward-
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looking policy is itself an example of economic 
. . l" 26 imperia ism. I am mentioning it in this context because 
a consideration of the wider economic interests that exist 
in Africa points to one of the theory's main failings; its 
assumption that South Africa could rapidly turn political 
acceptance in Africa into economic domination. This ignores 
the fact that South Africa would quickly come into conflict 
with the firmly established economic interests of the western 
powers if she ever tried to use political influence to this 
end (assuming, of course the Republic secured such influence). 
To those who argue that Malawi and the former High Commission 
territories are examples of countries where the coincidence 
of South African economic domination and political influence 
supports the im~erialist theory, it needs to be said that 
South Africa's d-om-irian'.t economic role in th.es~countries can 
hardly be attributed to the outward-looking policy. The economic 
role preceded the political policy by upwards of half a century. 27 
Neither Malawi nor Lesotho therefore can be said to be 
a precedent for .the kind of economic relationship South Africa 
would be able to establlsh with other friendly states in Efrica. 
Further, South Africa's current balance of payments difficulties 
and her related longstanding restrictions on the export' of · 
capital do not suggest that the country has the economic capacity 
to lay the basis in terms of investment for a dominant economic 
1 t .d f h t h f . fl 28 (Th ro e ou si e o er presen sp ere o in uence. e 
argument that trade could provtde the basis for an economically 
unequal or imperialist relationship with Africa tries to turn 
South Africa's trade deficit from a liability into a motive. It 
is fully explored in Append.ix B). 
All this, of course, is not to say that South Africa's 
foreign policy in Africa should or can be considered without 
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reference to economic forces. This is pa~ticularly true 
of the Republic's role in Southern Africa. Indeed in the 
context of foreign policy it makes little sense to define 
southern Africa straightforwardly in geographical terms 
and not take into account the region's political and 
economic limits. Looking at a map, for example, provides 
little clue as to :Malawi's ''southward" orientation. 
Drawing a political 11 borderi1 to southern Africa, Grundy 
reaches the conclusion that: 
"Two separate constellations of 
states exist in Southern Africa. 
One finds expression in the Congo-
Tanzania - Zambia loose combination 
with its growing ties to East 
African economic and political 
structures. The other is essentially 
a South Africa-Portugal pole serving 
to attract Rhodesia, Malawi and 
Lesotho and to a slightly lesser 
extent Botswana". 29 
Economically, a perhaps even more significant picture 
emerges. Within the geographical area from the Cape to the 
Congolese border, one can point to three main economic islands 
of industrialization (the Rand complex in the Southern Transvaal,30 
the Salisbury, Bulaway area, and the Zambian copperbelt) in what 
is largely a sea of underdevelopment. Further, the three 
countries in which these "islands" are situated are the only 
countries in the region that are importers rather than exporters 
of labour. 31 Put another way, South Africa, Rhodesia, and 
Zambia only in Southern Africa can be said to possess the 
infrastructure for independent economic development. What is 
more, :J!lliodesia and Zambian industrialization is not extensive 32 
enough to guarentee against being overwhelmed economically by 
the dominant power in the region, South Africa. In fact, for 
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Zambia to orientate herself to the north makes economic 
as well as political sense, despite the short term costs. 
Rhodesia, it should be remembered, owes much of her basis 
for industrialization to Federation when the markets of her 
two northern ·partners (and Zambia's copper) enabled her to 
achieve a measure of independence-from South Africa and to 
protect her infant industries by erecting a high tariff wall 
against South African goods.33 
Given Rhodesia's present economic subservience 
to South Africa as a result of U.D.I. it can be seen that the 
economic structure of the region largely underpins present 
political relationships within Southern Africa. Significantly, 
too, it suggests that short of economic disaster in Zambia, 
no long term conversion of Zambia to South Africa's sphere of 
influence is likely. In these circumstances, it is unlikely 
that the Republic will be able to secure the Southern African 
\ 
region as a whole from the pressures of militant independent 
Africa. This is another reason for upholding Marquard's basic 
thesis that South African foreign policy will remain essentially 
defensive as long as her present domestic policy prevails. 
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NOTES ON THE CONCLUSION. 
1. For example what Middle East expert could·have 
imagined that a relatively obscure revolutionary 
movement in Japan would become relevant to his 
studies? What student of Soviet-American can 
feel secure in assumptions that could rapidly be 
overturned by fresh technological breakthroughs 
in the field of military hardware? 
2. 1 million pico-seconds = 1 micro-second. · 1 million 
micro-seconds = 1 second. 
3. Attempts are being mad.e to overcome this problem, 
especially in the United States. So far however 
the results have tended to be trivial. 
4. J. Rosenau (ed.) : Linkage Politics (The Free Press 
New York 1969) p.2. 
5. ill£ p.6. 
6. Rapport 22.8.1971. 
7. M. Lipton : "Independent Bantustans 11 in International 
Affairs Vol. 48 No. 1. January 1972 p.17. 
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9. Ibid p.17 
10. See M. Howell et. al (Survey 1971) p.124 
11. Indeed, one of the reasons why dialogue has failed to 
get off the ground has been the discovery by African 
states of the South African government's unwillingness 
to consider all but the most marginal changes to present 
policy. See above section on Dialogue and Confrontation. 
12. Quoted in R. Ballinger (South West Africa) ·p. 52 
13. L. Marquard: Our Foreign Policy (SA.IRR, Johannesburg 1969) 
p.22 
t4. Ibid. 
15. Black and Thompson (eds.) p.426 
16. D. Austin: "White Power" in Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies. Vol VI No. 2 July 1968 p.98 
17. See Africa No. 2 July 1971 p.19 
18. G. Amighi and S.S. Saul : "Nationalism and Revolution in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 in R. M.iliband and J. Saville: 
The Socialist Register 1969 (Merlin, London 1969) pp.141-2 
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19. See Africa No. 2 July 1971 p.19. 
20. Ibid. 
21. See The Observer 15.11.1970. 
22. The fact that they have not loudly and :publicly 
proclaimed their support for dialogue itself reflects 
their wish not to antagonize needlessly the anti-dialogue 
ma'jciri ty of African states. 
23. Significant, for example, is the British Conservative 
government's retreat from its initial enthusiasm to sell 
arms to South Africa. 
24. See Africa Digest Vol XVIII No. 2 April 1971 pp26-7 









See, for example S. Gewasi: Industrialization, foreign 
capitalz and forced labour in South Africa (United 
Nations, New York, 1970) pp 90-94 
The principal component of the territories' dependence 
on Smuth Africa goes back to the 19th CentB.rY• A more 
reasonable claim is that the outward-looking policy has 
helped South Africa to expand to a limited degree her 
economic role. 
See Financial Mail 30.6~1972 and J.E. Spence (Republic 
under Pressure) p.53 
K. Grundy: "The Southern Border' of Africa" in c. G. Wid-
strand (ed.)) : African Botjndary Problems (The Scandanavian 
Institute of African Studies, Uppsala 1969) p .. 123 and p.125. 
Grundy calls it a diplomatic border as he bases it on the 
diplomatic relations each country in the area maintains • 
There are of course other areas of industrialization in 
South Africa, but this is the principal one. 
See for a graphi9 illustration. W.J. Breytenbach: Vreemde 
Bantoewerkers in Suid-Afrika en Bb.odesi@ (Africa Institute 
Pretoria 1970) p.IV 
Zambia's is based almost exclusively on the copper mines. 
See Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX A. 
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FOR 1960. 
JANUARY: 1st - Cameroun becomes independent. 
27th - Belgium announces that the Congo (Leopoldville) 
is to become independent on June 30th. 
FEBRUARY : 3rd - The British Prime 1\'Iinister, Harold MacMillan 
makes "wind of change" speech in the South African Parliament. 
MARCH . . 21st - The Sou.th African Police open fire on 
demonstrators protesting against the pass laws at Sharpeville, 
killing 67 and wounding 186. 
30~h - The South African government declares a state 
of emergency. 
APRIL: 1st - The U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 
deploring apartheid and calling on South Africa to abandon 
her racial policy by - 9 votes to o. 
9th - Attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life. 
27th - Togo becomes independent. 
MAY : Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. -
Eric Louw's request that Sou.th Africa be granted permission to 
stay in the Commonwealth should she become a Republic refused 
on the ground that the request was hypothetical. At Conference 
Nkrumah cancels invitation to Eric Louw to visit Accra. 
~: Conference of independent African states adopt thQgh 
resolutions on South Africa and South West Africa. 
26th - Malagasy becomes independent. 
30th - Congo (Leopoldville) becomes independent. 
1st - Somallland becomes independent~ 
11th - ~tanga secedes from the Congo. 
12th - U.N. Security Council authorises the Secretary-
General to give the new Congolese government military assistance to 
maintain law and. order. 
AUWUST 1st - Dahomey becomes independent. 
3rd - Niger becomes independent. 
5th - Upper Volta becomes independent. 
7th - Ivory Coast becomes independent. 
11th - Chad becomes independent. 
13th - Central A:frican Republic becomes independent. 
15th - Congo (Brazzaville) becomes independent. 
25th - Senegal becomes independent. 
SEPTEMBER: 
22nd - Mali becomes independent. 
OCTOBER: lst - Referendum of white electorate on whether 
South A:frica should become a Republic votes "Yes" by a 
narrow majority. 
NOVEMBER: 
4th - Ethiopia and Liberia file charges against 
South,Af'rica over South.West Africa at the International Court 
of Justice at the Hague. 
APPENDIX B. 
AFRICA AS A MARKET FOR SOUTH. AFRICAN GOODS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Mu.ch recent analysis of Sou.th Africa's ou.tward-
looking policy towards independent Africa has asserted 
that the implications of the policy are primarily economic 
in character. "South Africa is thrusting out into Africa 
for a number of reasons. She needs markets for her 
manufactured goods. She wants to export capital •••" 1 • 
Indeed, many carry the argument further and suggest that 
Sou.th Africa is seeking an economic and poli t~~cal role in 
Africa analagous to that of the United States in Latin 
America. 
"Sou.th Africa has now embarked 
upon a policy designed to 
neutralize the opposition to 
apartheid in Africa. It is 
attempting to develop its 
relations with independent 
African countries in order to 
create a community of nations 
·in southern Africa, which can 
live in 'peaceful co-existence'. 
It is offering more trade, aid, 
and investment to those countries. 
It is bound, however, to dominate 
any such association of nations. 
Countries participating in such 
an association would run the risk 
of seeing their development 
arrested. That is the meaning of 
Dummnt's warning against the 
'South Americanization' of Africa." 2 
Adding to the appeal of this argument is the fact 
that it is not confined to left-wing critics of South African 
foreign policy. In his book, The Third Africa, a senior 
South African diplomat, Eschel Rhoodie argues enthusiastically 
that South Africa dominates the southern third of the continent 
"to the same, if not a greater extent than the United States 
enjoys pre-eminence in the Americas. 11 3 Further, it is striking 
how both Marxist opponents of the Sout11 African government like 
Brian Bunting and right-wing critics, for example in the verkrampte 
monthly, Veg 4 have invoked the memory of Cecil Jobrn Rhodes in 
describing the "imperialist appetite 115 of the South African 
government. 
Finally, in accounting for the development of the outward-
1ooking foreign policy, Rhoodie, Molteno and Gervasi attach central 
importance to Dr .. Verwoerd's call in August 1964 for the creation 
of a Southern African Common Market stretching as far north as the 
Congo. Molteno goes furthest in asserting: 
"South Africa's ambition is not limited 
to trade with the individual African 
states. It is the creation of a huge 
free trade area and customs union in 
Central and East Africa as a market 
for South African goods." 6 
In particular, he lays stress on South Africa's growing balance of 
payments deficit in the second half of the 1960's and points out 
that only increased gold sales averted a crisis. 7 
8 9 10 By contrast, Spence , Legrnn , and Cockram , have paid 
more attention to the political implications of tb£ outward-looking 
policy and its role in presenting to the West an image of South 
Africa as a stable and prosperous state enjoying the goodwill of her 
neighbours. This striking ~heme has been underlined by the South 
African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, who has argued that 
South Africa's acceptance by Africa is more important to her 
relations with the rest of the world than her internal policy. 
"As the West becomes aware of our 
fruitful co-operation with other African 
states, their attitude towards us improves. 
I believe that it will happen to an 
increasing degree because we must simply 
accept that our relations with the rest of 
the world is largely determined by our 
relations with the African states. In this 
connection we are giving the world consider-
able food for thought. 11 11 
Essentially the same point was made by General Hiemstra 
(Commandant General o~ the South African Defence Force) in an 
address to the :Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns 
in July 1969. 
"If only they (some N.A.T.O members) 
would realize that there is more good-will 
in Africa towards white South Africa than 
1s superficially visible, they would not 
continue to foul their mm nests by 
encouraging terrorists and hatemongers in 
their evil, and in so doing play right 
into the hands of their enemies." 12 
·While these contrasting approaches to the study of South 
African foreign policy may be regarded as complementary rather than 
conflicting, they do point to the need for a more detailed study, 
of ihe salient issues as opposed to a general survey. 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO AFRICA. 
In this article, I intend looking at one of these, the 
importance of Africa as a market for South African goods. The idea 
that "South Africa's natural market is Africa1113 is by no means new. 
It was a common place of South African politics at the time Eric 
Louw14 recorded this reaction in 1957 to Ghanaian independence. 
"As far as the Union of South Africa 
if?_concerned, we naturally welcome any 
development on the Continent of Africa •••• 
••••• provided no impediment will be 
placed in the way of South Africa's 
access ti those markets. The territories 
to the fuorth of the L~mpopo are the 
natural markets for our large and 
expanding industries". 15 
Contacts and co-operation prompted by the Second World 
War in particular encouraged.hopes that South Africans would take, 
in Smuts' words, "our rightful place as leader in Pan-African 
development 11 • 16 Many expected Sou.th Africa to be the main bene-
ficiary of the post~war economic development of Africa. However, 
even at the high point of Pan-African co-operation at the end of the 
war, there were sceptics. 
3iO 
"A few indefatigable optimists even 
look on Africa as a vast hinterland 
crying out for the Union's industrial 
products and anxious to pour its 
wealth into her bilingual lap. South 
Africa, however, cannot expand 
industries on imports of African raw 
materials based on low paid sweated 
labour and at the same time hope to 
find profitable markets in these 
poverty-stricken areas. Moreover, 
the African continent cannot be 
regarded as, and will not in any case 
become, the Union's private preserve." 17 
In the event, this view has been amply justified as a 
table comparing the growth of total exports with those to Africa 
*" shows (see Table 1). The most immediately striking feature of 
the bare figures for South African exports to Africa is the 
absolute decline in exports from 1957 to 1963. A closer look at 
the figures reveals that even despite the evident recovery in 
South Africa's exports to the continent in the second half of 
the 1960's, exports to Africa to-day represent a smaller 
proportion of total South African exports than they did in the 
mid 1950's. 
Indeed, the dramatic recovery in the level of South 
African exports from 1965 that an uncritical look at the figures 
might suggest is misleading, as from 1965 the figures have been 
inflated by the inclusion of re-exports of imported goods. It 
seems likely the reason why the Bureau of Statistics introduced 
this change in the presentation of the export figures was 
Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. One of the 
effects of the change is to disguise the extent to which goods 
are channelled to Rhodesia through South Africa. U.D.I. also 
necessitated another important change. From 1965 the Bureau no 
longer published even a partial break-down of South Africa's 
trade with individual African countries; a policy towards which 
the Bureau had initially been moving in response to moves by 
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African states to boycott South African goods. 18 
When re-exports are added to the figures for 1961-64, the 
impact made on the level of South African exports to Africa by U.D.I 
becomes more apparent (see Table 2). The increase in exports for 
1966 over those of 1965 of almost R50 million is far and away the 
highest rise for a single year. But while the central role of 
this particular political development is borne out by a more 
detailed breakdown of the increase (see below), accounting for the 
decline between 1957-63 in political terms is more hazardous. At 
first sight, it might be tempting to ascribe the decline to the 
boycott of South African goods initiated by African states in the 
early 196o's. In fact, as an examination of a breakdovvn of the 
figures shows (see Table 3), the principal factor was the fall in 
South African exports to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland. 
During the period 1957-63 these fell by R39.5 million, while exports 
to the rest of Africa (excluding Mozambique) fell by Rl0.6 million.19 
In short, while South African trade with the continent was affected 
by the boycott, it was not the principal obstacle to its growth. 
That proved to be policies pursued by Federation to protect her 
infant manufacturing industries and in particular the restrictive 
nature of a new trade agreement with South Africa in 1960. 
Similarly and perhaps as imports, the break-up of 
Federation at the end of 1963 was a turning point in reversing the 
downward trend in South African exports to Africa. The point needs 
emphasizine; as it tends, not unnaturally, to.be overshadowed by the 
economic consequences of U.D.I and secondly, because it provides a 
possible additional economic motive for the South African government's 
hostility towards Federation. During its lifetime the free trade 
area within Fed.eration coupled with the high tariffs to protect 
Southern Rhodesian industry had acted as a strong inducement to the 
two northern territories to obtain their imports from Southern 
Rhodesia rather than South Africa. 
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The break-up ended this inducement and South African goods 
consequently became more competitive on the Zambian, Malawian, 
and Rhodesian markets than they had been during Federation. 
Whereas in 1964 inter-territorial trade had just outstripped 
the region's impo~ts from South Africa, in 1965 the position 
had been reyersed. 20 
U.D.I. itself sharply accelerated the decline in 
inter-territorial trade. Both Zambian and Malawian imports of 
I. 
·Rhodesian goods dropped quite sharply as did their exports to 
Rhodesia. By 1967 total inter-territorial trade among the 
former members of Federation amounted to less than a third of 
the region's imports from South Africa. 21 (Of course, it was 
not just trade pati;erns that were disrupted by the break-up of 
Federation and U.D.I. and in an economic context the drop in 
the employment of Malawians in both Rhodesia and Zambia should 
be mentioned. 22 ) 
While Table 3 indicates that the level of South 
African exports to the Federation played the primary role in 
determining the level of South African exports to Africa as a 
whole, the secondary role of exports to the rest of Africa 
(excluding Mozambique) 23 in the decline is nonetheless important. 
Though the actual value of this trade in relation to total 
exports was small (less than 4% even at its peak in 1957), the 
fact that it declined sharply in the period 1959-64 when the 
majority of African states gained their independence indicates 
that African states were more conscientious in implementing a 
boycott of South African goods than perhaps prevailing prejudice 
about the vulnerability of African states to South African 
economic pressure or persuasion might suggest. Indeed as "other" 
in Table 3 includes Angola and a number of Atlantic and. Indian 
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Ocean islands not politically part of Africa24 , the. figures 
tend to overstate the level of South African exports to 
independent African states and because South African exports 
to Angola and the islands were increasing, understate the 
sharpness of the decline in her trade with continental Africa 
outside of Southern Africa. 
A clearer picture is obtained by a more detailed 
break-down of South African exports to Africa for 1961-64 (see 
Table 4)). This set of figures shows that in 1964 exports -
with the inclusion of re-exports - to the independent states of 
Africa excluding Zambia and Malawi amounted to little more than 
R9 million or put another way, somewhat less than 1% total South 
African exports. Further, in the last years when a detailed 
break-down was given (1961 and 62), three countries - Kenya, the 
Congo, and Uganda - accounted for over 80% of South Africa's 
~xports to continental Africa outside of Southern Africa. In 
short, exports to West and North Africa were virtually non-
existent. 
To establish the pattern of trade after 1964 is more 
d.ifficul t, but by consul ting other than South African sources 
it is possible to identify the major factors accounting for the 
expansion of South African exports to Africa in the second half 
of the 1960's. The first problem to be faced is that after U.D.I. 
South Africa's principal African trading partner, Rhodesia ceased 
to provide a country by country break-down of her imports. 
Consequently for the years 1966-70 it is necessary to rely on the 
estimates of the U.N. sanction - busting committee. 25 Based on 
the committee's access to detailed and up to date figures on 
inter-African trade not easily available to an independent 
researcher, these are the best available, though as estimates they 
are naturally subject to a margin of error. A further reason for 
using these rather than any other set of figures is that they have 
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been calculated 26 to be comparable with Rhod~sian figures 
of her imports from South Africa prior to U.D.I •• In short, 
we can use the estimates to calculate the annual increase in 
Rhodesian imports from South Africa in the years following 
sanctions and her_imports from the Republic as a percentage of 
her total imports. The result is shown in Table 5. 
The pattern is much as might be expected; the 
largest annual increase occurring after U.D.I. in 1966 when 
South Africa doubled her share of the Rhodesian market. The 
figures confirm, too, Rhodesia's principal role in boosting 
South African exports to the continent. Nevertheless, the 
stagnation of Rhodesia's total imports since U.D.I. below 
their level in 1965 has clearly been a limiting factor on the 
growth of South African exports to Rhodesia. Indeed, the time 
has come when the lifting of sanctions-opening the way to the 
growth of the Rhodesian economy and consequently of her trade -
would from a trading perspective probably be in South Africa's 
best interests, even were her share of the Rhodesian market to 
decline. Because of the over-riding effects of u.n.I. on trade, 
it is difficult to assess the impact of the liberal trade 
agreement signed between South Africa and Rhodesia in Nombember 
1964. 27 Nevertheless, it is a reasonable supposition that the 
ag~eement would help to safeguard South Africa's position in 
the Rhodesian market if sanctions were lifted and limit the size 
of any short-term decline in South African exports to Rhodesia. 
By contrast with Rhodesia, Zambia's total imports -
mirroring the impressive growth rate of her economy - have more 
than doubled since 1964. At the end of 1964 the newly indepen-
dent government of Zambia gave "12 months' notice of termination of 
its trade agreements with South Africa with a view to encouraging 
importers to find alternative sources of supply and reducing 
dependence on South African imports. 11 28 Nevertheless, South 
Africa succeeded in maintaining her share of the market until 
1970 when for the first time since U.D.I. the proportion of 
imports from South Africa fell below 20% (see Table 6). The 
main reason for the continuing high level of imports from 
South Africa after the 1964 decision was U.D.I. South African 
exporters benefitted from the high priority the Zambian 
government gave to implementing sanctions against Rhodesia and 
the consequent substitution of some items (for example, coal) 
formerly imported from Rhodesia by South African products. Not 
surprisingly, the largest increase in Zambian imports from 
South Africa, both absolutely and as a proportion of her total 
imports occurred in 1966, the year immediately after U.D.I •• 
Since then Zambia's imports from South Africa have declined 
proportionately and since 1968 absolutely. 
Indeed, Zambia has really been strikingly successful 
in loosening her ties with the White south and diminishing her 
dependence on Rhodesian and South African imports. This becomes 
more app~rent when imports from the two countries are taken 
together. Whereas in 1964, their imports accounted for over 60% 
of Zambia's total imports, by 1970 their share had fallen to less 
29 than 24%. Further, barring a resolution in Zambia's foreign 
policy, an even sharper fall in her trade with the south and 
particularly South Africa can be expected once the Tanzam rail-
way has been built. The importance of the changes in Zambia's 
pattern of trade can hardly be over-emphasized. Apart from 
South Africa herself, Zambia imports more than any other country 
in Southern Africa.30 Indeed, her imports from South Africa 
alone still outstrip Malawi's total imports. 31 · But perhaps a 
better measure of the imminent consequences of South Africa's 
progressive exclusion from the Zambian market is the fact that 
in 1970 the drop in Zambia's imports from South Africa could be 
larg~r than Malawi's total imports from South Africa for that 
year. 32 In short, the Republic's trade with Zambia plays -
and will for some time continue to play - a very much more 
important role in determining the level of South African 
exports to Africa than her trade with Malawi or for that matter 
any other independent African state. 
Throughout the period under consideration (1964-70), 
Rhodesia and Zambia between them accounted each year for over 
two-thirds of South Africa's exports to Africa. Increases in 
their imports from South Africa were the main factors behind the 
expansion of the Republic's exports to Africa between 1966 and 
1968. In addition, the two countries provided far and away the 
major source of South Africa's burgeoning trade surplus with 
Africa, which rose from R37.l million in 1965 to Rl32.7 million 
in 1970.33 But the increases in trade with Rhodesia and Zambia 
were as we have seen largely the product of the exceptional_ an~ 
in the long run temporary trading conditions created by U.D.I., 
For this reason, the basis of the great expansion of South 
African exports to Africa and of her trade surp+us with the 
continent was in a sense artificial. The U.D.I. factor has been 
largely overlooked by those seeking an economic foundation to the 
outward-looking policy. 
"South Africa's concern is not to 
promote two-way trade with Africa, but 
to increase her own exports to the rest 
of the continent so as to improve her 
deteriorating balance of payments. . 
Africa is the only continent with which 
she has a favourable balance of trade. 
Further in the last five years, she has 
succeeded in increasing this.favourable 
balance enormously - from R6.2 m. in 
1965 to Rl30 m. in 1968". 34 
Molteno makes a technical error in calculating South Africa's 
trading surplus in 196535, but that aside, it is his failure to 
understand the basis of the increase in the trade surplus that 
leads him to view it as evidence of S<?uth Africa's concern "not 
to promote two-way trade". In fact, on the evidence it can be 
argued equally plausibly that the South African government would 
be willing to sustain a deficit in her trade with independent 
Africa in return for political and diplomatic concessions and 
that the Republic's over-all balance of trade deficit is a 
handicap rather than a spur to the outward-looking policy. As 
it is, the last available official break-down of South African 
trade with Africa showed the Republic in deficit on her trade 
outside of Southern Africa. 36 
However, before a fuller consideration of the wider 
issues raised by these arguments can be made, a more detailed 
analysis of South African exports to the continent is necessary. 
Besides ·Zambia and Rhodesia, three other areas to which South 
Africa has increased her exports since 1964 can be clearly 
identified. They are Maiawi and the two .Portuguese provinces 
of Angola and Mozambique. In growth terms the most impressive, 
but in absolute terms the smallest mar~et was Malawi. Her 
imports from South Africa rose from Rl.7 million in 1964 to 
R7.7 million in 1970. 
TABLE 7. 
MALAWIAN IMPORTS ~in thousand Kwacha (a)) 
YEAR TOTAL RHODESIA SOUTH AFRICA s.A. as2f IN· RAND. 
1964 28,640 11,202 1,713 5.,98 1,713 
1965 40,806 14,861 2,181 5.34 2,181 
1966 54,292 12,333 3,928 7.34 3,928 
1967 50,852 10,854 3,920 7.71 3,873 
1968 58,180 10,490 6,414 11.02 5,482 
1969 61,916 10,446 8,820 14.25 7,538 
1970 71,367 15,505 8,968 12.57 7,665 
Sources: Republic of Malawi - National Statistical Office (Zambia)) 
and Department of Census and Statistics: Annual Statement 
of External Trade 1966, 1968 and Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
3/S 
NOTES: (a) 1 Kwacha = 1 Rand prior to devaluation in November, 
1967. After devaluation £K 1 = approximately R0.855. 
In part, the increase in trade between the two countries 
may be seen as a factor in cementing their political and diplomatic 
relations and in part as a consequence of them. The signing of 
a new trade agreement 37between the Republic and Malawi in March 
1967 helped lay the foundation for the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, while part of recent South African loans to Malawi 
has been tied to the purchase of South African goods38 • Aid of 
this kind has already boosted - and should further boost- South 
Africa's position in the Malawian market. 
Nevertheless, it is important to resist the temptation 
to exaggerate the significance of Malawi's increased trade with 
South Africa. Firstly, in absolute terms the extent of the trade 
is small and even in 1970 the Republic's share in Malawi's imports 
was considerably smaller ·than her share in Zambia's. Secondly, 
trade is very far from being Malawi's most important economic link 
with South Africa. Of far greater importance is migratory labour 
and following the cut-back in the employment of Malawians in 
Rhodesia and Zambia, Malawi's reliance on South, Africa·' s 
admission of up to 80,000 of her labourers annually has become all 
the greater. Further, while, for instance, the completion of the 
Tanzam railway could radically affect Malawi's trading options, it 
is unlikely that she will find another market for her labour. In 
short, labour is a far better guarantee of Malawi's continued 
dependence on South Africa than trade. 
Finally, the growth of Malawi's trade with South Africa 
should not be looked at in isolation. Malawi's trading relations 
with the white south as a whole, like those of Zambia were 
affected both by the break-up of Federation and, despite the fact 
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that Malawi made no systematic attempt to implement sanctions, 
by u.n.I •• In fact, the growth of South African exports to 
Malawi during the period 1965-70 has been largely at the expense 
of Rhodesia. While in absolute terms Malawi's imports from the 
white south have increased substantially since 1964, as a pro-
portion of total imports they have declined by more than 10%. 
Rhodesia's share of the market was almost halved, while South 
Africa's doubled.39 
The very substantial growth of South African exports 
to Angola and Mozambique completes the picture of expansion (see 
Tables 8 and 9). It reflects both South Africa's closer political 
relations with Portugal and her greater economic involvement 
through schemes like the Cabora-Bassa dam project and the Kunene 
river project. The extension of South African capital to the 
two territories followed reforms in the Portuguese law on 
foreign investment between 1962 and 1965; changes prompted by 
Portugal's concern, in the wake of rebellion in both Angola and 
Mozambique, to secure greater foreign financial. support for her 
position in Africa. Politically, too, Portugal has sought closer 
links with South Africa and has fostered top level exchanges to 
this end. The two governments concluded a new trade agreement 
in October 1964. 
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TABLE 1. 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS a ~in millions of Rand) 
YEAR. TOTAL AFRICAb Africa as % of 
Total. 
1955 660.8 128.1 19.38 
1956 737.7 142.6 19.33 
1957 801.1 153.7 19.19 
1958 713.2 134.0 18.79 
1959 787.1 146.7 18.63 
1960 797.2 140.4 17.61 
1961 850.0 128.7 15.15 
1962 867.4 119.6 12.64 
1963 915.8 107.2 11.70 
1964 954.4 113.9 11.93 
1965 c 1056.3 147.1 13.92 
1966 1201.9 196.3 16.;31 
1967 1351.9 225.6 16.69 
1968 1502.4 248.0 16.51 
1969 1527.1 254.6 16.67 
1970 1542.9 263.9 17.10 
Sources : Republic of South Africa - Bureau of Statistics and 
Department of Customs and Excise. for 1955-63 - South African 
Statistical Yearbook 1965 
for 1964 - South African Statistical Yearbook 1966. 
for 1965-66 - South African Statistics 1968. 
for 1967-69 - Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics 
for 1970 - Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics 
Third Column calculated. Rl = £0.585 
NOTES. 
(a) For the purpose of foreign trade statistics South 
Africa includes the Republic, South West Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Swaziland. 
(b) Africa includes Madagascar, Mauritius, and a number of 
other Indian and Atlantic Ocean islands. 
Notes (a) and (b) apply to all South African figures. 
(c) Up to 1964, merchandize includes goods grown, produced, 
or manufactured in South Africa. Re-exports of imported goods 
are included from 1965. 
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TABLE 2. 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS a TO AFRICA (in millions of Rand) 
Year Africa Increase Year 
1961 145.4 1966 
1962 133.5 -11.9 1967 
1963 121.0 -12.5 1968 
1964 129.8 8.9 1969 
1965 147.1 17.3 1970 
SOURCES: 
For 1961-64 - See Table 4 
For 1965-70 - See Table 1 
NOTE (a) Figures include re-exports. 
TABLE 3. 
Break-down of Exportsa to Africa 1955-65 
YEAR TOTAL FEDERATION( b) 
1955 128.1 96.5 
1956 142.6 108.2 
1957 153·7 114.6 
1958 134.0 96.8 
1959 146.7 105.2 
1960 140.4 104.3 
1961 128;.7 96.3 
1962 119.6 84.;6 
1963 107.2 75.1 
1964 113.9 81.0(c) 








































Sources: Republic of South Africa ~ Bureau of Statistics: South 
African Statistical Year Book 1965, and 1966 
Unofficial source for 1965 figures - State of South Africa - Year 
book 1970 (da Gama Publishers, Johannesburg) p.253 
NOTES: 
(a) Figures exclud.e re-exports. 
(b) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
(c) Total of constituent parts of the former 
Federation (Rhodesia : 51.1, Malawi: 0.8, 
and Zambia : 29.1) . 
(d) Figure not broken down. 
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TABLE 4. 
DETAILED BREAK-DOWN OF EXPORTS(a)TO AFRICA 1961-4 
IN RAND. 
1961 1962 1963 1964 
Africa 145,415,847 133,499,958 120,987,127 129,814,484 




Angola 771,890 1,197,338 1,716,601 2,153,061 
Mozambique 12 2071 2833 14 1323 2076 15 2370 2948 18 2286 2011 
Sub-Total 121,819,748 110,476,325 102,600,188 113,735,246 
Ascension 36,634 38,914 56,971 96,978 
Canary Is. 22,533 86,010 332,937 1,180,377 
Madeira 450 125 504 105,926 
Mauritius 3,723,488 4,311,070 3,658,667 4,326,584 
Re-Union 85,696 249,967 231,255 955,245 
St. Helena 123,533 100,455 146,495 134,775 
Seycelles 38,121 60,094 92,907 125,309 
Tristan da 
Cunha 23 1049 15 2601 10 2 204 36 1 247 
Sub-Total 4,053,504 4,862,236 4,529,940 6,961,441 
The Rest of 
Africa. 19,542,595 18,161,397 13,623,508 9,117,797 
(Kenya 7,720,273 5,853,618 n.a. n.a. 
Congo(b) 6,904,381 7,851,233 n.a. n.a. 
Uganda) 1,401,356 1,034,431 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Republic of South Africa - Department of Customs and Excise: 
South African Forei Trade Statistics for 1962 and 1964. 
Exports and re-exports added. together.) 
NOTES: (a) The figures include re-exports. 
(b) The Congo (Leopoldville), as it then was. 
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TABLE 5. ( ) 
RHODESIAN IMPORTS (In millions of Rhode a ). 
YEAR 
. 





























Sources: Rhodesia -·Central Statistical Office (Salisbury): 
Annual Statement of External Trade 1965 (for 1964 
and 65) and Monthly Digest of Statistics (total 1966-70) 
United Nations S/10229/ Add.2 (13/7/71): 
Fourth Re ort of the Committee 
of Securit Council Resolution 
NOTES: (a) 1 Rhode = 1 Rand (£0.585) 
(b) committee's figures given in U.S. dollars 
calculated in Rhode. 
(c) of South African imports over previous year. 




(in millions of Kwacha (a)) 
SOUTH AFRICA INCREASE(b) _£c) RHODESIA 
1964 156.4 32.4 20.72 61.7 
1965 210.7 41.4 9.0 19.65 71.1 
1966 246.1 58.5 17.1 23.77 46·4 
1967 306.4 72.2 13.7 23.56 32.2 
1968 325.2 76.1 3.9 23.40 22.6 
1969 311.8 69.9 --6.2 22.42 21.8 









Sources: Republic of Zambia - Central Statistical Office (Lusaka): 
Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
Columns 3, 4 and 6 calculated. 
NOTES: (a) 1 Kwacha = 1 Rand. 
(b) of South African imports over previous year. 
(c) South Africa as percentage of total 
(d) Rhodesia and South Africa taken together. 
TABLE 7 ON P.3].7. 
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TABLE 8. 
MOZAMBIQUE IMPORTS (in millions of escudos(a)). 































Sources: Portugal - Institute of National Statistics (Lisbon): 
Annual Statistics 1965-68 (for 1964-68) 
Province of Mozambique - Director of Statistical 
Services (Lourenco Ma~ques): Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics (for 1969 and 70) . . 
3rd and 4th Columns calculated. 
NOTES: (a) 1,000 Escudos = approx. R25 
(b) based on figures for 10 months. 
TABLE 9. 
ANGOLAN IMPORTS (in thousands of escudos(a)) 






































Sources: Portugal - Institute of National Statistics (Lisbon): 
Annual Statistics 1965-68 (for 1964-68) 
Province of Angola - Director of Statistical Services 
(Luanda): Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (for 1969 and 70). 
3rd and 4th columns calculated. 
NOTES: (a) 1,000 Escudos = approx. R25 
(b) based on figures for 10 months. 
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To calculate from the imports of the fiv~ countries 
treated above South Africa's exports to the remainder of Africa 
since 1964 presents a number of problems. The primary difficulty 
is to establish a basis for comparing the 1964 ~mport figures 
given in Tables 5-9 with those for South African exports in that 
year (Table 4). A glance at the Tables reveals the wide 
divergence between the two sets of figures. For this there is 
no one simple explanation. A complex of factors operates and not 
all in the same direction. The main factors can be identified 
as follows: 
(1) The South African figures are f.o.b. while those of 
the five importing countries are c.i.f •• 
(2) The South African figures include re-exports of 
imported goods that are not generally credited to South Africa 
as the country of origin by the importing country. 40 
(3) The South African figures include all exports from the 
Rand area while the five countries list imports from Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa separately. 
(4) Finally, it would appear that countries through which 
a considerable quantity of South African goods pass like Rhodesia 
and Mozambique, are on occasion wrongly identified in South 
African figures as the final destination of goods in transit. 
This at any rate seems the logical explanation why, on the one 
hand the Mozambique import figure for 1964 is lower 'than its 
South African e~uivalent while the Angolan import figure is 
higher although the technical basis on which the two Portuguese 
41' figures were calculated was exactly the same. 
I 
The last factor probably does not significantly alter 
over-all totals of five countries taken together, but the other 
three clearly do. The first factor deflates the South African 
figure compared to the foreign figure; the second and third 
inflate it. Given the number and complexity of the factors 
involved it should be clear that no technical operation is 
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possible that will simply convert for example Malawian figures 
for imports from South A~rica into figures for South African 
exports to Malawi. Nevertheless, attempts have been made along 
these lines. Gervasi 42 , for instance, tries to calculate South 
~frican exports to the rest of Africa just by correcting for the 
first factor. As a consequence he grossly over-estimates South 
African exports to Africa outside of Southern Africa. The in-
built bias of the method can be readily demonstrated by applying 
it to comparable figures for 1964 when the result can be cross-
checked against an actual break-down of South African exports to 
Africa. 43 
Instead of trying to adjust for each and every factor 
and to avoid pit-falls of the kind I have just described, I have 
adopted what is in essence a simpler method of adjustment. That 
is, I have calculated the ration between South African exports to 
the rest of Africa in 1964 44 and the differBnce between South 
Africa's total African exports and the total imports of Rhodesia, 
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola from South Africa in 1964. 45 
I have then used that ratio to work out estimates for South African 
.exports to the rest of Africa between 1965 and 1970. 
TABLE 10. 













Source: Calculated from Tables 4 - 9. 
(a) 














NOTES: (a) Africa excluding Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
and Angola, but including re-exports. 
(b) Figures 65-70 estimates. 
32.? 
The method used rests on two assumptions: (1) that the 
four factors I've mentioned above bear a roughly constant relation 
to the volume of trade and (2) that the imports of the five 
countries from South Africa formed the same proportion of South 
Africa's total African exports between 1965 and 1970 as in 1964. 
In practice, these assumptions need to be qualified. Firstly, 
there is evidence that re-exports of imported goods to Africa, have 
risen sharply out of proportion to total African exports.46 
Secondly, imports by the five countries of South African goods have 
also risen as a proportion of total African exports largely because 
of U.D.I.. As is clear on reflection, the method I've adopted 
therefore slightly over-estimates South African exports to the rest 
of Africa. 47 
Consequently, the stagnation of South African trade 
beyond Southern Africa which the estimates in Table 10 indicate is 
all the more striking. Exports have remained below even their 
absolute level in 1961 and 1962 and as a proportion of total exports 
to Africa have fallen from just over 17% in 1962 to approximately 
Ti% in 1970. Further, when the inclusion in the figures of South 
African trade with various Atlantic and Indian Ocean islands is 
taken into account, it is clear that outside of Southern Africa the 
Republic's exports to the continent proper have amounted to somewhat 
less than 1% of the c9untry's total imports for at least the last 
three years (1968-70). 48 Even the consevative assumption that 
South African exports to the islands have not risen above their 1964 
level of just below R7 million places an upper limit on South African 
exports to the continent beyond her immediate neighbours.of about 
Rl2.6 million. This is in fact considerably less than South African 
exports to just Kenya and the Congo in 1961 or 62. In marked 
contrast to these figures are reports of journalists of head-way by 
\ South African exporters in francophone West Africa. l'b is 
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inevitably difficult to assess the reliability of these essentially 
impressionistic accounts. However this much is clear : on the 
figures any expansion of trade in this area has not off-set the 
virtual loss of the Kenyan market 49after independence and a 
probable similar decline in Congolese imports from South Africa, 
at least after Tschombe's fall in 1965. In general, on the 
evidence available there is no justification for the view that a 
break-through in South Africa's trading relations with independent 
Africa has occurred as an adjunct to her outward-looking foreign 
policy. 
CONCLUSION. 
It may of course be objected firstly that the figures 
on which I have based my analysis are inadequate or secondly that 
I have over-looked the possibility of a sizeable export of South 
African goods to Africa through third parties. There is no complete 
answer to the first point, though the steps taken by South Africa 
to disguise the exact location of her exports to Africa is it seems 
to me a sufficient reason to rule out actual deceit in the official 
figures. Further, it is really incumbent on those who challenge 
this analysis to produce solid evidence that there are short-cbmings 
in the figures that necessitate a fresh approach. As to the second 
point, two factors in my mpinion militate strongly against this 
possibility. South Africa is a high cost economy and even without 
the intervention of a third party her ability to compete with Europe 
in many parts of Africa over a large range of commodities is 
questionable. I also question whether countries finding South 
African goods attractive would feel, with the decline of O.A.U. 
solidarity and militancy on the question of Southern Africa, any 
need to resort to this kind of expedient. At the very least one 
would expect any earlier inhibitions about direct trade as such 
with South Africa to have declined and to be reflected in increases 
in the most recent.figures. For this the figures offer no 
support whatsoever. 
Trade of course is not the only index of economic 
relations. Investment is another and for example in the context 
of American economic relations with Latin .America a very much more 
important one. Nevertheless in the case of South Africa I have 
seen little evidence to suggest that there has been a sizeable 
expansion of .South African capital outside of So1ithern Africa. On 
the contrary, far and away the most important investment abroad by 
South Africa has been in the Portuguese territories and particularly 
in.the .Cabora-Bassa project. However, a detailed study of South 
African investment in Africa is needed before any more definite 
conclusions can be made in this area, though I think a similar 
pattern to that of trade of an almost exclusive concentration in 
Southern Africa is indicated. 
But perhaps the main question my analysis begs is this: 
given the difficulty of establishing basic facts about South Africa's 
economic realtions with Africa, why is it so readily assumed by 
academics of often quite different political persuasions that South 
Africa's outward-looking policy is economically motivated? The 
answer lies I think in the confusion that has arisen, because of 
their rough coincidence in time, between the evolution of the 
outward-looking policy and a distinct though not wholly unrelated 
development, the coalescing of Southern Africa. Certainly, the 
consolidation of the white-ruled states of Southern Africa into a 
redoubt 50 has facilitated economic co-operation with South Africa 
within the whole area including the black-ruled enclaves (Botswana, 
Leso~ho, and Swaziland) and Malawi, as in fact the trade figures 
show. However it has not been the case that South Africa's outward-
looking policy has depended on this consolidali~n. Indeed, the 
~~­
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increased mependence of Rhodesia on South Africa as a result of 
U.D.I. has been very much more of an embat(clssment to South African 
policy-makers than a help, especially in their search for a political 
accomodation with Zambia. 
While considerable evidence 51can be amassed as to South 
Africa's economic ambitions in Southern Africa, the circumstances 
(U.D.I, the wars in Angola and Mozambique) opening the way to their 
at least partial fulfilment have not been of South Africa's making 
or in general politically to her advantage. In short, an element 
of disjunction exists between South Africa's political and her 
economic interests in Africa. That is, I am not arguing that South 
Africa has no economic ambitions outside of Southern Africa or that 
economic interest groups within South Africa have not played a part 
in promoting an expansionist foreign policy towards Africa. What I 
am saying is that, outside of Southern Africa at least, political 
objectives - the neutralization of African campaigns against 
apartheid through th U.N. and so on - enjoy a very much higher 
priority in the framing of the outward-looking policy than do any 
economic aims. 
Indeed, the estimates of South African exports to the rest 
of Africa in Table 10 themselves provide evidence of the inadequacy 
of wholly or largely economic explanations in accounting for South 
African diplomatic overtures to, for example West Africa. In this 
area, quite apart from political barriers, South African exporters 
face formidable European competition 52and trade with South Africa 
is not likely to prove to be much of an indicator of the success or 
failure of South African foreign policy. Finally, this appendix 
will have fulfilled its purpose if it has made clear both the need 
for more detailed study of specific issues arising out of South 
Africa's policy towards Africa and the need to bridge the gap between 
political and economic interpretations of that policy in a way that 
does not assume a simple identity between South Africa's politica153 
and economic interests. 
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R. Burrows: The Develotment of Southern Africa. 
(South African Institu e of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1945. 
The last full break-down was published in 1962. 
Calculated from Table 3 and therefore excluding re-exports 
of imported goods •. 
Inter-territorial trade, calculated by adding each territory's 
imports from its neighbours, was Rl million more than the 
areas imports from South Africa in 1964; over R.l million less 
than in 1965. Unfortunately there are no official figures of 
inter-territorial trade during Federation itself. (Source: 
Official Rhodesian, Malawian, and Zambian statistics). 
Calculated as above but using Malawian and Zambian figures 
of their exports to Rhodesia in place of Rhodesian import 
figures and U.N. estimate of Rhodesia's South African imports 
(see Table 5). 
See H.R. Reed's article: The Economic Links within Southern 
Africa in Africa South of the Congo. 
i.e. the fourth column in Table 3. 
Of the list in Table 4, only Mauritius is today a member of 
the Organization of African Unity (since her independence 
in 1968). . 
Committee established in pursuance of Security Council 
Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968. 
However, the actual details of the calculations are 
unfortunately not given. 
Replacing the restrictive agreement with the Federation 
in 1960. 
J.E. Spence: Republic.under Pressure (Oxford University 
Press, London 1965) p.79 n. 
Calculated from Table 6. 
Her imports first outstripped those of Rhodesia in 1966. 
See Table 7 below (Note that the Malawian Kwacha is 
wonth less than the Zambian.). 
R8.2 million as opposed to R7.6 million. 
The difference between South African exports including 
re-exports and imports. 
Molteno p.11. 
The export figure he has taken in.1965 does not include 
re-exports (in fact_ over R30 million); that in 1968 does. 
Consequently he exaggerates the increase in the trade 
















In 1964, South African imports from Africa beyond the 
five countries of Southern Africa exceeded exports 
(including re-exports) by R20.6 million. Calculated 
from South African Foreign Trade Statistics 1964. 
Under the agreement certain Malawian commodities (princi-
pally agricultural) enter South Africa either duty-free 
or at South Africa's most favoured nation tariff, while 
South Africa gains a wide preferential access to the 
Malawian market. 
For example, the loan to Malawi for a rail link to 
Nacala was tied to the use of South African steel. 
(See Molteno p. 10 and Africa Research Bulletin (London) 
-Economic Series - Vol 6 No. 11 col. 1529. 
Calculated from Table 7. 
This can be confirmed by examining a break-down of 
both sets of figures according to S.I.T.C. sections • 
. ' 
The same mechanism seems to operate in the case of 
Rhodesia and Malawi. 
See Gervasi p.96. 
The method is not in fact the only error in Gervasi's 
calculations. His figure for total Rhodesian imports 
is half the actual figure, which leads him to a further 
exaggeration of South African exports outside of Southern 
Africa. (He estimates that in 1968 Africa beyond Southern 
Africa imported ~85 million worth of goods). 
Rl6.08 million i.e. excluding the five countries in Southern 
Africa but including re-exports and the Atlantic and Indian 
Ocean islandil. 
The difference is R26.2 million. 
In the last years when a figure for re-exports to Africa 
is available, these show a large increase, from Rl5.9 
million in 1964 to R30.9 million in 1965. (See Tables 3 
and 4) 
The unofficial figure for South African ex~orts (excluding 
re-exports) to the rest of Africa in 1965 lsee Table 3) 
provides additional evidence that this is the case, However 
I have not corrected for either factor in order to .~allow 
for any possible margin of error in the other direction, 
for instance perhaps in the U.N. estimates of Rhodesian 
imports from South Africa. 
In other words, roughly the same proportion of total 
imports as in 1964. 
See Republic of Kenya: Statistical Abstract 1969. 
(Ministry of Economic Planning and Development) according 
to which Kenyan imports from South Africa had declined to 
virtually zero by 1965. 
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50. A term used by Vernon IVIacKay ir.i W.A. Hance. (ed.) 
Southern Africa and the United States. (Columbia 
University Press, New York and London 1968) 
51. With Dr. Verwoerd's call in 1964 for a common market 
in Southern Africa,a natural highlight. 
52. Not least because of the area's special relationship 
with the European Comm.on Market. 
53. Included under this general heading of political 
interests would be security, though a strong case can 
clearly be made that defence interest represent a further 
third dimension of South African policy. 
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